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Synopsis 
 
This dissertation examines the relationship between financial market intermediaries 
and information asymmetry. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 re-examines issues raised in the 
literature, but extends this research by using unique datasets not previously available 
to researchers. Overall, the results show that (i) market intermediaries help reduce 
information asymmetry in upstairs markets by filtering out information-motivated 
trades, (ii) market intermediaries produce information which is valuable to clients 
who are able to trade ahead of the market, and iii) market intermediaries are 
heterogeneously informed, and are therefore affected differently by a change in 
market structure. 
 
The first issue examined is the role of brokers in the upstairs market. The literature 
argues that upstairs facilities are valuable to traders because they offer taps into 
unexpressed liquidity, and for their ability to filter out informed traders. The 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX, a subsidiary of the Australian Securities Exchange) 
provides a unique setting to examine upstairs trades in the absence of ‘fairness’ rules, 
which allows upstairs trades to execute at greatly varied prices. When brokers have 
the freedom to trade at any negotiated price, they will be more willing to trade with 
the informed, provided they are sufficiently compensated for the risk they take on. 
This is in direct contrast to other studies, which only sample upstairs trades that occur 
close to the best spread.  
 
Consistent with the literature, results indicate that upstairs markets are typically used 
when liquidity in the downstairs market is lacking, or when these costs are high. 
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Upstairs markets are especially useful for trades of greater complexity, that is, larger 
trades and trades in smaller stocks, which are often difficult to arrange in the 
downstairs limit order book. These findings are generally consistent with the widely 
held belief that upstairs markets allow for the execution of trades that would 
otherwise not have occurred. The results show that in the absence of ‘fairness’ rules a 
large number of upstairs trades do occur outside of the best downstairs spread. 
However, trades that are more likely to be informed receive poorer execution costs 
than those less likely to be informed. This provides evidence that upstairs brokers may 
use other information in addition to trader reputation (e.g. market conditions) to 
determine the information content of trades.  
 
The second issue examined relates to the complex relationship between equity 
analysts and information asymmetry. The literature suggests that analysts help to 
reduce information asymmetry (and improve price efficiency) by bringing privately 
held information in the hands of management to the market, and through their 
superior ability in disseminating and analysing publicly available information. This 
study re-examines the role of equity analysts in information asymmetry by 
differentiating the information asymmetry between investors and the management 
(depth), and information asymmetry between shareholders (breadth).  
 
Results suggest the presence of leakages in analyst recommendations, which are 
valuable to those that trade on them. Results also show that the clients of larger 
brokerage houses tend to be more sophisticated. That is, they make use of reports 
from a greater number of sources, possibly because they are better endowed and can 
afford to do so. Therefore even in the absence of leakages, certain clients have greater 
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access to analyst reports. These results shed light on the complexity of the relationship 
between analysts and information asymmetry. While analysts may excel at bringing 
privately held information to the market, its distribution is unlikely to be equal. Thus, 
there is a likely trade-off in the information asymmetry between investors and the 
management (depth), and information asymmetry between shareholders (breadth). 
 
The third issue examined relates to the effect of anonymous trading, using a unique 
dataset from the ASX which includes broker identifiers. While recent literature 
suggests that anonymity increases liquidity, these studies are conducted on a market-
wide basis, despite brokers being the natural unit of analysis. This study aims to 
disentangle from a pool of averages the effect of anonymity on heterogeneously 
informed brokers.  
 
While the results suggest that market execution costs decreases on average, the 
benefit of anonymity is skewed towards the large and reputable full-service brokers, 
who are more likely to be informed. In particular, results suggest that anonymity 
reduces the market’s ability to infer information from trades. This results in a larger 
price reversal for the trades of large full-service brokers. However, the trades of the 
less informed brokers face a case of ‘mistaken identity’, and lose their ability to 
reduce price impact by signalling their identity to the market. Moreover, results 
suggest that the market share of large full-service brokers increases, with their trades 
having a greater contribution to price discovery. Overall, results highlight the 
complexity of the relationship between anonymity and market quality.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines the relationship between financial market intermediaries, 
and the cost of information asymmetry in equity markets. Using unique datasets from 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX, a subsidiary of the Australian Securities 
Exchange), this dissertation sheds light on issues raised in the literature, but with 
greater microscopy and accuracy than what was previously possible.  
 
A majority of the classical works on markets are conducted under the assumption that 
participants have equal access to information. When optimal market conditions break 
down in classical economics, markets behave less effectively, reducing total welfare 
to their participants. In extreme cases, information asymmetry may lead to a 
breakdown of markets. For example, Akerlof (1970) examines the market for second-
hand cars, in which buyers are able to identify neither the quality nor the reputation of 
the sellers. Under these conditions, car dealers take advantage of their information, 
while potential buyers, aware of the dealers’ incentives, assume the worst. This leads 
to a market breakdown, and turns second-hand car markets into markets for ‘lemons’. 
 
Market intermediaries play no role in a perfect market. For example, under a 
Walrasian Auction (which is said to have been inspired by the Paris Bourse), all 
economic agents calculate their demand at every possible price. In a process of 
tâtonnement, the markets are cleared, with no excess demand or supply. The existence 
of market intermediaries suggests that market imperfections exist in some form. In an 
often cited example, real estate agents exist, presumably, because the search cost for 
real estate is non-zero. When market intermediaries are able to arrange property 
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transactions at a lower cost, overall welfare is increased, even if these intermediaries 
charge some form of economic rent.  
 
The economic literature presents two thoughts on why market intermediaries exist in 
equities markets, both of which are related to the presence of market imperfections. 
The first is that market intermediaries reduce liquidity search costs and transaction 
costs, when counterparties are not immediately available to trade. For example, full-
service brokers are thought to offer superior execution for difficult trades (in 
comparison to discount brokers), especially when the cost of immediacy is likely to be 
high. By working the order over time, these market intermediaries reduce the impact 
of their trades on market prices by trading when liquidity becomes available. 
Grossman (1992) shows that upstairs brokers are repositories for unexpressed trading 
interests. These brokers leverage their relationship with their clients, which allows 
them to find latent liquidity at lower costs.  
 
The second is that market intermediaries have access to information, or produce 
information at lower costs. Market makers, for example, are thought to mitigate 
adverse selection costs by differentiating informed and uninformed traders. These 
market intermediaries use information on trader reputation (e.g. Seppi, 1990; and 
Benveniste, Marcus and Wilhelm, 1992), and information on trade characteristics 
(e.g. Easley and O’Hara, 1987, 1992), to determine the likelihood of informed trading. 
Likewise, equity analysts are thought to reduce information asymmetry by bringing 
privately held information in the hands of management to the market, and through 
their superior ability in disseminating and analysing publicly available information. 
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The separation of these two roles is difficult, as market intermediaries such as brokers 
offer a multitude of services, some of which are related to information production 
(e.g. equity research), and others to liquidity provision and execution services (e.g. 
full-service broking, upstairs facilitation). While this dissertation covers both areas, its 
predominant focus is on the relationship between market intermediaries and 
information asymmetry. This dissertation makes use of a proprietary dataset from the 
ASX that displays the identity of brokers in each transaction. By differentiating the 
identities of different market intermediaries, this dissertation re-examines the issues 
surrounding market intermediaries and information asymmetry, but with greater detail 
than what was previously possible. 
 
1.1 Upstairs Markets, Liquidity Provision, and Filtration of Informed 
Trades 
 
The upstairs market is an over-the-counter network of brokers and institutional traders 
who negotiate large block trades of listed securities outside the normal trading venue 
of an exchange. Broker often acts as the intermediary to both buyers and sellers, but 
will take a position themselves when interest is lacking. On the ASX, these upstairs 
trades are called ‘block special crossings’, which have to exceed a trade value of $1 
million.  
 
There are two main schools of thought on why upstairs markets exist. Seppi (1990) 
argues that upstairs brokers have superior ability in differentiating between informed 
and uninformed traders through reputation certification, and are therefore able to offer 
uninformed traders lower costs. Grossman (1992) argues that upstairs brokers are 
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repositories for “unexpressed” latent demand, commonly called ‘dark pools’, 
providing access to greater liquidity and reducing transaction costs. The upstairs 
market is therefore a facility typically used by liquidity-motivated investors to trade 
large parcels of shares. While evidence provided in many studies appears consistent 
with both theories, a relatively recent study by Fong, Madhavan and Swan (2004) 
does not find evidence consistent with information filtering on the ASX.  
 
The aim of Chapter 5 is threefold. The first aim is an examination of liquidity 
conditions around upstairs trades to test the commonly held notion that upstairs 
markets facilitate trades that are difficult to arrange in the downstairs market. The 
second goal is to examine ASX’s lack of an upstairs pricing rule, and its effect on 
information filtering. The third aim is related to the first two, and seeks to model a 
trader’s choice between the upstairs and downstairs market.  
 
Numerous studies examine the execution costs of upstairs and downstairs trades. 
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) examine the execution costs in upstairs and downstairs 
markets for Dow Jones stocks. While they find significantly better execution costs for 
large trades in upstairs markets, they argue that these benefits are economically small. 
They suggest that their results could be a product of floor traders and specialists 
offering liquidity in a similar manner to brokers in the upstairs markets. Additionally, 
they find that upstairs markets tend to be used by those who have a “reputation” for 
being uninformed; because they are reluctant to submit large limit orders in fear of 
offering free options to the market.  
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Smith, Turnbull and White (2001) examine upstairs block trades on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange. Consistent with Grossman (1992)’s predictions, they find that upstairs 
markets are typically used for small and less liquid stocks, or when the downstairs 
order book is thin. Consistent with Seppi (1990)’s filtering hypothesis, Smith, 
Turnbull and White (2001) find that information-motivated trades are more likely to 
be routed downstairs, while those that carry no information are handled upstairs.  
 
Booth, Lin, Martikainen and Tse (2002) examine the price impact of upstairs trades 
on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. They find a smaller permanent price impact in 
upstairs trades, suggesting a lower level of information asymmetry in these trades. 
However, upstairs trades appear to have a higher temporary price impact, suggesting 
upstairs broker-dealers require a premium to cover the large liquidity risk. Overall 
they find lower total costs in upstairs markets when compared with downstairs 
markets. 
  
Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) examine the execution costs of upstairs 
trades, in comparison with their costs if they are instead routed to the downstairs limit 
order book. On average, they find that upstairs execution costs are only 35% as large 
as downstairs costs. Consistent with Grossman (1992), they find that upstairs markets 
tend to be use when downstairs liquidity is lacking, which is especially valuable for 
large trades, and those in small and illiquid stocks. Consistent with Seppi (1990), they 
find significantly lower permanent price impact in the upstairs market in comparison 
to the downstairs market, suggesting that brokers actively filter out informed trades.  
Despite empirical findings that are consistent with Seppi (1990)’s predictions on 
broker filtering, Fong, Madhavan and Swan (2004) find contrary evidence for the 
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ASX. They find that execution costs of upstairs and downstairs trades are similar, and 
carry similar information content. This suggests that informed traders participate in 
both market fragments equally, with no reputational filtering.  
 
The ASX is an especially useful venue for a reputational filtering study, as upstairs 
trade prices are not restricted. Most markets have some form of ‘fairness’ rule to 
determine the price range in which upstairs trades can be executed. For example, on 
the NYSE, examined by Keim and Madhavan (1996) and Madhavan and Cheng 
(1997), upstairs trades are typically executed within the spread found in the 
downstairs market. While it is possible under NYSE rule 127 to execute outside of the 
spread, orders must first be exposed downstairs to a possible price improvement, 
which is costly, and consequently rare1. 
 
 Likewise, the Toronto Stock Exchange (examined by Smith, Turnbull and White, 
2001) also requires upstairs trades to be executed within the best downstairs spread. 
On the Paris Bourse (examined by Bessembinder and Venkataranman, 2004), upstairs 
trades are also typically executed within the best downstairs spread, with the 
exception of eligible active stocks, which have to be executed within the hypothetical 
VWAP of the limit order book, if it is instead routed downstairs. On the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange, upstairs trades must be executed at the ‘best’ price. While this rule 
isn’t explicit, Booth, Lin, Martikainen and Tse (2002) believe this to be either within 
the best spread, or the VWAP when the best spread isn’t possible.  
 
                                                 
1 Hasbrouck, Sofianos and Sosebee (1993) estimate that less than 0.5% of all NYSE volume occurs as 
upstairs trades outside of the best downstairs spread. 
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As Seppi (1990) proposes, brokers consistently filter out information-motivated 
traders from upstairs markets. However, these ‘fairness’ rules effectively censor cases 
in which the traders are deemed to be informed by the brokers. This emanates from 
the restrictive price range in which upstairs trades are executed. Brokers will therefore 
either accept trades, or reject them if the cost in information asymmetry exceeds the 
benefits. This makes an examination of their behaviour in the presence of 
information-motivated traders difficult.  
 
Chapter 5 overcomes this hurdle by making use of a unique feature on ASX. No 
‘fairness’ rules exist on the ASX and upstairs trades can be executed at any agreed 
price. Trades perceived as being more informed are therefore not immediately 
discarded, as is the case of markets with more restrictive rules. This allows for greater 
flexibility in studying upstairs broker behaviour in the presence of trades that are 
perceived as more informed. 
 
1.2 Unequal Access to Analyst Research 
 
Managers are in a privileged position when it comes to judging the true value of a 
firm. When information asymmetry of this nature is coupled with poor governance 
and disclosure, shareholders lose. In the case of Enron, tens of billions of dollars were 
wiped in shareholder value, while the management, the keepers of their fraudulent 
accounting practices, gained through insider trading. Along with similar cases, the 
near bankruptcy of the energy giant and the downfall of Arthur Anderson reshaped 
financial and accounting practices. Equity analysts are widely considered to be a 
market power that counteracts these negative forces.  
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Easley and O’Hara (2004) argue that analyst coverage is complementary to 
accounting standards, disclosure policies, and market microstructure in minimising 
the cost of capital. This notion is supported by other studies. Botosan (1997) finds that 
the relationship between company disclosure and the cost of equity capital is strong, 
but only in stocks without a strong analyst following. In stocks that already have a 
strong analyst following, additional disclosure does not appear to reduce the cost of 
capital. This suggests that analyst coverage may be a close substitute, or at least 
complementary to voluntary disclosure. Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) find a higher 
valuation for firms that choose to cross-list in the US by issuing ADRs. They attribute 
this largely to analyst coverage, which improves the information environment of the 
stock, thereby reducing the cost of capital. 
 
Chapter 6 seeks to clarify the complex relationship between equity analysts and 
information asymmetry by examining the level of investor access to analyst reports. 
The existing literature suggests that analysts help to reduce information asymmetry 
(and improve price efficiency) by bringing privately held information in the hands of 
management to the market, and through their superior ability in analysing and 
disseminating publicly available information. While a consensus between the two 
views is still far away, numerous papers suggest that analysts have some information 
that is outside of the public domain.2  
 
                                                 
2 For example, by analysing the content of analyst reports and company annual reports, Rogers and 
Grant (1997) find that over half of the financial and operating data cited in analyst reports are not found 
in company reports. While papers that show evidence against analysts having private information are 
fewer in number, they do exist.  For example, Easley, O’Hara and Paperman (1998) find that analyst 
following does not affect the probability for private information events. Consequently, they conclude 
that analysts do not create private information. 
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Frankel and Lee (2004) find that an increase in analyst following lowers information 
asymmetry by reducing the frequency and profitability of insider purchases. 
Roulstone (2003) finds a negative relationship between the number of analysts 
covering a stock and the adverse selection component of its bid-ask spread. Bowen, 
Davis and Matsumoto (2002) find that analysts who had access to conference calls 
with management provided more accurate forecasts, increasing the amount of 
information available on the firm.  
 
Gomes, Gorton and Madureira (2007) examine the effect of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg FD) on the cost of capital. They discover an increase in the cost of 
capital in small stocks, which coincided with a reduction in analyst coverage. It is 
argued that Reg FD increases the cost for analysts to obtain private information from 
these small firms, thereby increasing information asymmetry and the cost of capital. 
Bowen, Chen and Cheng (2008) find lower SEO underpricing (implying lower 
information asymmetry) in stocks with higher analyst following. They find even 
lower underpricing when analyst coverage is provided by the lead underwriter. This is 
attributed to the underwriter’s ability in obtaining information that would otherwise 
remain private, thereby reducing information asymmetry. 
 
At the fundamental level, information asymmetry refers to one party having more or 
superior information to others. While the extant literature overwhelmingly suggests 
that equity analysis reduces a company’s cost of capital, insufficient distinction is 
made with asymmetry between investor and the management, and asymmetry 
between investor groups. With regard to equity analysis, if the distribution of analyst 
reports is unequal, one cannot conclude that information asymmetry has decreased. 
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When a subset of clients receive more information, or information in a more timely 
manner, asymmetry between management and the shareholders as a group may 
reduce, but asymmetry between different shareholders may actually increase.  
 
Confessions of Wall Street Analyst, an exposé by Dan Reingold on the analyst 
industry during the tech boom, highlights some of the issues that equity analysts face 
when bringing information to the market. The act of passing analyst information on to 
privileged clients prior to its public release is of particular interest, allowing these 
clients to trade ahead of the market.  Leakages in analyst reports are often exacerbated 
by the regular breach of Chinese walls between the equity analysis and investment 
banking arms of the brokerage houses.  
 
On 28 May, 2003, the NASD (now FINRA) charged Phua Young, a former analyst at 
Merrill, with giving advanced notices of rating changes to selected institutional 
clients, along with other misconducts.3 Such incidents, however, are not isolated to 
the US. On 20 March, 2007, the UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) fined an 
analyst for market misconduct while employed at Citigroup. 4  Similarly, the 
misconduct was in relation to the selective disclosure of a stock recommendation to 
four of his clients prior to its public release.  
 
As rankings in Institutional Investor’s All-American Research Team are based on the 
subjective opinions of buy-side firms, leaking analyst reports to favoured clients 
provides the potential for more favourable reviews in rankings. Since analyst 
                                                 
3 “NASD Charges Former Merrill Lynch Managing Director with Issuing Misleading Research, 
Selectively Disclosing Material Non-Public Information and Improper Gift Giving to Tyco’s CEO”, 
available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2003/P002906. 
4 “FSA fines analyst for market misconduct”, available 
at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2007/036.shtml. 
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remuneration is closely linked with their perceived quality (as judged by rankings, for 
example), a strong incentive therefore exists to establish and maintain a loyal client 
base through information leakage. From the brokerage firm’s perspective, leakages to 
favoured clients will increase the likelihood of future trading business. There is 
therefore a natural tendency to encourage (or disregard the presence) of such 
activities. 5  This leads to an increase in information asymmetry in stocks where 
leakages occur regularly, and represents a breach of insider trading laws if the reports 
make use of material non-public information. However, in the absence of superior 
data or research methods, a discussion on the likelihood or extent of insider trading in 
analyst reports is extremely dangerous, and is therefore omitted. 
 
Chapter 6 seeks to clarify the relationship between equity analysts and information 
asymmetry by examining the level of investor access to analyst reports. While 
undertaking the analysis, this chapter keeps in mind the differences between Merton’s 
(1987) depth and breadth in information asymmetry. Namely, Chapter 6 differentiates 
the information asymmetry between investors and the management (depth) from 
information asymmetry between shareholders (breadth). By focusing exclusively on 
the asymmetry between shareholders, this chapter seeks to show that: 
 
1) Some investors have early access to valuable analysts’ reports that are 
selectively disclosed to them (leakages); and  
2) More sophisticated investors make greater use of analyst reports, even in the 
absence of leakages. 
 
                                                 
5 According to Reingold and Reingold (2006), such activities were quite prevalent during the tech 
boom of the later 1990s. 
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An impediment to research in this area is the lack of comprehensive data at the 
investment firm level. As the market buy volume will by definition be equal to the 
market sell volume, aggregated data is inappropriate for the task at hand. A key task is 
to isolate the investment firm providing the research report and examine any abnormal 
order flow prior to the report’s release.  
 
Chapter 6 overcomes this problem with a unique dataset provided by the ASX that 
documents the buying and selling broker for each transaction occurring between 1996 
and 2008.  To the best of my knowledge, the only other studies that examine the 
financial benefits in obtaining a research report early are Kim, Lin, and Slovin (1997), 
and Green (2006). The focus of these studies, however, is on the timing difference 
between the official release of an analyst report, and when that information is picked 
up by the rest of the market through word of mouth, or through the mass media. 
Chapter 6 represents an investigation into leakages in analyst reports prior to the 
official release, and therefore differs significantly from these studies.   
 
1.3 Anonymity and Heterogeneously Informed Brokers 
 
Broker identifiers originated in floor-traded markets where, given the nature of the 
business, remaining anonymous is virtually impossible. As floor-traded markets 
around the world head towards automation, broker identifiers are quickly 
disappearing. Broker IDs, or rather the removal of them has been a game of follow the 
leader for exchanges around the world. With the exception of the Korean market, 
which introduced broker identifiers, stock exchanges have been increasing anonymity, 
a move which is often linked to the decision of other markets.  
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The ASX is no exception followed suit by removing broker IDs on 28 November, 
2005. While broker IDs naturally affect the execution ability of brokers, the extant 
empirical literature focuses predominantly on market-wide effects (e.g. bid-ask 
spreads), and finds that markets improve on average. This does not necessarily imply, 
however, that anonymity is Pareto-efficient, especially when a particular group of 
brokers benefit at the expense of others. Chapter 7 seeks to fill the literature gap by 
examining the effects of anonymity on brokers who are heterogeneously informed. 
 
Contrasting predictions are made in the literature about the effects of transparency and 
opacity on the liquidity of markets. A significant portion of the literature supports the 
belief that transparency improves markets. Pagano and Roell (1996) argue that 
transparency reduces the level of information asymmetry for uninformed investors, 
thereby reducing transaction costs. Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) discuss the 
implications for uninformed traders who pre-announce the size of their orders 
(sunshine trading). This reduces the level of information asymmetry, and 
consequently the transaction costs for those who are able to pre-announce. Seppi 
(1990) argues that upstairs brokers are better equipped at differentiating the identity of 
informed and uninformed traders. This allows liquidity-motivated traders to execute 
their block trades at lower prices in the upstairs market. These predictions appear 
consistent with the findings of Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) and Bessembinder, 
Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006), who find lower execution costs when markets 
improve their dissemination of trade information.  
 
However, Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) make opposite predictions regarding 
transparency and transaction costs. They argue that opaque markets increase the 
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incentives for market makers to compete for order flow, and hence reduce the size of 
the bid-ask spread. Results obtained from their laboratory experiment appear to 
support these arguments. Foucault, Moinas and Theissen (2007) make two distinct 
predictions regarding anonymity (that is transparency regarding the identity of the 
trader), depending on the participation rate of informed traders. When this 
participation rate is low, a switch to the anonymous regime increases the 
aggressiveness of limit orders placed by the uninformed, who would otherwise abstain 
from action if markets are transparent, thereby reducing the size of the bid-ask spread. 
However, when the participation rate of informed traders is high, the opposite 
prediction is made. Using data from the Paris Bourse, Foucault, Moinas and Theissen 
(2007) find lower spreads for the anonymous regime.  
 
Comerton-Forde, Frino and Mollica (2005) extend the work of Foucault, Moinas and 
Theissen (2007) to include markets in Paris, Tokyo, and Korea (which began showing 
broker IDs as opposed to removing them). Consistent with Foucault, Moinas and 
Theissen (2007), liquidity increases with anonymity and decreases with transparency. 
Comerton-Forde and Tang (2008) examine market quality of the ASX after switching 
to an anonymous regime. They find lower spreads and greater depth in anonymous 
markets, but only for the larger and more liquid stocks. Frino, Gerace and Lepone 
(2008) confirm these findings outside of equity markets by examining the removal of 
broker mnemonics on the Sydney Futures Exchange. 
 
While exchanges have been quick to unite in anonymity on the grounds of greater 
market quality, a number of investors raised concerns regarding the removal of broker 
 28 
IDs on the ASX, citing a competitive disadvantage in their absence.6 Similar concerns 
are conveyed in the ASX Market Reform Consultation paper, where a majority of 
fund managers preferred more transparency over less. These concerns are have some 
validity, as the removal of broker IDs is likely to affect some brokers more than 
others. The recent empirical literature, however, focuses predominantly on the 
market-wide effects of anonymity, citing improved market quality indicators such as 
lower bid-ask spreads. However, this is a pool of averages that ignores the effects of 
anonymity on different market participants, and does not necessarily imply that a 
switch to anonymity is Pareto-dominant.  
 
Chapter 7 aims at disentangling from a pool of averages the effect of anonymity on 
heterogeneously informed brokers. Brokers are the natural unit of analysis for broker 
IDs because they are the only ones that have legal access to them 7 . At the 
fundamental level, broker IDs affect the ability of brokers to work their order flow. If 
information asymmetry exists between brokers, then one would expect anonymity to 
have a greater effect on those with greater information.  
 
Due to constraints on the availability of broker-level data, the extant empirical 
literature is limited to market quality indicators such as the bid-ask spread. This 
chapter makes use of a unique dataset made available from the ASX, which includes 
the identities of brokers in every trade. This allows Chapter 7 to circumnavigate the 
pool of market quality averages, and discern the identity of the winners and losers in 
the anonymity game, and the mechanisms at work. As a consequence of the approach 
used, this chapter is the first to examine the execution ability of brokers around 
                                                 
6 “Blackout that caused an identity crisis”, The Australian, February 17, 2007. 
7 The SEATS Access Agreement prohibits the release of Broker ID information to any persons other 
than an ASX trading participant. 
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changes in anonymity, and possibly the first to examine broker execution ability in 
general.  
 
1.4 Summary 
 
The three studies in this dissertation re-examine the relationship between market 
intermediaries and information asymmetry from an alternative angle. The current 
chapter outlines the issues surrounding this complex relationship, and provides the 
motivation for the analyses.   
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature from related topics, which includes insider trading (as a form of informed 
trading), market transparency and its effects on adverse selection, the perceived role 
of equity analyst reports, and alternative trading venues and their roles in liquidity 
provision and information asymmetry. Chapter 3 documents the institutional details, 
and specifically reviews the ASX market structure, available block-trading facilities, 
and its information dissemination process. Based on the literature review and 
institutional details, Chapter 4 develops the hypotheses to be tested by the current 
dissertation. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 provide the analyses in the topics previously 
mentioned, while Chapter 8 summarises these findings and indicates potential 
avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This chapter reviews some of the results presented in the economic literature, both 
theoretical and empirical, on the relationship between equity market intermediaries, 
market microstructure, and information asymmetry. Specifically, this dissertation 
examines four particular areas of relevance: 
 
1) Insider trading (as a form of informed trading) and market quality 
2) Transparency, market quality, and the role of market intermediaries 
3) Financial analysts and information asymmetry 
4) Alternative trading venues 
 
Insider trading has long been a contentious topic in economics. At one level, 
disagreements exist on the costs and benefits of insider trading. Consequently, some 
academics argue for the legalisation of insider trading, citing overall welfare 
improvements. There are also disagreements on the optimal form of insider trading 
regulation, and its effectiveness. Empirical studies on insider trading restrictions 
further highlight the difference between legislation and actual enforcement and 
prosecution of those that conduct illegal insider trading.  
 
Market transparency is an optimal market design issue with implications for market 
quality. Transparency is the quality and quantity of information received by market 
participants on the market’s activities. This includes the prices and volumes of orders 
and trades, but may also include information on the identity of market participants. It 
is a widely held belief in economics that market imperfections (one of them being a 
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lack of market transparency), reduces the efficiency and quality of markets. Indeed, a 
majority of the classical works on markets are conducted under the assumption that 
participants have equal access to information. When these optimal conditions break 
down, markets behave less effectively, reducing total welfare to its participants. This 
is evident in Akerlof’s seminal work on markets for second-hand cars, where a lack of 
information relating to the quality of goods results in complete market failure. 
However, the recent theoretical and empirical literature finds startling results 
contradictory to these widely held beliefs. In particular, these studies argue that 
anonymity (opacity of participant identities) increases the incentives for less informed 
participants to trade, and therefore improves overall market liquidity.  
 
Trading venues outside of the main markets are commonly referred to as alternative 
trading venues (or alternative trading systems/platforms). These platforms trade 
securities identical to those concurrently traded on main markets, but have different 
market structures. The literature is divided on the likely effects of these alternative 
venues on main markets. While consolidated markets naturally provide liquidity 
externalities, numerous studies argue that fragmented markets foster price and 
liquidity competition, improving overall welfare. Upstairs markets are one of these 
alternative trading venues that capture a significant portion of the total trading 
activity. The literature argues that upstairs facilities are repositories for unexpressed 
trading interests, and provide filtration of informed trades. While both theories 
suggest lower trading costs in upstairs markets, the latter implies that informed trades 
are routed downstairs, increasing the level of information asymmetry.  
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These four areas are discussed in the following sections. The remainder of this chapter 
is organised as follows. Section 2.1 reviews the literature on insider trading as a form 
of informed trading, while Section 2.2 examines transparency as an issue of optimal 
market design. Of particular interest is the level of transparency on the identity of 
market participants, and its effects on market quality. Section 2.3 reviews some of the 
literature on equity analysts, and their perceived role in the information environment 
of financial markets. Section 2.4 evaluates the literature on alternative trading venues, 
and their effects on primary markets. The role of brokers in upstairs markets is also 
examined. 
 
2.1 Insider Trading 
 
Insider trading, being a special case of informed trading, occurs when those with 
access to privileged non-public information trade. A number of studies show that 
insiders earn greater returns from their trades, or their trades have high predictive 
value on future prices. Jaffe (1974a) investigates the performance of insider trades 
published by the US SEC in the Official Summary of Insider Trading. A random 
sample of trading months is drawn from the 200 largest firms between 1962 and 1968, 
some of which have insider trading. While insiders do have higher returns, transaction 
costs account for about 40% of their gross profits. Profits net of transaction costs are 
only significant for the ‘intensive trading’ sample, where different insiders trade in the 
same direction. These results represent a puzzle, as outside traders with access to the 
Official Summary are able to replicate the strategies of the insiders, and therefore earn 
similar returns. This suggests that markets are inefficient and do not make full use of 
published insider trades. Rozeff and Zaman (1988) show that this perceived 
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inefficiency is driven (at least in part) by the size and earnings/price ratio effects. 
When they control for these two effects, the size of insider profits drop by half.  
 
Seyhun (1988) examines the extent to which insiders are informed by examining 
60,000 insider trades between Jan 1975 and Oct 1981. They find that, in aggregate, 
trades by insiders predict future price movements in the market.  Insiders increase 
aggregate purchases (sales) prior to an increase (decrease) in market-wide 
performance, with aggregate purchases (sales) falling after this market rise (fall). It is 
concluded that insiders fare poorly in distinguishing between firm-specific and 
systematic factors, and respond to some economy-wide factors as if they were firm-
specific. Seyhun (1992b) finds that aggregate insider trading predicts up to 60% of the 
variation in aggregate stock returns, one year ahead of time. This is attributed to the 
insider’s ability in predicting changes in business conditions and movements away 
from fundamentals. 
 
2.1.1 Insider Trading Around Information Events 
 
The literature also examines the performance of insiders in various situations, but in 
particular when information asymmetry is likely to be high. One source of 
information asymmetry arises when companies issue announcements. Keown and 
Pinkerton (1981) investigate the price run-up prior to merger announcements from 
194 firms from NYSE, AMEX and OTC traded stocks. They find that 79% of firms 
have higher trading volume one week prior to the announcement (vs. benchmark 
volume), with the run-up accounting for approximately half of the total price 
movement (pre- and post-announcement). With this, they conclude that insider trading 
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exists in merger announcements, and those that trade in the pre-announcement period 
earn abnormal returns. To the extent that speculation exists before takeover 
announcements, announcement dates represent a poor choice for the true ‘event day’. 
For example, Aitken and Czernkowski (1992) show that unexpected returns prior to 
takeover announcements are reduced by one third when one controls for the presence 
of media reports. Likewise, Murray (1994) observes that in the absence of media 
speculation, no price run-ups exist prior to takeover announcements. However, 
Meulbroek (1992) finds that almost half of pre-announcement price run-ups occur on 
days with legal insider trading.  
 
Similar results are also documented in other types of announcements. Penman (1982) 
shows, using the Official Summary of Insider Trading, that insiders trade ahead of 
annual earnings forecasts, and these earn insiders abnormal returns. Cheng and Lo 
(2006) investigate insider gains associated with a delay in trading. Using voluntary 
disclosure announcements between 1995 and 2002, they show that managers delay 
their purchases (sales) until the release of bad (good) news.  
 
Other studies examine firm-specific attributes that drive insiders to trade. Aboody and 
Lev (2000) investigate the relationship between research and development (R&D) 
expenditure and the likelihood of insider trading. The cost of analysing R&D 
information for outsiders is likely to be higher than other types of information, as it 
requires from the outsider some form of technical understanding of what is being 
researched and developed. They find that gains to insider trading are substantially 
larger in R&D-intensive firms in comparison to firms without R&D. Insiders also 
appear to trade ahead of planned changes in R&D expenditure. Aboody, Hughes and 
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Liu (2005) examine insider trading profits when firms differ in their ‘earnings 
quality’. They use two measures: an estimate of abnormal accruals based on Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1995), and the extent to which working capital accruals 
eventuate into cash flow, based on Dechow and Dichev (2002). They find larger 
insider profits when firms have greater exposure to ‘earnings quality’ issues.  
 
Seyhun (1990) shows that insiders are active traders around market-wide information 
events. Using the US market crash of 1987, they find large purchases from insiders 
following the crash, with the worst affected stocks being the ones most bought. A year 
following the crash, stocks purchased by the insiders experience large returns. These 
results suggest that insiders are better equipped at analysing the effects of market-
wide shocks on the performance of their own stocks.  
 
2.1.2 The Effect of Insider Trading 
 
The literature identifies three areas in which insider trading affects equity markets, 
namely, its effect on price efficiency, on the allocative efficiency of capital, and the 
effects on firm value. A summary of the findings are examined in turn. 
 
Price Efficiency 
Using takeover announcements between 1980 and 1989, Meulbroek (1992) finds that 
the trades of insiders prior to official announcements are quickly detected by the 
market and impounded into prices. Abnormal returns on days of insider trading 
amount to 3%, and over half of the pre-announcement price run-up occurs on days 
where insiders participate. Therefore, it is argued that allowing insider trading may 
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lead to more efficient prices. Modelling the effects of insider trading, Leland (1992) 
concludes that prices are more informative when no restrictions are placed upon 
insiders trading on their privileged information. Fishman and Hagerty (1992), 
however, show that insider trading can in certain circumstances lead to less efficient 
prices. They argue that this is influenced by two outcomes of insider trading: one 
involving a reduction in the incentives for outsiders to trade and acquire information, 
and another involving a larger skewness in the distribution of information.  
 
Allocative Efficiency of Capital 
Manove (1989) models the effect of insider trading on corporate investments. When 
insiders with privileged information gain at the expense of shareholders, corporate 
investment is discouraged and the efficiency of corporate behaviour is reduced. 
Ausbel (1990) models the ‘investment stage’ and ‘trading stage’ of capital markets. 
When outsiders expect insiders to trade on their privileged information at the ‘trading 
stage’, investments are reduced. A restriction on insider trading will therefore allow 
insiders to pre-commit to behaving fairly, improving allocative efficiency and overall 
welfare. 
 
Bebechuk and Fershtman (1994) examine the manager’s choice among investments 
under two regimes, one which allows, and another which prevents insider trading. It is 
reasoned that managers are risk-averse, which will lead to suboptimal (overly 
conservative) investment choices. Therefore, insider trading aligns the interests of 
management and owners, leading to a better allocation of capital. Bernhardt, 
Hollifield and Hughson (1995) model rational uninformed traders’ choice between 
investment projects with different levels of insider trading. They find that insider 
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trading distorts investment choice towards assets with lower levels of private 
information. However, when investments are information-elastic, that is, when the 
insider’s information has high value to the investment decision, prices become more 
informative. This leads to Pareto-improvements in welfare.  
 
Effect on Firm Value 
Masson and Madhavan (1991) model simultaneously the effects of earnings, insider 
holdings, and insider trading on firm value. They find that, holding all else constant, 
insider trading lowers value while insider holdings increase value. Bhattacharya and 
Nicodano (2001) argue that insider trading improves the selling prices of assets and 
therefore improves the welfare of outsiders and their utility from consumption. This 
more than offsets any losses arising from adverse selection.  
 
Noe (1997) argues that gains from insider trading represent a substitute to 
compensation packages used to align the interests of managers and owners. While 
insider trading may not be as effective as compensation packages, it is nevertheless 
less costly. Allowing insider trading will therefore increase firm value. Roulstone 
(2003) empirically examines firm-level restrictions on insider trading and its 
relationship to executive compensation. Consistent with Noe (1997) and the notion 
that insider trading represents a means to align the interests of managers and owners, 
Roulstone (2003) observes that firms with self-imposed restrictions on insider trading 
pay a premium in the total compensation paid to managers.  
 
  
 38 
2.1.3 The Effect and Effectiveness of Regulation and Enforcement 
 
Kyle (1985) argues that information asymmetry arises when insiders hide their trades 
in a sea of noise trading. Similarly, Fischer (1992) finds that insider trading represents 
a moral hazard issue, and its absence leads to Pareto-improvements in welfare. 
However, as commitments by insiders not to trade on privileged information are 
unlikely to be credible, government regulation is required. Interestingly, similar 
welfare outcomes are reached when insiders are required to register their trades. John 
and Narayanan (1997) find that insider trade disclosure does not necessarily bring 
about optimal outcomes. This comes from an increase in the insider’s incentives to 
manipulate markets, and they will sometimes trade against their private information to 
move prices in their favour.  
 
DeMarzo, Fishman and Hagerty (1998) argue that insider trading regulations reduce 
adverse selection costs, but enforcement is costly, and optimal regulation involves 
balancing the costs and benefits. They find that the optimal policy involves following 
trades with large volumes, those that make large financial gains, or both. Consistent 
with the notion that regulation is an effective tool in limiting insider trading, Marsden 
and Tung (1999) show, using experimental markets, that regulation and enforcement 
reduce the trading gains of insiders.  
 
Numerous studies empirically examine the effectiveness of regulation and 
enforcement in insider trading. Jaffe (1974b) analyses the effect of case law on the 
volume and profitability of insider trades. After each of the three legal decisions 
between 1961 and 1966, no significant differences in insider activity are found. 
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Seyhun (1992a) investigates insider trades during the 1980s, a decade which 
witnessed significant increases in insider trading sanctions. New statutes in the 1980s 
include treble damages for insiders, a bounty program for informants, holding 
executives responsible for the insider trading compliance of their employees, and the 
creation of a right of action for those that lose to insiders. Despite these changes, 
Seyhun (1992a) finds that insider trading is more rampant and more profitable. 
Insiders earn 5.1% in abnormal returns (annualised) between 1980 and 1984, which 
increased to 7% after 1984, in comparison to 3.5% prior to 1980. Increases are 
likewise found in aggregate insider trading volumes.  
 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) investigate the cost of equity in 103 countries with 
stock markets, 87 of which have insider trading laws, and 38 with prosecutions. They 
find no evidence that introducing insider trading laws reduces the cost of equity. 
However, after the first prosecution, cost of equity falls significantly. Bushman, 
Piotroski and Smith (2005) examine the effects of insider trading enforcement on 
analyst following for 100 countries between 1987 and 2000. Analyst following is 
found to increase after initial enforcement of insider trading laws. These benefits, 
however, appear to be concentrated in emerging markets. This result suggests that 
enforcement significantly improves the incentives for outsiders to acquire 
information, which may have implications for the price efficiency of capital markets. 
Using data from 48 countries over 1980-2003, Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) find that 
enforcement improves price efficiency (measured by the variability of firm-specific 
stock returns), and reduces the cost of equity. Improvements in stock price 
informativeness are, however, concentrated in developed markets, and prices do not 
appear more efficient for countries with poor legal institutions. Fernandes and Ferreira 
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(2009) argue that insiders in developing countries represent an important source of 
information, which disappears upon the enforcement of insider trading.   
 
2.2 Information Asymmetry, Transparency, and the Role of Market 
Intermediaries 
 
Transparency is the quality and quantity of information received by market 
participants on the market’s activities. This includes the prices and volumes of orders 
and trades, but may also include information on the identity of market participants. A 
majority of the classical works on markets are conducted under the assumption that 
participants have equal access to information. Information available to transparent 
markets can be considered a subset of all available information from which traders 
make their decisions. When optimal market conditions break down in classical 
economics, markets behave less effectively, reducing total welfare to their 
participants.  
 
In extreme cases, information asymmetry may lead to a breakdown of markets. 
Akerlof (1970) examines the market for second-hand cars, in which buyers are unable 
to identify the quality or the reputation of the sellers. Under these conditions, car 
dealers take advantage of their information, while potential buyers, aware of the 
dealers’ incentives, assume the worst. This leads to a market breakdown, and turns 
second-hand car markets into markets for ‘lemons’. 
 
A few thoughts have surfaced in the economic literature regarding market 
transparency and transaction costs. From an optimal market design perspective, a 
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large number of studies advocate transparency as a means of mitigating information 
asymmetry costs. Previous literature also highlights the importance of market 
intermediaries and the role of reputation in differentiating between heterogeneously 
informed parties. Despite these findings, a number of studies advocate greater opacity, 
and specifically anonymity (the opacity of participant identities). The central 
arguments in these studies involve the relationship between transparency and 
incentives for liquidity provision. It is argued that lower incentives exist for market 
participants to provide liquidity in transparent markets, increasing liquidity costs. 
These arguments are reviewed in turn. 
 
2.2.1 Transparency and Lower Adverse Selection Costs 
 
Uninformed investors bear the burden of costs when markets suffer from information 
asymmetry. This idea has long been conveyed in market microstructure models such 
as those by Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). A bid-ask spread allows 
intermediaries such as market makers to recoup losses they make on informed traders 
from uninformed traders. Such mechanisms exist when market makers are unable to 
perfectly differentiate between the identities of the informed and the uninformed.  
Presumably, when market makers perfectly identify informed traders, adverse 
selection costs become a non-issue. The market maker may either refuse the trades of 
the informed party, or charge them differential spreads in comparison with 
uninformed traders. While the identification of informed traders may be imperfect, the 
literature shows this action to be value adding for uninformed traders, who receive 
better transaction costs. For example, Easley and O’Hara (1987) show that trade size 
is an important signal to the likelihood of an information-motivated trade. As 
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informed traders prefer to trade larger quantities, market makers will give large trades 
poorer execution costs, while smaller trades (which are less likely to be informed) will 
receive lower costs.  
 
Numerous studies examine transparency from a market design perspective. One 
school of thought advocates transparent markets because this results in a separating 
equilibrium of informed and uninformed investors. This reduces the adverse effects of 
information asymmetry and therefore provides uninformed market participants with 
lower trading costs. These studies are generally consistent with the notion that market 
imperfections (which include market opacity) are counterproductive to the 
effectiveness of markets.  
 
Pagano and Roell (1996) model and examine the effects of pre-trade transparency in 
various auction and dealer markets. When markets are transparent with respect to 
order flow direction and size, they find lower transaction costs for uninformed traders 
on average. Consistent with these predictions, Flood, Huisman, Koedijk and Mahieu 
(1999) find lower spreads and higher volumes for an experimental market with high 
pre-trade transparency.  
 
The literature makes comparisons between markets with different levels of 
transparency. For example, Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick (2003) examine the 
cost of trading with NASDAQ dealers in comparison to trades on electronic 
communication networks (ECNs). As ECNs are completely anonymous, they are 
more likely to be used when information asymmetry or market volatility is high. They 
find lower transaction costs on the NASDAQ, as dealers can preference or internalise 
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less informed trades. Harris and Piwowar (2006) find substantially higher transaction 
costs for trades in municipal bond markets compared with similar-sized trades in 
equity markets. They attribute this to a lack of transparency in OTC bond markets. 
Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (1998) model the relationship between inter-market 
price transparency and market quality for cross-listed stocks. When prices are 
transparent between linked markets, cross-listings reduce transaction costs by 
increasing the total number of trading participants. However, the opposite is true for 
stocks with poor inter-market transparency.  
 
Studies have also examined markets that change their level of transparency. 
Herndershott and Jones (2005) study the reduction of pre-trade transparency on the 
Island ECN, which stopped displaying its limit order book in the three most actively 
traded ETFs. They find a decrease in Island’s market share, and an increase in trading 
costs, which is attributed to larger adverse selection costs. When Island subsequently 
reversed the decision, trading costs improved. Boehmer, Saar and Yu (2005) 
investigate the introduction of OpenBook on the NYSE, which made order book 
information available to traders outside the exchange floor. This increase in pre-trade 
transparency resulted in lower trading costs, and an increase in the level of price 
efficiency.  
 
The literature also investigates changes in the level of transparency on bond markets. 
Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006) examine the effects of an increase 
in post-trade transparency for US corporate bond markets, which introduced a 
mandatory reporting system called TRACE for certain eligible bonds. Those eligible 
for TRACE had their execution costs halved, and experiencd a decrease in the market 
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share and cost advantage for large dealers. In similar studies that examine the 
introduction of TRACE, Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) and Goldstein, 
Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) find lower execution costs associated with an increase in 
post-trade transparency.  
 
2.2.2 The Role of Market Intermediaries and Reputational Transparency in 
Information Asymmetry Costs 
 
The literature highlights the importance of market intermediaries and the role of 
reputation in mitigating information asymmetry, especially in markets with a high 
degree of transparency. Seppi (1990) examines the role of reputation and trading costs 
in upstairs markets. When upstairs brokers are able to observe the identity of traders, 
they price-discriminate between the informed and uninformed traders based on their 
reputation. Therefore, the large degree of transparency in upstairs markets reduces 
adverse selection costs, and improves the welfare of uninformed traders. Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1991) model the effects of ‘sunshine trading’, or the act of pre-announcing 
order size, on transaction costs. Consistent with Seppi (1990), it is shown that pre-
announcement by liquidity traders improves transaction costs they receive from 
market makers.  
 
Benveniste, Marcus and Wilhelm (1992) model the long-run relationships between 
specialists and floor brokers. It is argued that knowledge of brokers’ reputations 
allows specialists to differentiate between informed and uninformed brokers, 
mitigating adverse selection costs. Battalio, Ellul and Jennings (2007) investigate the 
effects of NYSE trading floor relocations on reputation and transaction costs. While 
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specialists move to new trading locations, brokers typically do not. They find 
noticeable increases in liquidity costs, which are larger for stocks with greater adverse 
selection. Brokers that move together with the specialist appear to have lower costs in 
comparison to those that stay behind. These results are attributed to broker 
reputations, which have to be re-learnt by specialists when they move to a new 
location.  
 
2.2.3 Transparency and Higher Liquidity Costs 
 
In an alternative school of thought, it is argued that transparency increases liquidity 
costs by reducing the incentives for liquidity provision. Bloomfield and O'Hara 
(1999) find larger bid-ask spreads in experimental markets with transparent 
transaction prices in comparison to opaque markets. This is attributed to a reduced 
incentive for market makers to compete for order flow. Frutos and Manzano (2002) 
model the relationship between transparency and the level of order aggressiveness 
from liquidity providers in dealer markets. Consistent with Bloomfield and O'Hara 
(1999), they find reduced incentives for order flow competition in the transparent 
regime, leading to higher liquidity costs.  
 
A number of studies examine specifically the relationship between transparency of 
trader identities and market quality. Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb (2003) find an 
increase in the likelihood of odd-tick quotes (and lower resulting spreads) on the 
NASDAQ when dealers are able to post anonymous quotes on ECNs. Foucault, 
Moinas and Theissen (2007) model the effects of anonymity on bid-ask spreads. 
When the participation rate of informed traders is low, a move to anonymous trading 
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increases the aggressiveness of limit orders placed by the uninformed. Using data 
from the Paris Bourse which removed broker identifiers, Foucault, Moinas and 
Theissen (2007) find lower spreads in the anonymous markets. 
 
Comerton-Forde, Frino and Mollica (2005) extend the work of Foucault et al. (2007) 
to include markets in Paris, Tokyo, and Korea (which began showing broker IDs as 
opposed to removing them). Consistent with order aggressiveness predictions, they 
find higher liquidity in markets that move to anonymous trading. Comerton-Forde and 
Tang (2008) investigate the market quality of the ASX after the removal of broker 
identifiers. They find lower spreads and greater depth in anonymous markets, but only 
for the larger and more liquid stocks. Frino, Gerace and Lepone (2008) confirm these 
findings outside of equity markets by examining the removal of broker mnemonics on 
the Sydney Futures Exchange. 
  
2.3 Equity Analysts and Information Asymmetry 
 
Equity analysts add value by bringing privately held information in the hands of 
management to the market, and through their superior ability in disseminating and 
analysing publicly available information (e.g. Asquith, Mikhail and Au, 2005). The 
literature documents the value of equity research by examining its immediate impact 
on stock prices, and as predictors to future earnings and prices. However, equity 
research is often marred by the presence of systematic biases and errors, with a 
number of reasons cited as the driving forces behind these errors.  
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Equity analysts are thought to reduce information asymmetry by increasing the 
amount of information available in the public domain. There is, however, some 
concern regarding the privileged nature of relationships between analysts and 
company management. In particular, conference calls prior to company 
announcements are thought to provide analysts (and their clients) an unfair advantage 
in acquiring private information. To curb the potential consequences of these 
conference calls, the US SEC instigated Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), 
requiring information disseminated to be made available to all market participants 
simultaneously. There is, however, considerable contention in the economic literature 
regarding the efficacy and effectiveness of such regulations.  
 
Furthermore, analyst reports are not equally distributed among all market participants. 
This is not surprising, as reports are typically provided to customers of broker-
analysts, in exchange for soft-dollar brokerage commissions, which is prohibitively 
expensive for small retail traders. The literature provides evidence that those with 
access to research reports have a profitable short-run information advantage, and 
institutions and other large traders make greater use of information disseminated 
through equity analysts.  
 
2.3.1 Value of Analysts’ Research 
 
Literature examines the value of research by analysing its effect on asset prices and 
consequently their investment value. Using monthly NYSE data, Givoly and 
Lakonishok (1979) investigate the effects of analyst earnings forecasts on stock 
prices. Those that trade on these earnings forecasts can potentially earn abnormal 
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returns of 2.7% in a two-month holding period. Lys and Sohn (1990) find that analyst 
earnings forecasts affect stock prices, even when they are preceded by forecasts by 
another analyst, or by company earnings announcements.  
 
Similar results are documented in analyst stock recommendations. Bjerring, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) examine the investment value of recommendations 
issued by a Canadian brokerage house. After controlling for non-synchronous prices, 
they find significant abnormal returns for those who heed the advice of equity 
analysts. Womack (1996) examines recommendation changes issued by the largest 
US brokerage firms. On average, these recommendations move prices significantly, 
and are therefore valuable to those who have access to them. Furthermore, analysts 
appear to have stock picking abilities, evident from the large post-recommendation 
drift in stock prices. Howe, Unlu and Yan (2009) show that aggregate analyst 
recommendations predict market excess returns after controlling for other 
determinants. Aggregate industry recommendations also appear to predict future 
industry performance.  
 
The literature finds greater predictive power in the earnings forecasts of equity 
analysts in comparison to time series models, for the purpose of predicting future 
earnings (e.g. Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Collins and Hopwood, 1980; Brown, 
Hagerman, Griffin and Zmijewski, 1987;  and Conroy and Harris, 1987). Conroy and 
Harris (1987) argue that the apparent advantage of equity analysts exists only in short 
horizons of less than one year. Brown, Hagerman, Griffin and Zmijewski (1987) 
attribute this to information that equity analysts obtain between company earnings 
announcements. Consistent with the above evidence, Lobo (1992) shows that analyst 
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forecasts are superior to time series models. However, greater predictive power is 
obtained by combining time series forecasts with analyst forecasts, especially when 
dispersion in analyst forecasts is large.  
 
Studies also compare the usefulness of analyst reports in predicting future prices, and 
the value of including recommended stocks in portfolios. Fried and Givoly (1982) 
show that forecasting errors of equity analysts are better predictors of stock price 
movements than time series models. They attribute this advantage to equity analysts’ 
richer information set, which may already incorporate some of the historical 
information used in time series models. Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) find 
value in the quarterly change of consensus recommendations, and information that is 
orthogonal to other predictors. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001) 
show the value of adding recommended stocks to diversified portfolios. In 
conjunction with daily rebalancing, purchasing stocks with the most favourable 
recommendations and (short) selling stock with the least favourable recommendations 
yield annual abnormal returns in excess of 4%. However, as high-frequency portfolio 
rebalances erode profits, such strategies are unlikely to net any realised returns. 
 
2.3.2 Analyst Bias and Predictive Errors 
 
Despite the value of equity research, the literature also documents the presence of 
analyst bias and other systematic forecasting errors. This casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of analysts as a channel of information dissemination. A number of 
reasons are cited as possible sources of bias. These include the ‘management 
relationships’, ‘conflicts of interest’, and ‘selection bias’ hypotheses.  
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Francis and Philbrick (1993) present analyst over-optimism as a means of maintaining 
a favourable relationship (which is colloquially referred as ‘currying favour’) with the 
management of the stocks they cover. Given the relationship between management 
compensation and stock prices, managers prefer optimistic analysts’ reports. A 
negative report may reduce the analysts’ level of access to management information. 
Analysts therefore attempt to curry favour with managers, trading off bias for greater 
forecast accuracy. Lim (2001) models the utility of analysts with respect to forecast 
bias and accuracy. Consistent with the predictions of Francis and Philbrick (1993), he 
finds bias in optimal forecasts with respect to accuracy, illustrating the trade-off 
analysts often encounter. Given the incentives for currying favour, Das, Levine and 
Sivaramakrishnan (1998) posit a greater demand for non-public information when 
company earnings are hard to predict. They find greater earnings forecast bias for 
stocks that are predicted poorly by past earnings and returns.  
 
Irvine (2001) investigates the relationship between analyst research coverage and 
brokerage volume. On average, brokerage market share for covered stocks is 3.8% 
higher than uncovered stocks. Irvine (2004) finds larger broker-analyst market share 
in stocks after the release of forecasts or recommendations. Kim and Lustgarten 
(1998) examine the relationship between brokerage incentives to boost trading and the 
extent of bias in analyst earnings forecasts. As brokerage revenue is directly related to 
trading activities, incentives exist for analysts to sensationalise forecasts to stimulate 
trading activity. Given this assertion, they predict positive bias in buy 
recommendations in comparison to neutral recommendations, and a corresponding 
negative bias in sell recommendations. Contrary to these predictions, they find higher 
optimism in sell and hold recommendations in comparison to buy recommendations.  
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Dugar and Nathan (1995) examine the effects of investment banking relationships on 
analysts’ forecasts and recommendations. They find greater optimism (in both 
forecasts and recommendations) when analysts are concurrently underwriters for the 
same stock. Lin and McNichols (1998) find greater optimism in growth forecasts and 
stock recommendations when their affiliated investment firms are lead underwriters. 
Likewise, Michaely and Womack (1999) show that buy recommendations issued by 
underwriter analysts underperform those issued by unaffiliated brokers. Furthermore, 
markets do not appear to take full account of these biases. O’Brien, McNichols and 
Lin (2005) examine investment banking relationships and their effects on the speed 
with which analysts release negative news. Affiliated analysts are found to be faster in 
upgrades, but slower in downgrading stocks. These analysts are also less likely to 
drop coverage in comparison to unaffiliated analysts.  
 
Rajan and Servaes (1997) find analyst overoptimism in the prospects of recent IPOs. 
They find superior long-run stock performance when analysts refrain from overhyping 
IPOs. James and Karceski (2006) attribute analyst bias following IPOs to conflicts of 
interest. Banking-analysts provide price-boosting services to stocks which they 
underwrite. Following poor performance, these stocks are given higher target prices, 
with a greater likelihood for a strong buy recommendation.  
 
McNichols and O'Brien (1997) show the presence of a selection bias in an analyst’s 
choice to initiate stock coverage. Equity analysts tend to initiate coverage in stocks 
they view favourably, and discontinue coverage for stocks with unfavourable views. 
While equity analyst forecasts and recommendations may not be inherently biased, 
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their tendency to cover favourable stocks creates an apparent bias when measuring 
consensus values.  
 
Other potential sources of bias and analyst forecast errors are also examined. For 
example, Graham (1999) models the analysts’ incentives to herd in their stock 
recommendations. Graham (1999) hypothesises a greater likelihood to herd when 
analysts have low ability or high reputation, or when their private information is 
inconsistent with strong public information. Empirical results appear consistent with 
these hypotheses. Consistent with Graham (1999), Welch (2000) finds a positive 
correlation between an analyst’s revision and the two following revisions by other 
analysts. The prevailing consensus recommendation also appears to influence an 
analyst’s subsequent revision. Furthermore, the influence of the prevailing consensus 
appears stronger when market conditions are bullish, creating large biases in 
recommendations. Consistent with the notion that herding creates forecast errors, 
Clement and Tse (2005) find lower accuracy in forecasts that herd, in comparison to 
bold forecasts.  
 
Gu and Wu (2003) relate observed analyst bias to a statistical distribution artefact. 
They assert that analysts seeking to minimise mean absolute forecast errors (i.e. an 
attempt to maximise forecast accuracy) will use median earnings rather than mean 
earnings. However, when earnings are skewed, means and median earnings differ 
significantly, causing observed mean bias. Therefore, one reason for these reported 
‘biases’ emanates from efforts made by analysts to correct for earnings skewness.  
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2.3.3 Equity Research and Information Asymmetry 
 
Easley and O’Hara (2004) argue that analyst coverage is complementary to 
accounting standards, disclosure policies, and market microstructure in minimising 
the cost of capital. Like disclosure, analyst research increases the total amount of 
information available to market participants, by either obtaining private information 
from the relationship they hold with the management; or by analysing and interpreting 
publicly available information that may be difficult to digest in its absence. Consistent 
with the notion that analysts have access to private information, Rogers and Grant 
(1997) show that over half of all financial and operating data cited in analysts’ reports 
do not appear in company reports.  
 
The literature presents equity analysis as complementary or as a close substitute to 
company disclosure in reducing information asymmetry. Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
find greater analyst following in firms with more informative disclosure. Further, 
these stocks have lower analyst forecast errors, lower forecast dispersion, and less 
variability in forecast revisions. Using a new implied cost of capital measure, 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) show a positive relationship between the 
dispersion in analyst forecasts, and a company’s cost of capital.  
 
Frankel and Li (2004) examine the relationship between analyst coverage and the 
frequency and profitability of legal insider trades. They find fewer insider trades for 
firms with greater analyst following, and these trades are on average less profitable. 
Consistent with the notion that analyst coverage is complementary to voluntary 
disclosure, they also find a negative relationship between disclosure quality and the 
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frequency of insider purchases. Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2005) conduct an 
international study on insider trading restrictions and its effects on analyst coverage. 
They find an increase in analyst coverage after the initial enforcement of insider 
trading laws. However, this increase in analyst coverage appears concentrated in 
emerging markets which do not have a strong information environment. For markets 
with strong investor protection mechanisms already in place, insider trading 
enforcements lead to a less intense increase in analyst coverage. While the studies 
mentioned above illustrate the relationship between analyst coverage and the 
information environment in which companies operate, these do not show a causal 
relationship between equity analysts and information asymmetry. For example, if 
equity analysts prefer stocks with greater disclosure and those less prone to insider 
trading, it is unclear whether increased analyst presence actually leads to lower 
adverse selection costs.  
 
A number of studies examine specifically the role equity analysts play in the 
production of information, and its effects on market quality. Botosan (1997) finds a 
strong relationship between company disclosure and the cost of equity capital, but 
only in stocks without a strong analyst following. In stocks that already have a strong 
analyst following, additional disclosure does not appear to reduce the cost of capital. 
This suggests that analyst coverage plays a similar role in the information 
dissemination process when compared to voluntary company disclosure, both of 
which reduce information asymmetry.  
 
Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) investigate the relationship between a company’s 
decision to cross-list in the US, its effects on analyst coverage, and the resulting 
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effects on firm value. They find an increase in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy 
following listings in American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Of the ADRs that 
experience an increase in analyst coverage, firm value increases. Analyst coverage is 
therefore argued to improve a stock’s information environment, thereby reducing its 
cost of capital, and enhance shareholder value. Bowen, Chen and Cheng (2008) 
analyse the effects of analyst coverage on the level of information asymmetry in 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). To the extent that SEO underpricing reflects the 
presence of information asymmetry, analyst coverage appears to alleviate some of 
these costs. In comparison to firms without analyst coverage, firms followed by eight 
or more analysts have 60% lower SEO underpricing.  
 
Roulstone (2003) examines the characteristics of analyst following, and its 
relationship with market liquidity. Roulstone (2003) finds a positive (negative) 
relationship between the number of analysts following a stock (analyst forecast 
dispersion) and market liquidity (proxied by the bid-ask spread, depth, and the 
adverse selection component of the spread). Granger causality test results suggest that 
analyst characteristics lead those of market liquidity characteristics. These results are 
therefore consistent with the notion that analysts increase the total amount of 
information available to investors, reducing adverse selection, and therefore improve 
the liquidity of markets.  
 
2.3.4 Analysts and their Access to Privileged Information 
 
Despite evidence that suggests equity research is beneficial to markets (e.g. by 
reducing information asymmetry), concerns are raised regarding analysts’ privileged 
 56 
access to managers, and their ability to obtain private information. In particular, the 
US SEC is wary of conference calls where companies selectively disclose non-public 
information to certain equity analysts. This places those without access to conference 
calls at a competitive disadvantage, which includes retail investors. The SEC 
subsequently introduced Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in August 2000, which 
restricted company disclosure of material information unless it was made available to 
all market participants at the same time.  
 
Significant debate exists on the effects of conference calls (or in general, analysts 
receiving privileged information) on information asymmetry. Proponents of Reg FD 
argue that certain analysts (and therefore their clients) have unfair access to material 
non-public information, which provides them with a significant advantage over other 
analysts and investors without similar access. By removing this privilege, a level 
playing field is created, boosting investor confidence, and hence market liquidity.  
 
However, opponents of Reg FD are concerned that this move may increase the 
analysts’ costs in acquiring information, which may reduce the total amount of 
available information in the market place. This increases the value of private 
information held in the hands of management, and may therefore lead to higher 
adverse selection costs. For example, Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto (2002) show that 
conference calls reduce analyst forecast errors and reduce analyst forecast dispersion. 
Contrary to the intentions of Reg FD, they argue that conference calls are more 
beneficial to analysts with weaker forecasting abilities, and therefore create a level 
playing field among analysts. Brown, Hillegeist and Lo (2004) investigate the cross-
sectional and time-series relationship between conference calls and information 
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asymmetry. Using the PIN measure, they find significantly lower costs to information 
asymmetry for stocks that regularly employ conference calls. 
 
Empirical results generally agree that Reg FD has improved the level of fairness in 
information dissemination. Some studies show that, consistent with its intentions, Reg 
FD has reduced the competitive disadvantage of retail investors, resulting in an 
increase in retail holdings. Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller (2004) find an increase in 
the level of retail trading after the introduction of Reg FD, possibly as a result of 
improved fairness. Ke, Petroni and Yu (2008) investigate institutional trading in 
growth stocks that break from a series of earnings increases. They find significant 
selling by transient institutional traders in the quarter preceding bad news breaks, for 
firms that held conference calls. This abnormal selling disappears after the 
introduction of Reg FD, suggesting that markets have become fairer. Consistent with 
the above evidence, Chen, Dhaliwal and Xie (2009) find higher retail trading (lower 
institutional trading) under Reg FD, especially in the period preceding company 
announcements.  
 
However, little consensus exists on the effects of selective disclosure, and the efficacy 
of its restriction in improving the information environment of stocks, and its intended 
effect of reducing information asymmetry. Some studies document a reduction in 
analyst forecast accuracy and an increase in forecast dispersion (e.g. Bailey, Li, Mao 
and Zhong, 2003; and Agrawal, Chadha and Chen, 2006), both of which indicate a 
reduction in the effectiveness of analyst reports as a channel for information 
dissemination.  
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Other empirical results appear consistent with these observations. Štraser (2002) finds 
that while the quantity of information (measured by the number of disclosures) has 
increased post Reg FD, its quality has significantly reduced. Overall, Reg FD results 
in higher information asymmetry costs, as proxied by the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread, and the PIN. Consistent with Štraser (2002), Chen, 
Matsumoto and Rajgopal (2006) find poor price performance among stocks that have 
renounced EPS guidance to equity analysts. While Reg FD results in a larger number 
of company press releases regarding earnings, it also reduces analyst forecast 
accuracy and increases its dispersion. 
 
Sidhu, Smith, Whaley and Willis (2007) investigate the effects of Reg FD on the 
adverse selection components of the bid-ask spread. To avoid confounding effects of 
decimalisation on NYSE, they find, for a sample of NASDAQ stocks, an increase in 
the adverse selection of approximately 36%. Duarte, Han, Harford and Young (2008) 
find a modest increase in the cost of capital for NASDAQ stocks of 10-19 basis 
points. No significant change is found for NYSE or AMEX stocks.  
 
Gomes, Gorton and Madureira (2007) find a loss of information in small stocks as a 
result of Reg FD (measured as the quantity voluntary pre-announcement disclosure), 
which is especially significant for firms that communicate complex information. 
Furthermore, the loss of analyst-disseminated information in these cases does not 
appear to be compensated through other means. This results in higher cost of capital 
for small firms, while costs for larger firms do not change significantly.  
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Examining price and volumes effects surrounding quarterly earnings announcements, 
Ahmed and Schneible (2007) find similar results. While they document the 
effectiveness of Reg FD in curtailing selective disclosure, results do not indicate an 
increase in the average quality of information. Following Reg FD, they find lower 
information quality for small-to-medium and technology stocks, while no significant 
difference is found in other stocks. Likewise, they attribute these effects to a reduction 
in the amount of information disseminated through equity analysts, which may be 
especially important for small firms, or those that are more difficult to value.  
 
Taken as a whole, the studies cited above illustrate the differences between 
information quantity and information quality, and differences between information 
fairness and information asymmetry. They show that while access to information may 
be fairer after the introduction of Reg FD, there is a reduction in the quality of 
information produced by equity analysts, resulting in greater information asymmetry. 
However, it is unclear to which extent these results are attributable to Reg FD, rather 
than an artefact of methodology or data, especially when data used in these studies 
coincide with large volatilities experienced surrounding the tech boom/bust.  
 
In particular, a significant number of studies present results contrary to those 
mentioned previously, and use different methodologies, or examine the Reg FD issue 
from another perspective. For example, Sunder (2002) examines bid-ask spreads, as 
opposed to its adverse selection component. Prior to Reg FD, companies that held 
open conference calls (available to all investors) had lower bid-ask spreads in 
comparison to those that held restricted conference calls (available to selected 
analysts and institutions). Following Reg FD, this difference in information 
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asymmetry ceases to exist, with no observable increase in the level of bid-ask spreads 
in general. Therefore, contrary to Štraser (2002) and Brown, Hillegeist and Lo (2004), 
Sunder (2002) argues that conference calls increase information asymmetry; and with 
the introduction of Reg FD, information dissemination becomes fairer, leading to 
lower adverse selection costs.  
 
Eleswarapu, Thompson and Venkataraman (2002) find that trading costs (as measured 
by the effective bid-ask spread and price impact) are reduced following Reg FD. 
Contrary to Ahmed and Schneible (2007) and Gomes, Gorton and Madureira (2007), 
they find a greater improvement in trading costs for small and illiquid stocks. 
Gintschel and Markov (2004) find lower price impact on average after Reg FD, with 
growth stocks experiencing the largest fall in trading costs. Likewise, Chiyachantana, 
Jiang, Taechapiroontong and Wood (2009) find a reduction in spreads on average, and 
spreads around quarterly earnings announcements. They find that this is related to a 
reduction in the participation rate of institutional investors in the pre-announcement 
period, since they are more likely to be informed in the pre-Reg FD period. 
Comparing the cost of equity capital for US listed stocks and ADRs (which are 
exempt from Reg FD), they find a reduction in the cost of capital for US stocks, but 
no significant change in the ADRs.  
 
2.3.5 Unequal Access to Analyst Reports 
 
Institutional investors are widely considered to be more informed in comparison with 
retail investors. Literature shows that returns on stocks with higher institutional 
holding leads those with lower institutional holding (Badrinath, Kale and Noe, 1995), 
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that institutional traders move prices more often (Chakravarty, 2001), that their trades 
predict future returns (Yan and Zhang, 2009), that institutional investors are more 
likely to purchase stocks (sold by retail investors) that eventually outperform (Griffin, 
Harris and Topaloglu, 2003), and they appear to have ability in predicting a break 
from a series of earnings increases, at least one quarter ahead of the break (Ke and 
Petroni, 2004).  
 
One advantage that institutional investors hold is their ability to use a wider range of 
information.8 This is arguably related to the amount of resources available at the 
institution’s disposal, either allowing them to acquire and process their own 
information, or to obtain information from a fee-based source such as those provided 
by equity analysts. The literature shows that certain investor groups make greater use 
of analyst reports. For example, Walther (1997) examines whether institutional 
investors rely more on analyst forecasts than time series models in forming their view 
on expected earnings. Stocks with greater institutional ownership are found to place a 
greater weight on analyst forecasts, rather than simple time series models.  
 
Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) find that small and large traders behave in a manner 
consistent with the two groups having different information sets. While large traders 
make use of time series models in addition to analyst forecasts, small traders tend to 
ignore earnings signals contained in analyst forecasts. These results suggest that 
small/retail investors have less access to information disseminated by equity analysts, 
and consequently make poorer economic decisions. This is possibly related to the cost 
of obtaining analyst research, which is prohibitively high for smaller retail traders.  
                                                 
8 There may be other reasons why institutional investors outperform retail investors. For example, 
institutional investors may be more disciplined and therefore face less behavioural bias in their 
investment decision process. See Barber and Odean (2000). 
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In addition to the evidence provided on unequal access, the literature also shows the 
financial benefits for those with analyst research subscriptions. Kim, Lin, and Slovin 
(1997) examine the price reaction of initial buy recommendations. Using a sample of 
initial recommendations that are released prior to the market open, they find the 
presence of short-run profit opportunities. This provides those with analyst 
subscriptions a means to trade for abnormal profits. Green (2006) investigates the 
value of obtaining an analyst recommendation after its official release, but ahead of 
other investors who do not have direct access to them. Short-term profit opportunities 
persist for roughly two hours following the release of analyst recommendations, with 
two-day abnormal holding returns of 1.02% on upgrades, and 1.50% on downgrades. 
These results, when considered in conjunction with those obtained from other studies, 
show that investor access to analyst research is unequal, which creates profitable 
trading opportunities for those with access.  
 
2.4 Alternative Trading Venues and Market Fragmentation 
 
Despite the benefits of having a consolidated market, identical securities are often 
traded on different venues with different market structures. This is especially true for 
the US, where stocks concurrently trade on the NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, electronic 
communication networks (ECNs), crossing networks (CNs), and upstairs markets. 
Alternative trading venues such as ECNs, CNs, and upstairs markets represent an 
important source of liquidity, and are commonly referred to as ‘dark pools’, or non-
displayed liquidity. 
 
 63 
Three competing theories exist on the likely effects and reason behind market 
fragmentation. One school argues that fragmentation increases liquidity search costs, 
reducing the quality of markets overall. The second school hypothesises a clientele 
effect, where market fragments exist to cater for different investor groups. The final 
school posits fragmentation as a means of fostering competition among markets for 
liquidity, reducing the size of transaction costs. The latter two theories predict that 
market fragmentation is valuable, while the former predicts lower liquidity in 
fragmented markets. Empirical results on market fragmentation are mixed, with 
results appearing to support any of the three theories.   
 
A number of studies specifically examine the trading costs of these alternative trading 
venues in comparison to the main downstairs market. They find that ECNs and CNs 
offer lower execution costs in certain cases, by increasing the level of competition in 
downstairs liquidity providers. Upstairs brokers are thought to have greater 
information on the location of non-displayed liquidity (reducing liquidity costs), and 
have the ability to filter out information-motivated trades (and thereby reduce 
information asymmetry costs).  
 
2.4.1 Theory on Market Fragmentation 
 
Three competing theories exist on the likely effects of market fragmentation, these are 
the ‘liquidity cost effects’, ‘clientele effects’, and the ‘competition effect’. The first 
predicts lower overall market performance in fragmented markets, while the latter two 
hypothesise that fragmentation is valuable. Mendelson (1987) argues that 
consolidated markets offer lower search costs and therefore greater liquidity and price 
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efficiency. Modelling the trade-off between fragmented and consolidated markets, he 
finds a lower total number of shares traded in fragmented markets, having price 
signals of lower quality (higher price volatility), and lower expected gains from trade. 
However, fragmented markets may improve the quality of price signals when 
information is aggregated and disseminated.  
 
Seppi (1997) models the competition between a specialist and a limit order book 
market. A hybrid specialist market is found to offer better liquidity for small retail and 
large institutional trades, while a pure limit order market is better suited to medium-
sized trades. This appears to suggest the presence of specific clienteles in the choice 
of trading venue, and the existence of market fragments as a means of fulfilling 
different demands. Madhavan (1995) investigates the relationship between market 
fragmentation and trade disclosure, and finds evidence that supports both the liquidity 
consolidation and clientele theories. Consistent with Mendelson (1987), Madhavan 
(1995) finds higher price volatility and lower price efficiency in fragmented markets. 
Large traders, however, prefer to trade in fragmented markets when their trades are 
not disclosed, resulting in lower execution costs, which appear to support Seppi 
(1997).  
 
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) model the competition between dealer markets 
and a passive crossing network. Price competition from crossing networks is argued 
to attract new traders that would otherwise have abstained from trading. However, 
competition may also increase the risks associated with market making (crowding-out 
effects), resulting in larger bid-ask spreads on the main market. They argue that the 
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negative effects are small when securities have sufficient ‘critical mass’ to begin with, 
and when crossing networks only attract a small portion of the total order flow.  
 
Parlour and Seppi (2003) model the competition between a hybrid market and a pure 
limit order book market. Consistent with Hendershott and Mendelson (2000), Parlour 
and Seppi (2003) show that fragmentation can, in certain cases, reduce transaction 
costs. While fragmentation may reduce total depth overall, competition also reduces 
the size of the spread, which is beneficial to traders who trade small amounts. They 
also conclude that neither market is competition-proof, and both can exist in 
equilibrium. Consistent with the clientele effect, they show that different investors 
may prefer one market structure over the other.   
 
With little consensus on the expected impact of greater market fragmentation (or 
consolidation), empirical results are also mixed. Battalio (1997) examines the issue of 
fragmentation in third market broker-dealers. Madoff Securities (which later became 
NASDAQ) began paying brokers for order flow in small retail trades. These trades are 
guaranteed to be executed at no worse than the National Best Bid and Offer. Contrary 
to the belief that fragmentation reduces liquidity in the main market, Battalio (1997) 
finds no change in trading costs on the NYSE as a result of Madoff Securities. This 
suggests that market fragmentation may improve competition. Battalio, Greene and 
Jennings (1997) investigate the effects of greater market fragmentation arising from 
the internalisation of orders from the Boston Stock Exchange and the Cincinnati Stock 
Exchange. Consistent with Battalio (1997), they find no increase in the effective bid-
ask spreads on the NYSE. 
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Mayhew (2002) studies the effects of market competition in fragmented options 
markets. Options listed on multiple exchanges appear to have lower bid-ask spreads in 
comparison with those listed on a single exchange. Moreover, when a competing 
exchange de-lists an option, spreads in other markets increase. These results are 
consistent with the notion that market fragments improve competition for liquidity, 
which reduces transaction costs. De Fontnouvelle, Fishe and Harris (2003) investigate 
the relationship between payments for order flow in options markets, and the size of 
bid-ask spreads. Consistent with Mayhew (2002), they find a reduction in bid-ask 
spreads following greater competition from fragmented markets.  
 
Foucault and Menkveld (2008) analyse the effects of fragmentation in the Dutch 
market. With the introduction of EuroSETS, an electronic limit order book market set 
up by the London Stock Exchange in direction competition to Euronext, bid-ask 
spreads fell. Surprisingly, they also find an increase in depth of the incumbent market, 
which they attribute to a fee reduction from Euronext on limit orders. Taken as a 
whole, these results show that market fragmentation may improve the liquidity of 
markets by fostering competition.  
 
Contrary to empirical studies showing the value of fragmentation, Amihud, 
Lauterbach and Mendelson (2003) find greater liquidity in consolidated markets. 
When examining deep-in-the-money warrants that are exercised upon expiry, they 
find an increase in the liquidity of underlying markets, and an associated rise in asset 
prices. This is attributed to a consolidation of trading interests upon the expiry of 
warrants. Bennett and Wei (2006) investigate the effects of order flow fragmentation 
on market quality. Order flow on NYSE listed stocks is typically less fragmented than 
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those listed on the NASDAQ, which has more trading venues. When NASDAQ 
stocks switch their listing to the NYSE, an increase in market consolidation results in 
greater market quality and price efficiency.  
 
2.4.2 Electronic Communication Networks and Crossing Networks  
 
A number of studies investigate specifically the effects of electronic communication 
networks (ECNs) and crossing networks (CNs) on traditional markets. The vast 
majority of these studies show that ECNs and CNs induce competition from 
traditional markets, resulting in lower transaction costs. Using a proprietary dataset 
from a large US investor, Næs and Skjeltorp (2003) show that competition from CNs 
appears concentrated in large and liquid stocks. While trading in CNs increases the 
risk of non-execution, they show using simulations that a strategy of trying to cross all 
shares is optimal. Using the same dataset, Næs and Ødegaard (2006) show that while 
execution costs on CNs are lower, this is offset by higher costs of non-execution, 
which is difficult to quantify in traditional measures of transaction costs.  
 
Gresse (2006) investigates the competition between the London SEAQ quote-driven 
market and a CN. Dealer market spreads are found to be negatively related to CN 
volumes. Given the significant participation of dealers in CNs, CNs are argued to 
improve risk sharing among dealers. Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts (2009) model 
the competition between a CN and a dealer market under three different transparency 
regimes. Consistent with Hendershott and Mendelson (2000), they show that the 
introduction of a CN creates new liquidity from traders that would otherwise have 
abstained from trading. However, the CN also exerts a negative crowding-out effect 
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on the dealer’s willingness to provide liquidity. Overall welfare is shown to increase 
when the spread is high to begin with, but decrease when spreads are already low.  
 
Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick (2003) find significantly lower execution costs 
on ECNs in comparison to the NASDAQ, if and when this liquidity is actually 
present. However, dealers are argued to provide lower ex-ante execution costs for 
small traders, due to their preferencing arrangements. Furthermore, they find greater 
information asymmetry in ECNs, especially around periods of high volume and stock 
price volatility.  
 
Huang (2006) compares the quoting behaviour of ECNs in comparison to the 
NASDAQ. Consistent with the empirical evidence on CNs, quoted spreads in ECNs 
are often lower than those quoted by dealers. Moreover, quotes are provided more 
frequently on the ECNs, causing ECNs to be price leaders (Instinet and Island in 
particular). These results suggest that ECNs promote quote quality, and improve the 
liquidity of markets.  Fink, Fink and Weston (2006) make similar comparisons 
between ECNs and NASDAQ. They find that an increase in ECN activity is 
associated with lower quoted, effective and relative spreads, and find no deterioration 
in depth.  
 
Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003) compare the execution costs of CNs, ECNs, and 
orders filled by brokers (e.g. on the NYSE, NASDAQ or upstairs markets). After 
controlling for endogeneity in the choice of trading venue, they find lower execution 
costs on CNs and ECNs. These lower costs are partially attributed to lower tick sizes 
on alternative trading systems, which have since equalised.  
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2.4.3 Upstairs Markets 
 
There are two competing theories on why upstairs markets exist. Seppi (1990) argues 
that upstairs dealer-brokers keep track of trader reputations. When traders have a 
reputation for being informed, they receive poorer execution costs in comparison to 
those with superior reputation, resulting in a separating equilibrium between the two 
trader groups. Upstairs markets are therefore free from informed traders, resulting in 
lower average execution costs. Grossman (1992) argues that upstairs market brokers 
are repositories for unexpressed trading interests. Upstairs markets are therefore able 
to facilitate large trades at relatively lower costs compared to downstairs markets.  
 
While both theories predict lower transaction costs in upstairs markets, the overall 
welfare effect of upstairs markets is unclear. If upstairs markets force informed 
traders into the downstairs market as implied by Seppi (1990), then downstairs 
markets will experience an increase in adverse selection costs. Therefore, upstairs 
markets may ‘cream-skim’ the most profitable trades from downstairs markets, 
leaving little benefit to overall welfare. The empirical evidence is ambiguous with 
regard to these ‘cream-skimming’ effects. While no studies suggest outright that 
upstairs markets may harm the downstairs market, some do show evidence consistent 
with broker filtering. 
 
In an experimental study on the behaviour of off-floor (upstairs) trading, Campbell, 
LaMaster, Smith and Van Boening (1991) find that these trades often occur inside the 
spread, providing consistency with empirical results that show lower off-market 
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execution costs. They also find that off-floor trading is more likely when their 
experimental trading floor experiences higher spreads. 
 
Keim and Madhavan (1996) model and examine the price effects of upstairs trades. 
For a small sample of upstairs trades in illiquid stocks, they find significant permanent 
price impact in both buyer- and seller-initiated trades, with a price continuation in the 
larger block trades. They also find a significantly positive relationship between trade 
size and the temporary price impact of seller-initiated trades. Keim and Madhavan 
(1996) argue that the optimal number of counterparties to the trade depends on the 
size of the block. Increasing the number of counterparties minimises the price impact 
of the block trade, but results in an increase in the cost associated with information 
leakages. This leads to a trade-off, and therefore a non-linear relationship exists 
between the number of shares traded and the temporary price impact. In addition, they 
report significant movements in pre-trade prices, which they attribute to information 
leakages prior to the upstairs trade.   
 
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) examine the execution costs in upstairs and downstairs 
markets for Dow Jones stocks. While they find significantly better execution costs for 
large trades in upstairs markets, they argue that these benefits are economically small. 
Consistent with Seppi (1990) and the notion that upstairs brokers screen for informed 
trading, they find that reputation is an important determinant of execution costs. 
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) further argue that upstairs markets are especially 
beneficial to institutional liquidity providers, who are reluctant to offer free trading 
options in the downstairs market. By acting as the counterparty to trades that have 
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been pre-screened by brokers, upstairs markets facilitate trades that would not 
otherwise have occurred in the downstairs market. 
 
Smith, Turnbull and White (2001) examine upstairs block trades on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange. Consistent with Grossman (1992)’s predictions, they find that upstairs 
markets are typically used by small and less liquid stocks, or when the downstairs 
order book is thin. While upstairs trades have lower variable costs, they also find 
higher fixed costs. Trades that exceeded 24% of mean daily trading volume have 
lower execution costs upstairs. They also investigate brokers’ choice of executing an 
order on a principle basis upstairs, on an agent basis, or routing it downstairs. 
Consistent with Seppi (1990)’s filtering hypothesis, Smith, Turnbull and White (2001) 
find that information-motivated trades are more likely to be routed downstairs, while 
those that carry no information are handled upstairs. While they conclude that upstairs 
markets are typically used for liquidity reasons, the welfare effects of routing 
informed trades downstairs are unclear.  
 
Booth, Lin, Martikainen and Tse (2002) examine the price impact of upstairs trades 
on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Consistent with Seppi (1990), they find a smaller 
permanent price impact in upstairs trades, suggesting a lower level of information 
asymmetry in these trades. However, upstairs trades appear to have a higher 
temporary price impact, suggesting upstairs broker-dealers require a premium to 
cover the large liquidity risks. Overall they find lower total costs in upstairs markets 
in comparison to downstairs markets, which is consistent with the prediction of 
Grossman (1992). 
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Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) examine the execution costs of upstairs 
trades, in comparison with their costs if they are instead routed to the downstairs limit 
order book. Consistent with Grossman (1992), upstairs markets tend to be used when 
downstairs liquidity is lacking, which is especially valuable for large trades, and those 
in small and illiquid stocks. On average, they find that upstairs execution costs are 
only 35% as large as downstairs costs. Consistent with Seppi (1990), they find 
significantly lower permanent price impact in the upstairs market in comparison to the 
downstairs market, suggesting that brokers actively filter out informed trades.  
 
Fong, Madhavan and Swan (2004) examine and compare execution costs of upstairs 
and downstairs markets, and a crossing network in Australia. Contrary to prior 
evidence, they find similar execution costs in upstairs and downstairs trades. 
Furthermore, upstairs trades in Australia do not appear less informed in comparison 
with similar downstairs trades. These results provide evidence against Seppi (1990)’s 
prediction that upstairs markets are information-free. Moreover, Fong, Madhavan and 
Swan (2004) find no evidence of upstairs trades harming downstairs markets by 
increasing their trading costs and bid-ask spreads. Swan and Westerholm (2004) 
examine the market microstructure of 38 exchanges around the world. Overall, 
upstairs markets tend to be beneficial, but only for the smaller and less liquid stocks, 
where liquidity provision is most valued.  
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Chapter 3: Institutional Details 
 
This chapter provides background information on the Australian equities market. In 
particular, this chapter covers the market structure for trading and clearing, facilities 
for block-trading, (along with its reporting procedures), and routes of information 
dissemination. 
 
3.1 ASX Market Structure 
 
The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) is the largest of the three exchanges9 operating 
in Australia. The ASX results from the amalgamation in 1987 of the six regional 
exchanges in Melbourne, Sydney, Hobart, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth. In 1996, the 
ASX demutualised and became a listed entity within itself in 1998. As of 30 June, 
2009, there are 2,198 stocks listed on the ASX, with a total domestic market 
capitalisation of $1.09 trillion. According to the World Federation of Exchanges (as of 
June 2009), the ASX is the 16th largest stock market in the world by domestic 
capitalisation, 17th in terms of turnover, and 9th in the number of listed stocks.  
 
                                                 
9 The other exchanges are the National Stock Exchange of Australia (NSX, formerly known as the 
Newcastle Stock Exchange) and the Bendigo Stock Exchange (which is wholly owned by the NSX), 
each of which maintains a very small listing of stocks and related securities. Trading in these two 
exchanges represents a very small portion of the total activity for Australia. For example, in 2009, 
turnover on the NSX was less than $4.5 million Australian dollars. The Asia Pacific Exchange is 
another entity that operates in Australia. However, it has only one listed security, which has yet to see 
any trading.  
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3.1.1 Trading Procedures and Platform 
 
From 19 October, 1987, trading on the ASX gradually moved from the trading floor 
onto the automated trading system known as Stock Exchange Automated Trading 
System (SEATS), and by 1 October, 1990, trading on all stocks was automated. This 
was superseded by the Integrated Trading System (ITS) during November, 2006. 
With the introduction of ITS, undisclosed orders were due to replace iceberg orders. 
However, due to technical issues, this never eventuated, and currently neither iceberg 
nor undisclosed orders are available at the ASX.  
 
The ASX currently allows for two kinds of orders, market orders and limit orders. 
Limit orders may be placed with a specified expiry date, which upon expiry are 
purged from the system. Other order types, such as stop loss orders, are not provided 
by the exchange, and are instead provided at the discretion of brokers on their 
proprietary systems. The ASX has three minimum price step categories based on 
stock prices: $0.001 for shares valued lower than $0.10, $0.005 for shares valued 
between $0.10 and $1.995, and $0.01 for shares with a value greater than or equal to 
$2.00.  
 
3.1.2 Market Phases 
 
There are five market phases on the ASX: pre-open, opening auction, normal trading, 
pre-close, and closing auction. The pre-open takes place between 7am and 10am, 
during which orders are allowed to be entered, amended or deleted, but with no trades 
executing. At 10am, stocks enter the opening auction in batches, with the last batch 
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opening at approximately 10:09am. Normal trading occurs for the rest of the trading 
day, until the pre-closing at 4:00pm, at which point orders are allowed to be entered, 
amended or deleted, but not executed. A single closing auction occurs between 
4:10pm and 4:12pm. These times are subject to a random adjustment of up to +/- 15 
seconds by the trading platform.  
 
3.1.3 Market Participants 
 
As of 2010, there are 43 registered brokers operating at the ASX, 10 of which offer 
discount internet and/or telephone broking services, and 34 of these offer full-service 
brokerage, providing additional value-added services such as research and execution. 
The largest full-service brokers at the ASX (in terms of turnover) are Macquarie 
Bank, Goldman Sachs JBWere, UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, CSFB, ABN AMRO 
(currently owned by RBS), Morgan Stanley, and JP Morgan. Two large discount 
brokers also have significant market share: Commonwealth Securities, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, and E-Trade, owned by 
the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group.  
 
3.1.4 Share Registration and Settlement 
 
Shares on ASX listed entities are registered through two means, via the broker-
sponsored Clearing House Electronic Subregister System (CHESS), or through an 
issuer-sponsored subregister. Issuer-sponsored subregisters are typically shares that 
have never traded in secondary markets, for example, shares obtained from an IPO 
allocation. Before trades can be settled, the ASX requires issuer-sponsored holdings 
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to be transferred to CHESS. As such, all trades conducted at the ASX are settled 
through CHESS, typically on a T+3 basis. CHESS provides shareholders with a 
unique Holder Identification Number (HIN) for each broker they trade through. This 
allows the ownership of stock portfolios to be tracked and, when necessary, facilitates 
the transfer of holdings between brokers.  
 
3.1.5 Broker ID Removal 
 
As a part of the ‘ASX Market Reforms’, a consultation paper10 was released by the 
exchange in November 2003 that proposed amendments to the current broker ID 
reporting regime. Three options are provided, one involving the full visibility of IDs 
to brokers and investors (option A), another involving complete anonymity (option 
B), and a hybrid system allowing brokers to choose whether or not to disclose their 
identity (option C). An excerpt from the consultation paper raises the issue of 
transparency and it’s adverse effects on front running: 
 
“Broker IDs are an additional piece of information that can, in some 
circumstances, be useful in predicting future market activity. It is apparent 
that some traders attempt to second-guess future price movements based on 
trading by particular brokers, ... possibly even assuming a particular client is 
involved, and then attempting to trade ahead of those further orders.” 
 
It is argued that front running increases the costs for limit order traders, reducing their 
incentives for liquidity provision. An anonymous market mitigates these costs, and is 
                                                 
10 ASX Consultation Paper (2003), “ASX Market Reforms - Enhancing the Liquidity of the Australian 
Equity Markets”. 
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therefore expected to have greater liquidity. The ASX also cites anonymity as the 
international best practice, with numerous markets around the world moving to 
anonymous trading. Furthermore, empirical evidence from academia appears 
consistent with the predictions regarding anonymity and liquidity.  
 
Despite an overwhelming majority of fund managers preferring more transparency, 
the ASX removed broker identifiers from SEATS on 28 November, 2005.  In place of 
the broker ID, a generic ‘7777’ masks all orders and trades on the trading platform. 
 
As a replacement to the loss of post-trade transparency, the ASX introduced three 
additional reports. The first report aggregates the daily value of trades conducted by 
each broker for each stock, without differentiating between purchases and sales. It is 
therefore difficult to infer from this information the net direction of a broker’s trades. 
Another report is similar to the first, but instead of reporting turnover, reports the total 
number of trades. These two reports are available approximately one hour after the 
closing auction, typically at 5pm. A third report details every trade conducted by each 
broker at the ASX, and is available at 7am on a T+3 basis.  
 
3.2 Block-Trading Facilities 
 
3.2.1 Block-Trading on the ASX 
 
The ASX has no explicit trading mechanisms for executing block trades on the limit 
order book. A trader wishing to trade a large amount on the trading platform simply 
places a large market or limit order. However, a broker may assist in the search for 
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counterparties outside of the limit order book through various means, for example, by 
calling institutions that have an undisplayed interest in trading. These quasi-OTC 
markets are commonly referred to as upstairs markets.  There are four classes of 
upstairs trades at the ASX: Block Special Crossings (BSC), Facilitated Specified Size 
Block Special Crossings (FSSBSC), Portfolio Special Crossings (PSC), and Index 
Replicating Special Crossings (IRSC). The first two classes involve a large trade in a 
single security, while the latter two involve a basket of securities.  
 
The most common type of upstairs trade by far is the Block Special Crossing (BSC), 
which is a block trade negotiated by a broker on behalf of two clients in a single 
security. For stocks, these must have a trade value exceeding $1 million; a fixed 
threshold independent of stock characteristics. Upon entering into an agreement, BSC 
trades are reported immediately to the trading platform. The exception is when a trade 
occurs during or after the single price closing auction. When they occur during the 
closing auction, they are to be reported immediately following the auction. When 
BSCs occur after the market close (or prior to the opening), reporting can be delayed, 
and they are instead reported no later than 15 minutes prior to the opening of the next 
trading session.  
 
There is another subclass of single-security upstairs trades called Facilitated Specified 
Size Block Special Crossings (FSSBSC). These essentially differ from BSCs when a 
broker chooses to act as the counterparty to a block trade. While these are less 
common than BSCs, they represent an important source of liquidity provision, 
especially when no immediate counterparties are available to trade with. Depending 
on the liquidity of the stock and historical patterns in upstairs trading, the ASX 
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categorises stocks into four bands: A, B, C, and others, with respective thresholds of 
$15, $10, $5, and $2 million. From time to time, the ASX may choose to recategorise 
stocks into a higher band; in particular, when FSSBSCs approach or exceed 20% of 
the value of all BSCs (over a period of one week) in that stock.  
 
Unlike BSCs, FSSBSCs are reported with a delay. When these trades occur before 
1pm, then they must be reported to the trading platform no later than 15 minutes prior 
to the opening of the next trading session. If they occur after 1pm, trades are to be 
reported no later than 1pm on the following trading day. This is done, presumably, 
with the intention of reducing the adverse effects of front running, providing brokers 
with an opportunity to manage their inventory. The broker may then choose to offload 
their position gradually into the limit order book, or with other counterparties when 
interest for trading arises.  
 
The ASX also allows the execution of a portfolio of stocks which are called Portfolio 
Special Crossings (PSC). These involve the sale and/or purchase of at least 10 equity 
securities, with each security having a value no less than $200,000, and the total value 
of the portfolio having a value no less than $5 million. Reporting requirements for 
PSCs are identical to those for the BSCs and FSSBSCs, depending on whether a 
broker had acted as the counterparty. Index Replicating Special Crossings (IRSC) are 
a special case of PSCs, and occur when the traded portfolio contains 90% of the 
securities in an approved index, and must exceed a value of $1m. IRSCs are reported 
in the same manner as FSSBSCs.  
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One key difference exists in the pricing of ASX upstairs trades in comparison to other 
equity markets. Other markets have fairness rules, with upper and lower bounds in 
which upstairs trades are allowed to execute. Upstairs trades in other markets are 
therefore typically executed within the best downstairs bid-ask spread, or within the 
theoretical volume-weighted average price of routing the trade downstairs. A fairness 
rule does not exist on the ASX for upstairs trades. There is therefore greater room for 
negotiation on the ASX, which may encourage trades which otherwise would not 
have occurred (should they be forced instead to execute within a restrictive price 
bound).  
 
3.2.2 Other Venues for Block-Trading 
 
For a short period in late 1999, the ASX trialled an automated off-market block trade 
system called BLOX. This operated from 22 November, 1999 to 26 November using 
dummy orders, and from 29 November to 17 December using real orders.  BLOX 
allows for greater pre- and post-trade anonymity, reducing the risk of information 
leakages in upstairs trades. While the trial showed a degree of success, anecdotally, it 
failed due to a high level of resistance from the brokers, as institutions were given 
direct market access.  
 
Currently, there are a number of institutions that provide on-market crossings on ASX 
listed shares. These include POSIT (ITG), Liquidnet (which recently received ASIC 
approval), UBS PIN (UBS), Crossfinder (part of Credit Suisse’s Advanced Execution 
Service, AES), and BlocSec (Hong Kong based CLSA). These typically provide non-
continuous crossings at predetermined times. Continuous crossings are difficult on the 
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ASX in the presence of the ‘10 second rule’, which requires all crossing orders to be 
exposed to the market for at least 10 seconds. This reduces the execution certainty of 
crossing networks. However, in late 2009 the ASX recently removed this rule, which 
is expected to increase the proliferation of crossing networks in the Australian market. 
 
A number of alternative trading venues (in particular ECNs) have signalled their 
intention to compete with the ASX on block trades. These include the AXE-ECN 
(partly owned by the New Zealand Stock Exchange, and five other major Australian 
brokers), Liquidnet and Chi-X. On 23 July, 2007, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) released a consultation paper regarding the 
applications of AXE-ECN. Some of the concerns relayed in the ASX response include 
a reduction in pre- and post-trade transparency, a reduction in price efficiency, and an 
increase in transaction costs arising from the internalisation of trades.  
 
The alternative platforms argue that competition generally improves the pricing of the 
incumbent exchange, and therefore improves the wellbeing of financial markets. This 
argument appears reasonable, as the ASX soon reduced exchange fees on crossings, 
on which the alternative platforms compete. In response to the potential conflicts of 
interest arising from supervision by the ASX, ASIC announced on 24 August, 2009 
that the majority of supervision will be transferred to ASIC, with the ASX 
maintaining supervision related to listing and disclosure rules. Currently Chi-X is the 
only ECN to receive in principle support from ASIC for their application to enter the 
Australian market, and is yet to begin trading.  
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3.3 Information Dissemination in Australia 
 
3.3.1 ASX Reporting Requirements and Company Announcements 
 
In additional to bi-annual company reports, section 674 of the Corporations Act 
requires public Australian companies to continuously disclose. Furthermore, ASX 
listing rule 3.1 (with certain exceptions) requires the disclosure of: 
 
“information which may affect security values or influence investment 
decisions, and information in which security holders, investors and ASX have 
a legitimate interest… Once an entity is or becomes aware of any information 
concerning it that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect 
on the price or value of that entity’s securities, the entity must immediately tell 
ASX that information.” 
 
When information is submitted to the ASX, a member of staff (an ASX Company 
Advisor) first determines whether this information is likely to be price-sensitive. 
When a price-sensitive announcement is released by the ASX, a trading halt of no less 
than ten minutes is introduced. This aims to provide the market with sufficient time to 
digest the information, prior to their trading decisions. Historically, approximately 
25% of all announcements are classified by the ASX as being market-sensitive.  
 
From time to time, the ASX may query companies regarding information that has 
appeared in the media or broker research reports, but has not been announced. This is 
also true when the ASX market surveillance department detects abnormal price 
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movements in stocks. In these cases, the ASX may require the companies to clarify 
the matter to the market, if only to ensure that markets do not respond to 
misinformation.  
 
3.3.2 Other Avenues for Information Dissemination  
 
In addition to company announcements and bi-annual reports, the 2008 Australian 
Share Ownership Study identifies several additional sources of information and 
investment advice. These include information available in the media (e.g. from 
newspapers, magazines, investment newsletters, the radio, television), but also advice 
from ‘experts’, in particular brokerage firms which offer research services. ASX 
survey statistics show that in 2008 approximately 21% of all retail investors surveyed 
made use of analyst reports (1% for error). While no statistics are provided for 
institutional investors, it is likely that they use analysts to a greater extent when 
making financial decisions, given their higher level of endowment.   
 
ASIC and the ASX forbid the release of price-sensitive information to equity analysts 
that is not already in the public domain (‘selective briefings’). Companies that wish to 
disclose non-public information to analysts must first release this information to the 
markets via an announcement. In the event that information is inadvertently passed 
on, companies must immediately file a notice with the ASX.  
 
Institutional and high-wealth investors typically rely on an information service such 
as First Call (a subsidiary of Thompson Corporation) to receive analyst reports from 
their brokers. The less appealing alternative is to check the websites of various 
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brokers at regular intervals. This is time-consuming and may cause delays in 
receiving valuable information, possibly forgoing the advantage of early trading. 
Upon receiving a report from a broker, First Call simultaneously sends it to all clients 
who have been granted access rights by the brokerage house. Those who do not have 
access rights may find out about the report at a later time and may purchase the report 
from First Call. 
 
While analyst reports are typically issued simultaneously to all investors with 
subscriptions11, anecdotal evidence from non-academic sources suggests otherwise. 
For example, Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst, an exposé by Dan Reingold on the 
analyst industry during the tech boom, highlights some of the issues that equity 
analysts face when bringing information to the market. In particular, the act of passing 
analyst information on to privileged clients prior to its public release allows certain 
clients to trade ahead of the market.   
                                                 
11 Analyst firms typically have their own internal controls to ensure the simultaneous dissemination of 
reports to all subscribers.  
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Chapter 4: Hypotheses 
 
In this chapter, hypotheses are developed based on the literature review and 
institutional details.  
 
4.1 Hypotheses on Upstairs Markets 
 
Grossman (1992) posits upstairs brokers as repositories for unexpressed trading 
interests. These facilities allow for trades that would otherwise not have occurred. 
Given this notion, this dissertation hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 5.1: Upstairs markets are typically used when liquidity in the downstairs 
markets is lacking, or trading costs are prohibitively high.  
 
As block trades in small stocks are particularly difficult to arrange in the downstairs 
market, the literature documents the disproportionate use of upstairs markets in small 
and illiquid stocks (e.g. Smith, Turnbull and White, 2001; and Bessembinder and 
Venkataraman, 2004). Therefore, this dissertation hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 5.2: Upstairs markets are more beneficial for block-trading in small 
stocks, in comparison with large and liquid stocks.  
 
If upstairs markets are typically used when downstairs liquidity is lacking, then an 
improvement in downstairs liquidity is expected to reduce the reliance on upstairs 
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markets. Over time, markets naturally become more liquid, therefore this dissertation 
hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 5.3: As downstairs markets become more liquid over time, upstairs 
markets become less important as a source of liquidity provision.  
 
Unlike other markets, ASX upstairs trades can be executed at any price and do not 
have to be exposed to the downstairs market. Seppi (1990) argues that upstairs 
brokers have a greater ability to filter out informed trading by observing a trader’s 
reputation. If the informed trader’s presence is an indication of future price 
movements, then one would expect the upstairs brokers to refuse their trades. 
Alternatively, they could charge the informed traders a premium that is sufficient to 
cover the additional risk. However, this can only occur when upstairs brokers have 
complete freedom to negotiate prices, which is true for the ASX. Therefore, this 
dissertation hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 5.4: Trades that execute far away from the best bid and ask prices have 
higher information content.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses on Equity Analysts   
 
Equity research represents a way of developing favourable relationships with clients, 
which adds to revenue. Literature shows that equity analysts add value to their 
investment banking business (Michaely and Womack, 1999) and to their brokerage 
business (Irvine, 2001, 2004; Jackson, 2004; Strauss and Zhu, 2004). Investment 
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firms that provide good research encourage investors to trade through them, and 
therefore earn higher commissions. Strauss and Zhu (2004) find that both quantity and 
perceived quality of research contribute to the generation of brokerage revenue. 
Indeed, it is entirely irrational for a financial institution to spend large sums of money 
on an activity which nets them no gain.  
 
The market for information literature presents two reasons why brokers prefer to 
“sell” their information, rather than using the information to trade directly. One 
reason, as argued by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), is optimal risk sharing by brokers 
with their clients. When differences in risk aversion are sufficiently large, it may be 
optimal for the informed broker not to trade, and act solely as an information vendor. 
Brokers may also wish to sell their information when they are competing against other 
informed parties with the same information. Fishman and Hagerty (1995) show that a 
broker is able to maximise his/her profit by selling information to others, thereby 
increasing the number of competing (and informed) parties. While this may reduce 
the profits of the individual traders, it increases the broker’s share of total profits.  
 
When those seeking analysts’ reports demand different levels of service, the market 
for these reports becomes segmented. Some may be willing to pay additional fees in 
return for better or more timely information, while others may not have the means to 
do so. Information leakage is provided to favoured clients in exchange for additional 
trading business (soft dollar). As both parties have financial incentives to live up to 
their side of the bargain, in the absence of regulation, relationships are likely to be 
long-lasting. When their ‘favoured clients’ represent a large part of their brokerage 
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business (and presumably large buy-side institutions are their largest customers), 
incentives to leak information are even greater.  
 
The literature on insider trading shows that those with access to non-public 
information often trade ahead of information releases, which earns them abnormal 
returns. The literature shows that analyst recommendations have investment value 
(e.g. Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1983; and Womack, 1996); that is, they 
contain information regarding the value of stocks. To the extent that analyst 
recommendations can be considered one form of information release, this dissertation 
hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 6.1: Leakages exist in analyst recommendations, and certain customers of 
broker-analyst firms trade on these leakages, which nets them abnormal profits.  
 
As equity research is not free, it is not expected to be distributed evenly across the 
market. For example, Green (2006) shows that those with subscriptions to analyst 
research are able to trade profitably on their short-run information advantage. 
Institutions and other large traders are more likely to have research subscriptions, 
given their larger endowment. Empirical evidence appears consistent with this view. 
For example, Walther (1997) shows that stocks with higher institutional ownership 
place more weight on analysts’ forecasts over forecasts that can be obtained from a 
simple time series model. Consistent with Walther (1997), Battalio and Mendenhall 
(2005) show that small traders ignore earnings signals from analyst earnings forecasts, 
while large traders do not. Given these results, this dissertation hypothesises that: 
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Hypothesis 6.2: If customers of more reputable analysts are more sophisticated, then 
they will make investment decisions based on a larger number of analyst forecasts. 
 
4.3 Hypotheses on Anonymity 
 
Foucault, Moinas and Theissen (2007) predict lower bid-ask spreads in anonymous 
markets overall, which is supported empirically by Comerton-Forde, Frino and 
Mollica (2005), Comerton-Forde and Tang (2008), and Frino, Gerace and Lepone 
(2008). To the extent that lower bid-ask spreads reduce actual transaction costs (other 
things being equal), one would expect lower transaction costs in anonymous markets. 
Therefore this dissertation hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 7.1: Transaction costs are lower (on average) in anonymous markets. 
 
However, market microstructure models suggest that informed traders hide their 
trades among liquidity-motivated traders (e.g. Kyle, 1985). If the removal of broker 
IDs reduces the market’s ability to detect informed trading, then one would expect 
lower trading costs and greater market share for informed traders, but not for the 
uninformed. Therefore, this dissertation hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 7.2: The large full-service broker-analysts have a greater reduction in 
their transaction costs in anonymous markets, when compared to the trading costs of 
less informed brokers. 
 
 90 
Hypothesis 7.3: Anonymity results in greater market share for the large full-service 
broker-analysts, and they contribute to a greater portion of price discovery.  
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Chapter 5: Upstairs Markets, Liquidity Provision, and 
Filtration of Informed Trades 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The upstairs market is an over-the-counter network of brokers and institutional traders 
that negotiate large block trades of listed securities outside the normal trading venue 
of an exchange. On the ASX, upstairs trades are typically conducted through ‘Block 
Special Crossings’, which have to exceed a trade value of $1 million.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the role of brokers in the upstairs market. There are two main 
schools of thought on why upstairs markets exist. Seppi (1990) argues that upstairs 
brokers have superior ability in differentiating between informed and uninformed 
traders through reputation certification, and are therefore able to offer uninformed 
traders lower costs. Grossman (1992) argues that upstairs brokers are repositories for 
‘unexpressed’ latent demand, commonly called ‘dark pools’, providing access to 
greater liquidity and reducing transaction costs.  In general, the empirical literature 
finds evidence consistent with the predictions of both theories. However, a relatively 
recent study by Fong, Madhavan and Swan (2004) does not find evidence consistent 
with information filtering on the ASX.  
 
The ASX provides a unique setting to examine upstairs trades in the absence of 
‘fairness’ rules, which allows upstairs trades to execute at greatly varied prices. When 
brokers have the freedom to trade at any negotiated price, they will be more willing to 
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trade with the informed, provided they are sufficiently compensated for the risk they 
take on. This is in direct contrast to other studies, which only sample upstairs trades 
that occur close to the best quoted spread.  
 
The aim of this Chapter is threefold. The first aim is an examination of liquidity 
conditions around upstairs trades to test the commonly held notion that upstairs 
markets facilitate trades that are difficult to arrange in the downstairs market. Block 
trades are difficult to arrange downstairs when the limit order book is low on liquidity 
or has high trading costs (Hypothesis 5.1), which increases its value to small and 
illiquid stocks (Hypothesis 5.2). Moreover, if liquidity naturally improves downstairs 
over time, the reliance on upstairs markets is expected to decrease (Hypothesis 5.3). 
The second goal is to examine ASX’s lack of an upstairs pricing rule, and its effect on 
information filtering (Hypothesis 5.4). The third aim is related to the first two, and 
seeks to model a trader’s choice between the upstairs and downstairs market.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 contains 
information on the data source along with descriptive statistics for upstairs and 
downstairs trades, and their time trends. Section 5.3 analyses the liquidity of the limit 
order book around upstairs trades, and calculates expected costs if trades were instead 
routed downstairs. Section 5.4 examines the absence of ‘fairness’ rules in ASX 
upstairs markets, and its effect on broker behaviour. Section 5.5 models the 
propensity to trade upstairs using a probit specification. Section 5.6 summarises the 
results in addition to offering some concluding remarks. 
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5.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 
This study uses a sample of upstairs and downstairs trades from January, 1996 to 
December, 2005. An upstairs block trade is one that satisfies the requirements for 
BSC. A downstairs block trade is defined as a trade that satisfies the requirement for 
BSC, but is instead executed in the limit order book. In essence, this study captures 
order book block trades that exceed $1 million in value.  
 
The main source of data used in this study is the Securities Industry Research Centre 
of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The SIRCA data provides complete details of all orders and 
trades on SEATS. Data on downstairs block trades includes fields for date, time, 
volume, price, and whether the trade was buyer- or seller-initiated, removing the need 
to use imprecise classification methods for downstairs block trades. Large market 
orders are often recorded as separate trades because they execute against multiple 
limit orders. However, because these ‘trades’ have a unique ID and timestamp 
(accurate to milliseconds), they are easily aggregated. 
 
Upstairs data, on the other hand, is more complex, as it is often unclear which party 
had initiated the trade. With the exception of principal upstairs trades in which the 
brokers themselves are the counterparty, it is possible that two traders both had an 
equal demand for immediacy. This is apparent, as many upstairs trades occur at or 
near the midpoint of the best quotes, making classification difficult. Furthermore, 
while BSCs have to be reported immediately, in reality, there is always a small delay, 
as upstairs trades are manually entered into the trading platform. For upstairs trades, 
anything that is above the midpoint of the spread five minutes prior to the reporting of 
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the trade is classified as a buyer-initiated trade, and anything below as a seller-
initiated trade. Trades that occur at the midpoint are removed.12 A subclass of BSCs, 
the FSSBSC trades are not reported immediately to the market, making their 
classification into buys and sells difficult. This study takes advantage of a unique 
proprietary dataset obtained from the ASX which lists every FSSBSC trade, allowing 
these trades to be removed.  
 
To examine the limit order book liquidity conditions around upstairs trades, the entire 
limit order book is reconstructed using SIRCA order book data in a manner consistent 
with Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004). Unlike their study, data on 
amendments and cancellation of orders are available through SIRCA, which allows 
precise reconstruction of the order book. 
 
Table 5.1 presents several descriptive statistics for upstairs and downstairs block 
trades, which include the number of trades, the mean, median, and total value of block 
trades, and the proportion of total turnover that was executed upstairs or downstairs. 
This study ranks stocks by market capitalisation on a monthly basis, and places them 
into one of six market capitalisation groups, based on a monthly rank.   
                                                 
12 This study acknowledges the problems associated with an imprecise classification method, and later 
tests the robustness of results using the spread at different times prior to the upstairs trade. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for Upstairs and Downstairs Trades 
 
The block trade sample from January, 1996 to December, 2005 obtained from the 
Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) consists of a total of 
249,771 block trades, of which 140,816 are downstairs, and 108,955 are upstairs 
trades. Downstairs trades are defined as those which satisfy the criteria for upstairs 
trading (that is, have a trade value in excess of $1 million), but are instead executed 
on the downstairs limit order book. For upstairs trades, only trades that occur during 
normal trading hours are included. Delayed reporting trades are also removed. For 
upstairs and downstairs, Table 5.1 reports the total number of trades, the mean, 
median, and total value of trades, categorised by market capitalisation groups. 
Turnover is expressed as a proportion of all block trade turnover.  
 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Group Location 
No. of 
trades 
Trade Value (in $ millions) 
Prop. of 
total block 
turnover 
(%) Mean Median Total 
All Downstairs 140,816 1.966 1.424 276,798 45.23 
Upstairs 108,955 3.076 1.778 335,185 54.77 
1-20 Downstairs 83,332 1.896 1.424 158,028 25.82 
Upstairs 46,520 3.267 1.889 152,000 24.84 
21-50 Downstairs 32,990 2.222 1.440 73,289 11.98 
Upstairs 31,212 2.846 1.720 88,841 14.52 
51-100 Downstairs 14,899 1.838 1.400 27,389 4.475 
Upstairs 15,971 2.927 1.695 46,740 7.637 
101-200  Downstairs 7,522 1.846 1.387 13,887 2.269 
Upstairs 10,389 3.045 1.700 31,631 5.169 
201-500 Downstairs 1,862 2.071 1.498 3,856 0.6301 
Upstairs 4,338 3.410 1.698 14,794 2.417 
501+ Downstairs 211 1.658 1.400 350 0.0572 
   Upstairs 525 2.246 1.500 1,179 0.1927 
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Before the classification of trades into buys and sells, there are in total 249,771 block 
trades, of which 140,816 are downstairs, and 108,955 are upstairs. While downstairs 
block trades are greater in number, upstairs trades are on average much larger than 
downstairs trades ($3.0764 million versus $1.9657 million). The total value of 
upstairs trades represents close to 55% of total block trade turnover, at over $335 
billion for the sample. Trade value is skewed towards larger trades, with the mean 
significantly larger than the median for both upstairs and downstairs block trades. 
 
Block-trading in general is dominated by the top 20 stocks, accounting for more than 
half of the total block-trading turnover. Consistent with Bessembinder and 
Venkataraman (2004), the results presented here show that smaller stocks rely more 
on upstairs facilities, with upstairs turnover heavily dominating downstairs turnover in 
these stocks. This is not surprising, as order book liquidity for the smallest of stocks is 
typically very low, or close to non-existent. Traders wishing to trade large amounts in 
illiquid stocks therefore are reliant on upstairs markets.  
 
Unique to this study, results from Table 5.1 suggest that upstairs trading in the 
smallest stocks, despite turning over more money than downstairs blocks, is virtually 
non-existent. There are only 525 upstairs trades for stocks outside of the top 500 in 
the entire sample, accounting for only 0.19% of total block trade turnover. Partially, 
this is caused by upstairs thresholds on the ASX remaining constant at $1 million for 
all stocks, including the least liquid ones. Unlike other exchanges such as the London 
Stock Exchange or Euronext (which now includes the Paris Bourse), which have 
adopted upstairs thresholds dependant on liquidity characteristics, the $1 million ASX 
threshold for the least liquid of stocks often prevents trades from executing upstairs. 
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This section also examines time trends in block-trading on the ASX. For each two-
year period of the ten-year sample, the total number of trades, the total turnover for 
upstairs and downstairs blocks, and their relative contribution to block-trading is 
calculated. To help determine whether possible trends are biased by any particular 
subset of stocks, two Herfindahl-Hirschman indices are also calculated, one for the 
number of trades, and the other for turnover. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
is an index of market share, defined as: 
 
∑
=
=
N
i
iSH
1
2          (5.1) 
 
where Si = the market share of stock i, in either of the two market segments, with 
upstairs and downstairs facilities treated as separate markets. Normally, N takes on a 
maximum value of 50, but for current purpose, N is unrestricted.13 Table 5.2 presents 
the time trends of ASX block trades, by the number of trades and also by turnover. 
Block trades, both upstairs and downstairs, have grown over the ten-year sample, in 
terms of frequency and total value. This growth is most pronounced in downstairs 
block trades, which have grown from a total value (number of trades) of $4.676 
billion (2,068) in 1996-97 to $87.426 billion (40,473) in 2004-05.  
 
  
                                                 
13 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is typically used as a test of market dominance, where an N of 50 
is a reasonable upper bound to the total number of firms. Any firm beyond the top 50 is unlikely to 
contribute significantly to the HHI. However, for the purpose of market dominance in securities 
trading, an N of 50 is inappropriate, as numerous stocks exist beyond the top 50, which attract 
significant trading interests.   
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Table 5.2: Trends in the Use of Upstairs Facilities 
 
Table 5.2 reports trends in block-trading on the ASX. For each two-year period of the 
ten-year sample, the total number of trades, the total turnover for upstairs and 
downstairs blocks, and their relative contribution to block-trading are calculated. Two 
Herfendarl-Hirschman indices are calculated (with an unrestricted N); one for the 
number of trades, and the other for turnover. The Herfendarl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
is an index of market share, defined as: , where Si = the market share of 
stock i for upstairs/downstairs block trades. 
∑
=
=
N
i
iSH
1
2
 
Year Location 
No. of 
trades 
Proportion 
of trades 
(%) 
HHI on 
No. of 
trades 
Total 
trade 
value 
($ mil) 
Proportion 
of total trade 
turnover 
(%) 
HHI on 
total 
trade 
value 
    
Full 
Sample 
Downstairs 140,816 56.38 468 276,798 45.23 441 
Upstairs 108,955 43.62 165 335,185 54.77 180 
    
1996-97 Downstairs 3,444 19.73 637 7,363 15.38 1048 
Upstairs 14,013 80.27 226 40,506 84.62 270 
    
1998-99 Downstairs 5,612 23.93 502 10,126 17.50 534 
Upstairs 17,840 76.07 226 47,734 82.50 255 
    
2000-01 Downstairs 19,560 45.06 617 34,919 32.56 589 
Upstairs 23,850 54.94 217 72,332 67.44 248 
    
2002-03 Downstairs 41,426 62.60 562 77,150 50.52 555 
Upstairs 24,755 37.40 176 75,554 49.48 197 
    
2004-05 
Downstairs 70,774 71.29 452 147,240 59.78 440 
Upstairs 28,497 28.71 137 99,059 40.22 155 
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Upstairs trades, while experiencing moderate growth both in their frequency and their 
total value, is small in comparison to downstairs growth. It is apparent that upstairs 
trades dominate downstairs trades prior to the year 2000, both in their frequency and 
value. For example, in 1996-97, upstairs trades accounted for 79% (81%) of the total 
number of block trades (total block trade value). This trend is reversed for later years 
of the sample, with upstairs trades accounting for approximately 24% of all block 
trades (31% in total value) in 2004-05. Therefore, results suggest that block trades are 
less likely to go upstairs in the latter years of the sample, consistent with Hypothesis 
5.3. This could be driven by an improvement in order book liquidity over time, 
making block trades easier to execute downstairs, reducing the need for upstairs 
facilities.14  
 
It is also apparent that block trades, both upstairs and downstairs, have become less 
concentrated. The upstairs HHI for the number of trades and for total value 
experiences a consistent reduction over the sample period. This suggests that block-
trading is now dominated to a lesser extent by trades in the larger stocks. While 
downstairs blocks also experience a decline in the HHI, most of this occurs in 1998-
99, after which it remains relatively stable.   
                                                 
14 This issue is examined further in Section 5.5, after controlling for confounding effects.  
 100 
5.3 Cost of Sending an Upstairs Trade Downstairs 
 
5.3.1 Statistical Analyses 
 
To examine the limit order book liquidity conditions around upstairs trades, the entire 
limit order book is reconstructed using SIRCA order book data (taking account of 
amendments and deletions) in a manner consistent with Bessembinder and 
Venkataraman (2004). The execution cost of an upstairs trade is compared with a 
theoretical cost if it was instead routed to the downstairs limit order book.  While this 
section of the study deals with ‘costs’, the aim of this is to examine characteristics of 
the limit order book around upstairs trades, and hypothesise possible reasons why 
trades go upstairs instead of remaining on the limit order book. The execution ‘cost’ 
of an upstairs trade, and the hypothetical cost of routing the same trade downstairs, is 
defined as follows: 
 
m
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j QPE ,, −=        (5.2) 
m
tij
on
j QVWAPE ,−=        (5.3) 
 
Where  is the block trade price,  is the volume-weighted average price of 
the transaction by contemporaneously routing the upstairs order to the downstairs 
limit order book, and  is the contemporaneous bid-ask midpoint of the downstairs 
limit order book.   
block
tjP , jVWAP
m
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The difference between the two execution costs can be considered a ‘benefit’ of sorts, 
or more accurately, a cost-saving metric for upstairs trading.15 Note that this ‘benefit’ 
metric overestimates the true costs of trading a large parcel of shares downstairs. It 
entirely ignores the ability of brokers to minimise execution costs by working a large 
order over a longer period of time. However, the purpose of the current analysis is to 
examine the state of the limit order book at the time of the upstairs trade, rather than 
an explicit comparison of execution costs per se.  
 
Results in Table 5.3 are separated into four categories, based on the liquidity and 
execution cost characteristics of the trade. When an upstairs trade is sent downstairs, 
the contemporaneous limit order book could either provide insufficient liquidity to 
absorb the trade, cost less, cost more, or cost the same as the upstairs trade. As the 
limit order book during the auction phases is not meaningful for analysis, trades that 
occur prior to 10am or after 4pm are removed. Some upstairs trades occur at the 
downstairs midpoint, which makes classification into buyer- and seller-initiated trades 
difficult. Consequently, these trades are also removed. After excluding 36,535 of 
these observations (of which 3,631 are due to classification issues) from the original 
108,955, there are in total 72,420 upstairs trades, of which 32,483 are buyer-initiated, 
and 39,937 are seller-initiated.  
 
  
                                                 
15 In circumstances where the downstairs limit order book has insufficient liquidity to absorb the entire 
upstairs trade, they are excluded from the cost analysis. Their frequency is recorded.  
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Table 5.3: Cost of Sending an Upstairs Trade Downstairs – Contemporaneous 
Quotes 
 
In this table, the execution cost of an upstairs trade is compared with a theoretical cost 
if it was instead routed to the downstairs limit order book. Cost of sending an upstairs 
trade to the limit order book is defined as VWAP of the trade minus the prevailing 
quote midpoint in the downstairs market. When an upstairs trade is sent downstairs, 
the contemporaneous limit order book could either have insufficient liquidity to 
absorb the trade, cost less, cost more, or cost the same as the upstairs trade. Results 
are further categorised into groups based on market capitalisation.  
 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Group 
     Insufficient 
liq in the 
limit order 
book 
Sufficient liq in the limit order book 
Initiator 
No. of 
trades 
cost up > 
cost down 
cost up < 
cost down 
cost up = 
cost down 
All Buyer 32,483 12,946 18,114 709 714 
Seller 39,937 17,447 20,770 822 898 
1-20 Buyer 13,869 2,215 10,731 583 340 
Seller 15,528 2,463 11,993 656 416 
21-50 Buyer 9,355 3,974 5,110 77 194 
Seller 11,020 4,890 5,754 107 269 
51-100 Buyer 4,930 3,229 1,557 23 121 
Seller 6,454 4,205 2,073 34 142 
101-200 Buyer 3,202 2,465 659 20 58 
Seller 4,528 3,579 863 16 70 
201-500 Buyer 1,021 959 57 4 1 
Seller 2,142 2,049 85 7 1 
501+ Buyer 106 104 0 2 0 
  Seller 265 261 2 2 0 
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The first observation is that 30,393 upstairs trades (12,946 buyer-initiated and 17,447 
seller-initiated) cannot be filled immediately in the contemporaneous downstairs limit 
order book, which represents 42% of the entire sample. In an examination of the less 
liquid stocks, this proportion increases dramatically, and for stocks outside the top 
200, few (if any) can be transacted immediately downstairs. Furthermore, when 
liquidity is sufficient, the number of transactions where the cost downstairs is lower 
than cost upstairs is few in number, especially with the smaller stocks. Therefore, 
upstairs trades appear to occur because i) there is insufficient liquidity to trade 
downstairs, and/or ii) the cost of moving the market is often large, especially when 
liquidity is low. These findings are thus consistent with Hypothesis 5.1 and 
Hypothesis 5.2. The choice of trading venue is examined in greater detail in Section 
5.5, after controlling for confounding effects.  
 
5.3.2 Sensitivity Tests 
 
Results documented previously use the bid-ask quotes at the trade reporting time to 
determine the direction of upstairs trades. However, as upstairs trades are manually 
entered into the trading platform, there may be a small delay between the execution 
and reporting of these trades. To gauge the sensitivity of the previous results to the 
choice of methodology used, two additional measures of bid-ask quotes are used: the 
bid-ask spread five and ten minutes prior to the reported time of the upstairs trades. 
The analysis conducted in Section 5.3.1 is repeated here, using bid-ask quotes and 
depths prior to the reported trade times, but is otherwise identical. 
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Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 report respectively, the results obtained using bid-ask quotes 
and depths five and ten minutes prior to the upstairs trade reporting time. Results here 
are consistent with those presented in Table 5.3 and the notion that upstairs trades are 
typically used when liquidity in the downstairs limit order book is low, or associated 
trading costs are high. Results appear insensitive to the methodology used to 
determine the direction of upstairs trades. 
 
Table 5.4: Cost of Sending an Upstairs Trade Downstairs – Five Min. Quote Lag 
 
In this table, the execution cost of an upstairs trade is compared with a theoretical cost 
if it was instead routed to the downstairs limit order book. Cost of sending an upstairs 
trade to the limit order book is defined as VWAP of the trade, minus the bid-ask 
midpoint in the downstairs market five minutes before the trade reporting time. When 
an upstairs trade is sent downstairs, the limit order book five minutes before the 
reporting time could either have insufficient liquidity to absorb the trade, cost less, 
cost more, or cost the same as the upstairs trade. Results are further categorised into 
groups based on market capitalisation.  
 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Group 
      Insufficient 
liq in the 
limit order 
book 
Sufficient liq in the limit order book 
Initiator 
No. of 
trades 
cost up > 
cost down 
cost up < 
cost down 
cost up = 
cost down 
All Buyer 33,710 13,479 18,374 1,017 840 
Seller 39,044 17,273 19,855 957 959 
1-20 Buyer 14,427 2,350 10,852 831 394 
Seller 15,128 2,558 11,338 799 433 
21-50 Buyer 9,745 4,125 5,247 120 253 
Seller 10,759 4,827 5,548 101 283 
51-100 Buyer 5,113 3,380 1,568 40 125 
Seller 6,297 4,089 2,014 30 164 
101-200 Buyer 3,229 2,498 645 20 66 
Seller 4,514 3,549 869 20 76 
201-500 Buyer 1,081 1,013 62 4 2 
Seller 2,092 1,998 85 6 3 
501+ Buyer 115 113 0 2 0 
  Seller 254 252 1 1 0 
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Table 5.5: Cost of Sending an Upstairs Trade Downstairs – Ten Min. Quote Lag 
 
In this table, the execution cost of an upstairs trade is compared with a theoretical cost 
if it was instead routed to the downstairs limit order book. Cost of sending an upstairs 
trade to the limit order book is defined as VWAP of the trade, minus the bid-ask 
midpoint in the downstairs market ten minutes before the trade reporting time. When 
an upstairs trade is sent downstairs, the limit order book ten minutes before the 
reporting time could either have insufficient liquidity to absorb the trade, cost less, 
cost more, or cost the same as the upstairs trade. Results are further categorised into 
groups based on market capitalisation.  
 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Group 
      Sufficient liq in the limit order book 
Initiator 
No. of 
trades 
Insufficient 
liq in the 
limit order 
book 
cost up > 
cost down 
cost up < 
cost down 
cost up = 
cost down 
All Buyer 34,043 13,787 17,939 1,536 781 
Seller 38,972 17,268 19,294 1,496 914 
1-20 Buyer 14,470 2,403 10,467 1,266 334 
Seller 15,163 2,586 10,915 1,269 393 
21-50 Buyer 9,920 4,281 5,202 184 253 
Seller 10,706 4,823 5,445 166 272 
51-100 Buyer 5,180 3,442 1,558 53 127 
Seller 6,273 4,085 1,983 32 173 
101-200 Buyer 3,243 2,502 652 24 65 
Seller 4,499 3,538 868 23 70 
201-500 Buyer 1,115 1,046 60 7 2 
Seller 2,073 1,981 81 5 6 
501+ Buyer 115 113 0 2 0 
  Seller 258 255 2 1 0 
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5.4 Trade Filtration in Upstairs Markets Without ‘Fairness’ Rules 
 
5.4.1 Statistical Analyses 
 
This section documents the absence of a ‘fairness’ rule on the ASX, and its effects on 
upstairs pricing. Seppi (1990) predicts that informed traders receive poorer execution 
costs upstairs. Brokers will either accept trades, or reject them if the cost in 
information asymmetry exceeds the benefits. Therefore, these ‘fairness’ rules 
effectively censor cases in which the traders are deemed to be informed by the 
upstairs brokers. This makes the examination of trades which are more likely to be 
informed difficult. No ‘fairness’ rules exist on the ASX and upstairs trades can be 
executed at any agreed price. Trades perceived as being more informed are therefore 
not immediately discarded, as is the case of markets with more restrictive rules. This 
allows greater flexibility in studying upstairs broker behaviour in the presence of 
trades that are perceived as more informed. To test the hypothesis that information-
motivated trades receive poorer execution costs upstairs, the ‘price improvement’ 
provided to upstairs traders relative to the downstairs spread is calculated. This is 
defined as: 
 
Ask
TradeAsktimprovemen )( −= , for buyer-initiated trades,  (5.4) 
Bid
BidTradetimprovemen )( −= , for seller-initiated trades,  (5.5) 
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where Trade is the upstairs trade price, and Bid and Ask are respectively the 
contemporaneous downstairs bid and ask quotes at the reported time of the upstairs 
trade. 
 
Table 5.6 categorises trades into four groups based on the size and sign of ‘price 
improvement’. Upstairs trades either execute within the best downstairs quotes, at the 
best downstairs quotes, within 1% of the downstairs quotes, or otherwise.  For each 
category, the number of observations, the median price improvement, and the median 
downstairs price movement from the prevailing mid-quotes to the closing price are 
reported. Results are further separated based on the direction of trade, with Panel A 
and Panel B displaying respectively, the results for buyer- and seller-initiated upstairs 
trades. 
 
The results show that the proportion of upstairs trades executed outside of the spread 
is large on the ASX, being 28.11% for buys and 33.14% for sells. This is in contrast 
to Bessembinder and Venkataranman (2004), who find that for a subset of trades that 
are allowed to execute outside of the best spread, only 10.4% of buys and 9.3% of 
sells actually do. As expected, when ‘fairness’ rules do not exist, there is a greater 
variation in upstairs trade prices. The median post-trade price movements are 
monotonically increasing with groups that receive poorer execution costs. The size of 
median ‘price improvement’ for upstairs purchases (sales) ranges from 0.1490% 
(0.1587%) for trades that occur within the downstairs quotes, to -1.8032% (-2.0101%) 
for trades that executed more than 1% away from the downstairs quotes. The first 
three groups, which have the most favourable execution costs, have similar post-trade 
price movements. Post-trade returns for purchases (sales) in these three groups range 
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from 0.0826% (-0.0485%) to 0.1022% (-0.0619%). However, the last group, which 
receive poorer execution costs in comparison to the first three, have significantly 
larger post-trade returns of 0.4427% for purchases and -0.1518% for sales. The results 
are therefore consistent with Hypothesis 5.4. 
 
Table 5.6: The Distribution of Upstairs Trade Prices – Contemporaneous Quotes 
 
In this table, the ‘price improvement’ provided to upstairs traders relative to the 
contemporaneous downstairs bid-ask spread is calculated. Trades are then categorised 
into four groups based on the size and sign of ‘price improvement’. This table reports 
the number of observations in each category, the median price improvement, and the 
median stock returns from the bid-ask quote midpoint to the close.  
 
Price improvement category No. of Trades 
Med. price 
improvement 
(%) 
P-Value 
Med. return 
until close 
(%) 
P-Value 
Panel A: Buyer Initiated 
Within best bid/ask 1,994 0.1490 0.0000 0.1022 0.0000 
At best bid/ask 21,098 0.0000 N/A 0.0956 0.0000 
Less than 1% away from best bid/ask 8,383 -0.1529 0.0000 0.0826 0.0000 
More than 1% away from best bid/ask 647 -1.803 0.0000 0.4427 0.0000 
Panel B: Seller Initiated           
Within best bid/ask 2,175 0.1587 0.0000 -0.0524 0.0227 
At best bid/ask 24,226 0.0000 N/A -0.0619 0.0000 
Less than 1% away from best bid/ask 11,398 -0.1736 0.0000 -0.0485 0.0000 
More than 1% away from best bid/ask 1,688 -2.010 0.0000 -0.1518 0.0000 
 
 
There are two alternative explanations for the above results. The first is that these 
trades are not informed, but rather, are submitted with poor timing. While upstairs 
brokers may know the reputation of the trader based on their prior dealings, given that 
prices are moving quickly in the market, reputation alone may be insufficient to 
certify that these trades are information-free. The second alternative is that these 
traders are uncertified. Allowing uncertified traders to trade with their clients runs a 
 109 
greater risk of damaging their own reputation (and hence their future profits). A larger 
premium is therefore necessary to cover these additional risks. Both of these 
alternative explanations are at least partially consistent with the filtration of trades that 
are more likely to be informed, or at greater risk of adverse selection.  
 
An implication of Seppi (1990) is that, in a multi-period game, informed traders are 
filtered out and denied trading opportunities. In effect, reputation becomes a perfect 
proxy to the information content of upstairs trades. In contrast to these predictions, the 
results in Table 5.4 indicate that trades more likely to be informed are still allowed to 
execute upstairs, although they incur greater execution costs. Therefore the results 
show that upstairs brokers use market conditions (in conjunction with reputation, 
which is by no means a perfect proxy to information content) to determine the 
information content of trades. If upstairs brokers have some knowledge about the 
future volatility of stock prices (at least in the short-run, even if this knowledge is 
noisy), then it would be entirely rational for them to incorporate this information in 
upstairs pricing.16  
 
These results also add to the growing literature that presents execution costs as a 
function of market conditions [e.g. Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood, 2004]. 
Results presented in this section differs to those Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood 
(2004), who link the price impact of institution trades to bull versus bear markets, and 
                                                 
16 Upstairs brokers are advantaged in two ways in comparison with other market participants with 
respects to information. First, they are affiliated with equity analysts from the same firm. In the absence 
of perfectly functioning Chinese walls, brokers may have access to more price-sensitive information 
that the rest of the market. Second, they have access to order flow information specific to the orders 
placed by their clients. While this may be a somewhat noisy proxy to the market order flow, it is 
nevertheless information that may be used to predict future price movements.  
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are determined on a monthly basis. In contrast, this section finds that brokers make 
use of shorter lived information to price upstairs trades.  
 
Table 5.7: The Distribution of Upstairs Trade Prices – Five Min. Quote Lag 
 
The ‘price improvement’ provided to upstairs traders relative to the downstairs bid-
ask spread five minutes prior the reported trade time is calculated. Trades are then 
categorised into four groups based on the size and sign of ‘price improvement’. This 
table reports the number of observations in each category, the median price 
improvement, and the median stock returns from the bid-ask quote midpoint to the 
close.  
 
Price improvement category No. of Trades 
Med. price 
improvement 
(%) 
P-Value 
Med. return 
until close 
(%) 
P-Value 
Panel A: Buyer-Initiated 
Within best bid/ask 1,929 0.1402 0.0000 0.0937 0.0000 
At best bid/ask 20,648 0.0000 N/A 0.1383 0.0000 
Less than 1% away from best bid/ask 9,936 -0.1562 0.0000 0.1909 0.0000 
More than 1% away from best bid/ask 812 -1.843 0.0000 0.6623 0.0000 
Panel B: Seller-Initiated           
Within best bid/ask 2,076 0.1386 0.0000 -0.0423 0.1950 
At best bid/ask 22,554 0.0000 N/A -0.1030 0.0000 
Less than 1% away from best bid/ask 12,211 -0.1745 0.0000 -0.1420 0.0000 
More than 1% away from best bid/ask 1,766 -2.041 0.0000 -0.2515 0.0000 
 
 
These results and inferences are also in contrast to those presented by Fong, 
Madhavan and Swan (2004), who find similar permanent price impact in upstairs and 
downstairs block trades on the ASX. They conclude that upstairs and downstairs 
trades have similar information content, which they source as evidence against 
information filtering by upstairs brokers. Results obtained in this chapter show that 
while reputation filtering by upstairs brokers may not be perfect (as evidenced by the 
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use of market conditions), it nevertheless does occur, albeit in a more complex 
fashion than the processes proposed by Seppi (1990).  
 
5.4.2 Sensitivity Tests 
 
If upstairs trades are reported with a small delay, then results obtained previously 
using the contemporaneous limit order book may cause bias in the price improvement 
and post-trade return metrics. To control for this possibility, analysis conducted in 
Section 5.4.1 is repeated using the limit order book five and ten minutes prior to the 
upstairs reporting time. The limit order book five and ten minutes prior to the upstairs 
trade is used to determine the trade direction, the size of the price improvement, and 
post-trade returns. The methodology is otherwise identical. Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 
report respectively the results obtained using bid-ask quotes five and ten minutes prior 
to the upstairs trade reporting time.  
 
Overall, these two tables convey similar results to those seen in Table 5.6, and are 
consistent with the notion that upstairs markets detect informed trading. Upstairs 
trades that receive poorer prices from upstairs brokers typically have larger post-trade 
price movement.  
  
 112 
Table 5.8: The Distribution of Upstairs Trade Prices – Ten Min. Quote Lag 
 
The ‘price improvement’ provided to upstairs traders relative to the downstairs bid-
ask spread ten minutes prior the reported trade time is calculated. Trades are then 
categorised into four groups based on the size and sign of ‘price improvement’. This 
table reports the number of observations in each category, the median price 
improvement, and the median stock returns from the bid-ask quote midpoint to the 
close.  
 
Price improvement category No. of Trades 
Med. price 
improvement 
(%) 
P-Value 
Med. return 
until close 
(%) 
P-Value 
Panel A: Buyer-Initiated 
Within best bid/ask 1,762 0.1481 0.0000 0.1264 0.0000 
At best bid/ask 18,421 0.0000 N/A 0.1368 0.0000 
Less than 1% away from best bid/ask 12,360 -0.1754 0.0000 0.1900 0.0000 
More than 1% away from best bid/ask 1,103 -1.942 0.0000 0.5291 0.0000 
Panel B: Seller-Initiated           
Within best bid/ask 2,033 0.1487 0.0000 0.0000 0.6710 
At best bid/ask 20,189 0.0000 N/A -0.0971 0.0000 
Less than 1% away from best bid/ask 14,236 -0.1893 0.0000 -0.1458 0.0000 
More than 1% away from best bid/ask 2,084 -2.057 0.0000 -0.4209 0.0000 
 
 
5.5 Determinants on the Propensity to Trade Upstairs 
 
5.5.1 Statistical Analyses 
 
In this section, a trader’s choice of trading venue is modelled. While Section 5.3 
shows that block trades are usually sent upstairs when liquidity in the limit order book 
is low, or downstairs trading costs are high, there may be many confounding effects. 
The following Probit specification is proposed for modelling the propensity of 
upstairs block-trading: 
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The variable size is the natural logarithm of the trade value, mcap is the natural 
logarithm of the stock market capitalisation, spread is the percentage bid-ask spread 
of the stock immediately prior to the block trade, vola is the volatility of the stock 
measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the daily high and low prices, and 
Dpost2001 is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the trade occurs during or after 
January, 2000, and zero otherwise. 
 
One expects a larger trade size to increase the likelihood that a trade is sent upstairs. 
The execution of a large trade is naturally limited by the availability of liquidity in the 
limit order book, while no such restrictions are placed on upstairs trades (provided an 
upstairs broker can either find sufficient counter parties, or is willing to bear the risk 
themselves). Similarly, it is expected that traders prefer upstairs markets for block 
trades in smaller stocks. The sign for the market capitalisation coefficient is therefore 
expected to be negative.  
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The sign for percentage spread is expected to be positive for two reasons. First, since 
spreads proxy for the level of liquidity and trading costs in the limit order book at the 
time of the block trade, higher bid-ask spreads are expected to increase the likelihood 
that a trade is executed upstairs. Second, the bid-ask spread also measures the level of 
information asymmetry in the stock, both contemporaneously, and cross-sectionally. 
At times of increased information asymmetry, a liquidity-motivated block trade 
downstairs might easily be misinterpreted as informed. Therefore, in line with Seppi 
(1990), uninformed traders will prefer upstairs markets, where their ‘reputation’ 
provides them certification. The volatility metric used in this study is a measure of 
absolute price range within a trading day, and can be considered akin to the speed of 
stock price movements. When prices move quickly (higher volatility), one expects 
greater information asymmetry, and therefore less willingness from upstairs brokers 
to arrange such trades.  
 
Table 5.9 reports the results from the probit analysis. After removing all trades 
executed outside of 10am to 4pm, or observations that had missing information on 
any of the variables, there are in total 205,959 block trades, of which 128,013 are 
downstairs, and 77,946 are upstairs. All coefficients are in the direction of a priori 
expectations and are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
To examine the model’s goodness of fit, a ‘count pseudo R-squared’ is computed. 
This involves calculating the predicted probability, generated from the probit. If the 
predicted probability equal or exceeds 0.5, then it is deemed to be a predicted upstairs 
trade, otherwise it is predicted to be a downstairs trade. The predicted venue is 
compared to the actual venue, and the percentage of accurate predictions is reported 
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as the ‘count pseudo R-squared’. As a benchmark, the pseudo R-square is compared 
to the percentage of all block trades that are executed downstairs. In the absence of 
any information to predict block trade venues, one’s best (and naïve) guess is simply 
the frequency of trades that were historically executed upstairs/downstairs, which is 
62.15% for the current sample.    
 
Table 5.9: Choice of Trading Venue – Contemporaneous Quotes 
 
This table analyses the propensity for a block trade to be routed upstairs (as opposed 
to downstairs), modelled in the following manner with a probit specification: 
 
i
post
iiiiiii eDvolaspreadmcapsizeU ++++++= 200154321* βββββα   
 
The model includes a variable for trade size, stock size, the contemporaneous 
downstairs bid-ask spread, the downstairs price volatility, and a date dummy variable. 
 
Parameters Estimate Std. Error Wald Chi-Sq P-Value 
intercept 4.246 0.0487 7,615 <.0001 
size 0.6749 0.0053 16,343 <.0001 
mcap -0.1776 0.0021 7,045 <.0001 
spread 0.3295 0.0047 4,984 <.0001 
vola -0.0040 0.0011 14 0.0002 
post2001 -0.9520 0.0067 19,905 <.0001 
Count pseudo R-square = 72.34% 
 
An examination of the pseudo R-square suggests that the model has predictive power 
that exceeds a naïve benchmark by approximately 10%. The complexity of the 
decision process however, is apparent in the lack of near perfect predictive power. 
This suggests that various other factors (not considered in by this model) are 
important determinants on the choice of trading venue.  
 
As expected, larger trades are more likely to be arranged upstairs, where liquidity is 
not limited in the traditional sense. Trades in larger stocks are less likely to be routed 
 116 
upstairs. Smaller stocks have lower liquidity in the downstairs limit order book, and 
will therefore place a greater reliance on upstairs markets for liquidity provision. The 
percentage spread, which is a measure for both liquidity and asymmetric information, 
has a positive coefficient. Increased volatility17 reduces the likelihood of upstairs 
execution.  
 
This is consistent with the notion that upstairs markets reduce information asymmetry 
by filtering out information-motivated trades. This also suggests that upstairs brokers 
may use market conditions, in conjunction with reputation, as a means of filtering out 
informed trades. Consistent with the results presented in Section 5.2, the date dummy 
variable indicates that the Australian market has reduced its reliance on upstairs 
liquidity. This is possibly caused by an improvement in the downstairs liquidity over 
time, making it easier to execute block trades on the limit order book. Overall, the 
probit results are consistent with Hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, and results portrayed in 
previous sections. 
 
5.5.2 Sensitivity Tests 
 
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 examine the robustness of results obtained in Table 5.9 by using 
the bid-ask spread five and ten minutes prior to the reporting timestamp of an upstairs 
trade. This procedure controls for a possible delay in trade reporting, which may 
increase the measurement error of limit order book conditions immediately preceding 
an upstairs trade. As downstairs trades do not suffer from delayed reporting, no 
                                                 
17 This measure of volatility is based on the dispersion of trade prices within an entire trading day. The 
alternative is to use the prevailing dispersion of trade prices immediately prior to a block trade. A 
probit model based on this method yields qualitatively similar results, albeit with a lower level of 
statistical significance. 
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adjustments are made to these trades in comparison with Table 5.9. The model is 
otherwise identical to those used in Table 5.9. 
 
Overall, signs of parameter coefficients from Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 are identical 
to those presented previously in Table 5.9. With the exception of the bid-ask spread 
variable, magnitudes of coefficient estimates are also similar. In comparison to Table 
5.10 and Table 5.11, the coefficient for the bid-ask spread is much larger in Table 5.9. 
A larger economic significance (and higher pseudo R-square) from using the 
prevailing bid-ask spread is reassuring. Therefore, conclusions made previously are 
robust to possible delays in upstairs trade reporting times. 
 
Table 5.10: Choice of Trading Venue – Five Min. Quote Lag 
 
This table analyses the propensity for a block trade to be routed upstairs (as opposed 
to downstairs), modelled in the following manner with a probit specification: 
 
i
post
iiiiiii eDvolaspreadmcapsizeU ++++++= 200154321* βββββα   
 
The model includes a variable for trade size, stock size, the downstairs bid-ask spread 
with a five min. lag, the downstairs price volatility, and a date dummy variable. With 
the exception of the spread variable, the model used in Table 5.10 is otherwise 
identical to Table 5.9. 
 
Parameters Estimate Std. Error Wald Chi-Sq P-Value 
intercept 4.994 0.0471 11,264 <.0001 
size 0.6508 0.0051 16,120 <.0001 
mcap -0.2088 0.0021 10,368 <.0001 
spread 0.0609 0.0015 1,620 <.0001 
vola -0.0035 0.001 11 0.0008 
post2001 -0.9826 0.0067 21,426 <.0001 
Count pseudo R-square = 71.91% 
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Table 5.11: Choice of Trading Venue – Ten Min. Quote Lag 
 
This table analyses the propensity for a block trade to be routed upstairs (as opposed 
to downstairs), modelled in the following manner with a probit specification: 
 
i
post
iiiiiii eDvolaspreadmcapsizeU ++++++= 200154321* βββββα   
 
The model includes a variable for trade size, stock size, the downstairs bid-ask spread 
with a ten min. lag, the downstairs price volatility, and a date dummy variable. With 
the exception of the spread variable, the model used in Table 5.11 is otherwise 
identical to Table 5.9. 
 
Parameters Estimate Std. Error Wald Chi-Sq P-Value 
intercept 4.892 0.0472 10,754 <.0001 
size 0.6538 0.0051 16,148 <.0001 
mcap -0.2044 0.0021 9,891 <.0001 
spread 0.0912 0.0018 2,579 <.0001 
vola -0.0032 0.001 10 0.0019 
post2001 -0.9757 0.0067 21,119 <.0001 
Count pseudo R-square = 71.56% 
 
Table 5.12 examines the robustness of results obtained in Table 5.9 with the inclusion 
of two additional date dummy variables. In comparison to the model used in Table 
5.9, these two dummy variables capture wider temporal differences in the propensity 
to trade upstairs. These two dummy variables are respectively, Dpost1998, which is 
equal to one if the trade occurs during or after January, 1998, and zero otherwise, and 
Dpost2004, which is equal to one if the trade occurs during or after January, 2004, and 
zero otherwise. The model is specified as follows, but is otherwise identical to the one 
used in Table 5.9: 
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Overall, signs of parameter coefficients from Table 5.12 are identical to those 
presented previously in Table 5.9. All date dummy variables have significantly 
negative coefficients and are consistent with Table 5.9 and the notion that improving 
downstairs liquidity reduces the need to trade upstairs. Results are therefore robust to 
the choice of date dummy variables.   
 
Table 5.12: Choice of Trading Venue – Additional Date Dummy Variables 
 
This table analyses the propensity for a block trade to be routed upstairs (as opposed 
to downstairs), modelled in the following manner with a probit specification: 
 
i
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The model includes a variable for trade size, stock size, the contemporaneous 
downstairs bid-ask spread, the downstairs price volatility, and three date dummy 
variables. With the exception of two additional date dummy variables, the model used 
in Table 5.12 is otherwise identical to Table 5.9. 
 
Parameters Estimate 
Std. 
Err. 
Wald Chi-
Sq P-Value 
intercept 4.357 0.0493 7,814 <.0001 
size 0.6844 0.0053 16,649 <.0001 
mcap -0.1771 0.0021 6,895 <.0001 
spread 0.3254 0.0047 4,806 <.0001 
vola -0.0055 0.0011 26 <.0001 
post1998 -0.1722 0.0134 165 <.0001 
post2001 -0.7593 0.0083 8,467 <.0001 
post2004 -0.2974 0.0063 2,237 <.0001 
Count pseudo R-square = 72.53% 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
The literature argues that upstairs facilities are valuable to traders because they offer 
taps into unexpressed liquidity (Grossman, 1992) and for their ability to filter out 
informed trades (Seppi, 1990). Using 10 years of data from the ASX, this study 
examines downstairs market conditions around upstairs trades. In addition, the current 
 120 
study models a block trader’s choice between upstairs and downstairs markets, and 
how these trades are priced by the upstairs brokers.   
 
Consistent with prior literature, this chapter shows that upstairs markets are typically 
used when liquidity in the downstairs market is lacking, or when these costs are high. 
Upstairs markets are especially useful for trades of greater complexity, that is, larger 
trades and trades in smaller stocks, which are often difficult to arrange in the 
downstairs limit order book. These findings are generally consistent with the widely 
held belief that upstairs markets allow for the execution of trades that would 
otherwise not have occurred. However, in the analysis of block-trading trends, 
markets appear less reliant on upstairs facilities as a source of liquidity with the 
passage of time. This result is likely driven by the natural improvement in downstairs 
liquidity over time, which further lends support to the value of upstairs markets as a 
source of liquidity.   
 
The results show that in the absence of ‘fairness’ rules, a large number of upstairs 
trades do occur outside of the best downstairs spread. However, consistent with the 
predictions of Seppi (1990), trades that are more likely to be informed receive poorer 
execution costs than those less likely to be informed. This provides evidence that 
upstairs brokers may use other information in addition to trader reputation (e.g. 
market conditions) to determine the information content of trades. The results 
presented in this study are therefore consistent with those of Chiyachantana, Jain, 
Jiang and Wood (2004), who report market conditions as a strong determinant of 
execution costs for institutional traders in the downstairs market.   
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Chapter 6: Unequal Access to Analyst Research 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Information asymmetry refers to one party having more or superior information to 
others. Merton (1987) separates information asymmetry into two dimensions: 
information asymmetry between investors and the management (depth), and 
information asymmetry between shareholders (breadth). While the extant literature 
overwhelmingly suggests that equity analysis reduces a company’s cost of capital, 
insufficient distinction is made with the asymmetry between investor and the 
management, and asymmetry between investor groups. With regards to equity 
analysis, if the distribution of analyst reports is unequal, one cannot conclude that 
information asymmetry has decreased. When a subset of clients receive more 
information, or information in a more timely manner, asymmetry between 
management and the shareholders as a group may reduce, but asymmetry between 
different shareholders may actually increase.  
 
This chapter seeks to clarify the relationship between equity analysts and information 
asymmetry by examining the level of investor access to analyst reports. Specifically, 
this chapter focuses exclusively on the asymmetry between shareholders, and seeks to 
show that: 
 
i. Leakages exist in analyst recommendations, and certain customers of broker-
analyst firms trade on these leakages, which nets them abnormal profits 
(Hypothesis 6.1); 
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ii. Investors of greater sophistication make greater use of analyst reports, even in 
the absence of leakages (Hypothesis 6.2). 
 
The only other studies that examine the financial benefits in obtaining a research 
report early are Kim, Lin, and Slovin (1997), and Green (2006). These studies, 
however, focus on the timing difference between the official release of an analyst 
report and when that information is picked up by the rest of the market through word 
of mouth, or through the mass media. This study represents an investigation into 
leakages in analyst reports prior to the official release, and therefore differs 
significantly from these papers.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the data 
source, while Section 6.3 provides evidence of information leakages in analyst reports 
and their likely profitability. Section 6.4 analyses whether a subset of investors are 
more sophisticated, that is, whether they make use of information from a wider range 
of sources. Section 6.5 summarises this chapter’s findings.  
 
6.2 Data 
 
The data used in this chapter comes from a proprietary dataset containing all trades on 
the ASX between 1996 and 2008 with fields for stock code, date, time, price, volume, 
and the buying and selling brokers. Data pertaining to equity analysis is obtained from 
I/B/E/S through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). This comes in three parts: 
earnings per share forecasts, consensus earnings forecasts, and stock 
recommendations. The earnings forecast dataset contains fields for analyst firm, stock 
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ticker, date of forecast, forecasting period, and value of forecast. The consensus 
forecast database contains the stock ticker, forecasting period, mean/median 
consensus forecasts, number of forecasts, and the standard deviation of forecasts. The 
recommendations dataset contains the stock ticker, analyst firm, recommendation 
date, recommendation time, and the stock recommendation issued. While each analyst 
firm has its own rating system, I/B/E/S standardises these into five levels, which 
roughly correspond to strong buy, buy, hold, sell, and strong sell. 
 
Through the use of a historical list provided by the ASX detailing the names and 
broker IDs of each brokerage house across time, brokers in the I/B/E/S dataset are 
matched to brokers in the trade level data. All this is further supplemented with index 
data from Yahoo Finance, and with the Signal G ASX announcements database 
provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).  
 
6.3 Leakages in Analyst Recommendations 
 
This section tests Hypothesis 6.1 by investigating the possible presence of leakages in 
analyst recommendations, and the likely financial benefits of trading on these 
leakages. Between 1996 and June 2008, there are in total 46,348 analyst 
recommendations in 1,273 stocks (identified by tickers). This section classifies 
recommendations into upgrades or downgrades by comparing each recommendation 
with the previous recommendation issued by the same analyst firm. While 
recommendations themselves might be biased, changes in recommendations might not 
be, especially when rational investors take note of any historical biases and 
systematically correct for them. Recommendations that did not change are therefore 
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excluded from the analysis. This approach is consistent with Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, 
and Lee (2004), where changes in recommendations are found to be stronger 
predictors of returns. Of the 46,348 recommendations, 33,302 represent clear 
upgrades or downgrades. 
 
Recommendations are classified into those that occur during a trading session, and 
those that occur outside of one (i.e. before market open, or after market close). There 
is a danger in combining recommendations released during trading hours, given a 
large variation in the amount of time available for the market to process the 
information. For example, a recommendation released two minutes prior to the close 
may not cause a market reaction until the following day. Combining this together with 
recommendations released immediately after the open will introduce significant noise. 
To reduce the severity of this issue, and consistent with Green (2006), all 
recommendations released during market trading hours are excluded, with a total of 
25,074 recommendations remaining. After matching recommendations to a list of 
ASX research brokers and trades database, there are 8,750 recommendations 
remaining. 
 
Welch (2000) finds that equity analyst recommendations suffer from the effects of 
herding. Clement and Tse (2005) argue that bolder recommendations (i.e. those that 
do not suffer from herding) are more informative to the market. Herding, and 
generally recommendations being contemporaneously close to one another, cause 
confounding effects that are difficult to disentangle. Indeed, criticisms of the event 
study methodology usually stem from the lack of controls for confounding events, 
which makes drawing inferences both dangerous and difficult. Therefore, all 
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recommendations released within a week of another recommendation (in the same 
stock) are excluded from the analysis. Recommendations around information events 
likewise cause results to be confounding. This section excludes all recommendations 
within two weeks of a company announcement deemed market-sensitive by the ASX. 
After excluding these observations, 1,082 upgrades and 1,161 downgrades remain. 
The sample selection criteria is summarised in Table 6.1. 
 
An initial (and interesting) observation is the approximate equality in the number of 
upgrades and downgrades after controlling for herding effects and other information 
events. It therefore appears that analysts are not inherently biased, but rather become 
biased when incentives are present for them to be backward-looking. This is most 
severe when the analyst comes across a piece of information that s/he believes s/he 
has overlooked, as in the case of recommendations issued by another institution, or a 
company announcement. This may be driven, at least in part, by analysts’ attempts to 
maintain their reputation (e.g. see Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 1998; and Graham, 
1999). When no contemporaneous information events confound an analyst, s/he is 
more likely to recommend based purely on his/her private information. Consequently, 
there is no evidence that analyst recommendations are inherently biased. 
 
To investigate the extent to which leakages occur in analysts’ reports, daily order flow 
imbalances around the public release of stock recommendations are examined. 
Specifically, the variable of interest is the order flow imbalance for the broker 
recommending the stock, in the stock being recommended. Order flow imbalance is 
defined as the recommending broker’s aggregate daily buy volume divided by the 
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broker’s total volume for the recommended stock during the trading session. For 
broker i on day t, the imbalance is:  
 
Imbalanceit= Buy_Volit Total_Volit⁄     (6.1) 
 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of the Sample Selection Criteria 
 
This table summarises the sample selection criteria used in Section 6.3. It reports the 
action(s) taken, and the rationale for these actions. Also reported are the number of 
observations removed at each step, and the numbers remaining.  
 
Action Taken Summary of Reason for Removal 
No. 
Obs. 
Before 
No. 
Removed 
No. 
Obs. 
After 
Removal of all 
recommendations that are not 
clear upgrades or 
downgrades, or reiterated a 
previous recommendation 
from the same brokerage 
firm. 
Unless a recommendation is 
an upgrade or a downgrade, it 
is unclear whether it is a 
positive or a negative 
information event. 
46348 13046 33302 
Recommendation that are 
released during a trading 
session are removed 
It is difficult to gauge the 
market effects of different 
recommendations that are 
released at different times 
within a trading session. 
33302 8227 25075 
Only included 
recommendations by analysts 
that have a brokerage 
presence within Australia. 
This section examines the 
activities of ASX broker-
analysts around 
recommendation 
upgrades/downgrades. Unless 
the analysts have a brokerage 
business in Australia, this 
analysis is nonsensical. 
25075 16325 8750 
Removed confounding 
effects, that is, 
recommendations that are 
released within 1 week of 
another recommendation by 
another analyst, and 
recommendations released 
within two weeks of a market 
sensitive company 
announcement (as determined 
by the ASX). 
Confounding effects reduce 
the validity of conclusions 
drawn from results. 
8750 6507 2243 
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To measure deviations from market expectations, the broker’s average daily order 
flow imbalance from four months to one month before the analyst recommendation is 
used as the benchmark imbalance. Abnormal order flow imbalance is examined for 
ten trading sessions before and after the recommendation. Note that ten trading 
sessions are not the same as ten trading days. For example, if a stock recommendation 
is made at 6pm, then the previous trading session is on the same calendar day, and the 
next trading session on the subsequent weekday. Consequently the 0th trading session 
(or day 0 commonly found in event studies) does not exist in this study, and due care 
is advised when interpreting the tables and figures. Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 report the 
mean abnormal order imbalances for upgrades and downgrades in the event window, 
and associated student t-test p-values.  
 
The results suggest that stock recommendations are perceived to be informative, and 
are traded on. Upon brokers issuing an upgrade (downgrade), there is abnormal and 
significant buy (sell) side order flow imbalance, which remains significant until day 9 
(with the exception of day 3 for upgrades). Of greater interest to this study, however, 
is the order flow prior to the release of a stock recommendation, as they represent 
abnormal trading patterns possibly linked to leakages. For upgrades, buy-side order 
flow becomes significantly higher one trading session prior to the release of the 
recommendation. For downgrades, sell-side order flow is significantly larger up to 
four trading sessions before. This observably significant change in broker order flow 
is consistent with the presence of leakages prior to analysts’ recommendations. 
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Table 6.2: Abnormal Order Flow Surrounding Equity Analysts’ 
Recommendations 
 
This table reports the mean abnormal order flow imbalance surrounding changes in 
equity analysts’ recommendations. Order flow is defined as the issuing broker’s total 
shares purchased (in the stock being recommended) on the day divided by the sum of 
purchases and sales. Abnormal order flow is the broker order flow minus a benchmark 
order flow, defined as a broker’s average daily order flow imbalance from four 
months to one month before the recommendation. The mean abnormal order flow of 
upgrades and downgrades is examined for ten trading sessions before and after the 
recommendation, with significance determined by student t-tests with alphas at 5%. 
  
Trading 
Period 
Upgrades (n=1082) Downgrades (n=1161) 
Mean Abn. 
Orderflow (%) P-Value 
Mean Abn. 
Orderflow (%) P-Value 
-10 -0.4144 0.7428 1.0095 0.4025 
-9 -2.434 0.0553 0.0526 0.9657 
-8 0.0756 0.9530 1.281 0.2894 
-7 -1.883 0.1331 2.028 0.0989 
-6 0.2312 0.8547 -2.068 0.0939 
-5 0.9632 0.4543 -0.8441 0.4790 
-4 -1.092 0.3942 -3.410 0.0048 
-3 -0.0140 0.9912 -6.278 0.0000 
-2 0.2507 0.8443 -3.092 0.0118 
-1 3.911 0.0025 -2.955 0.0179 
1 3.266 0.0097 -4.795 0.0001 
2 5.011 0.0001 -4.083 0.0008 
3 2.110 0.0982 -3.886 0.0016 
4 2.750 0.0328 -3.358 0.0086 
5 2.934 0.0200 -2.980 0.0180 
6 5.463 0.0000 -2.878 0.0212 
7 3.430 0.0072 -2.466 0.0486 
8 2.671 0.0345 -4.913 0.0001 
9 2.004 0.1142 -1.990 0.1026 
10 1.475 0.2447 -2.423 0.0527 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6.1: Abnormal Order Flow Surrounding Equity Analysts’ 
Recommendations 
 
Figure 6.1 displays the mean abnormal order flow imbalances for analyst-brokers 
surrounding changes in stock recommendations, in excess of a three-month historical 
benchmark. Order flow imbalance is measured by dividing the recommending 
analyst-broker’s purchase volume by their total volume in a trading session.  
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To investigate the profitability of trading on leakages, the market-adjusted abnormal 
returns around recommendations are examined. Returns are defined as the close-to-
close returns on a stock, net of returns on an index in the corresponding period. While 
optimally one should use the S&P/ASX 300 Index, an index that roughly equates to 
stocks with analyst coverage, this index did not exist until April 2000. This chapter 
therefore uses a broader market index, the All Ordinaries (roughly equivalent to the 
top 500 stocks) as a proxy of market returns. Table 6.3 and Figure 6.2 report the mean 
and median abnormal returns surrounding changes in recommendations. 
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Table 6.3: Abnormal Returns Surrounding Equity Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
This table reports the mean and median abnormal returns surrounding changes in analyst recommendations. Trading session abnormal returns 
are defined as the close-to-close returns on the stock being recommended, net of the returns on the All Ordinaries Index. Mean and median 
abnormal returns for upgrades and downgrades are examined for ten trading sessions before and after the recommendation change, with 
significance determined respectively by student t-tests and sign rank tests, with alphas at 5%. 
 
Trading 
Period 
Upgrades (n=1082) Downgrades (n=1161) 
Mean AR (%) P-Value Med. AR (%) P-Value Mean AR (%) P-Value Med. AR (%) P-Value 
-10 -0.0663 0.3139 -0.1120 0.0478 0.0485 0.3875 -0.0311 0.8106 
-9 -0.0733 0.2517 -0.0951 0.0278 0.0918 0.2106 0.1022 0.0029 
-8 -0.0495 0.5332 -0.1330 0.0200 0.0002 0.9982 -0.0361 0.9621 
-7 -0.0620 0.4269 -0.1253 0.0107 0.0788 0.2969 0.0598 0.0572 
-6 -0.0779 0.2051 -0.0657 0.1043 0.0933 0.2432 0.1277 0.0164 
-5 -0.1164 0.1183 -0.1503 0.0038 0.0185 0.7818 0.0547 0.2295 
-4 -0.1792 0.0023 -0.1697 0.0000 0.0974 0.1460 0.1228 0.0576 
-3 -0.1077 0.0893 -0.1477 0.0394 0.0055 0.9324 -0.0323 0.8104 
-2 0.1316 0.0433 -0.0420 0.3096 -0.0604 0.5151 0.0273 0.7329 
-1 0.1420 0.0337 0.0124 0.2508 -0.0018 0.9774 -0.1496 0.0788 
1 0.3407 0.0000 0.1832 0.0000 -0.2114 0.0007 -0.1307 0.0004 
2 0.1588 0.0149 0.0996 0.0088 -0.2746 0.0000 -0.1650 0.0000 
3 0.0984 0.0977 0.0522 0.2248 -0.1846 0.0028 -0.1343 0.0000 
4 0.0661 0.2116 0.0170 0.4915 -0.0760 0.1696 -0.1078 0.0319 
5 0.0448 0.4149 0.0172 0.7136 -0.0837 0.1379 -0.0547 0.0925 
6 0.0664 0.2516 -0.0123 0.5501 -0.0328 0.5672 -0.1208 0.1600 
7 0.0952 0.1040 0.0756 0.0840 0.0011 0.9865 -0.0610 0.1555 
8 -0.0722 0.2587 -0.0590 0.1525 -0.0448 0.5463 -0.1065 0.0861 
9 0.0803 0.4153 0.0651 0.3007 0.0567 0.5730 0.0281 0.3983 
10 0.0573 0.4451 0.0182 0.4028 0.0847 0.5430 -0.0612 0.3991 
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Figure 6.2: Abnormal Returns Surrounding Equity Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
Figure 6.2 displays stock returns surrounding changes in analyst recommendations, 
net of returns on the All Ordinaries Index in the corresponding period. Panel A 
displays mean abnormal returns, while Panel B displays median abnormal returns. 
 
Panel A: Means 
 
 
Panel B: Medians 
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Consistent with prior literature, results suggest that recommendations are valuable 
(e.g. Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1983), and mean abnormal returns on the 
trading session immediately after an upgrade (downgrade) are a statistically 
significant 0.3441% (-0.2236%). Abnormal returns remain significant for a further 
two trading sessions for downgrades, and one trading session for upgrades. In 
conjunction with Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1, these results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 6.1; that leakages in analysts’ reports exist, and these are valuable for 
those who trade on them. 
 
An interesting and peculiar observation is the lack of a long price run-up normally 
associated with information leakages. Results suggest that abnormal returns prior to 
the release of the recommendation are more likely to be positive for downgrades, and 
negative for upgrades. While these abnormal returns are statistically insignificant on 
their own, their accumulation is significant (shown later). This is inconsistent with 
results of prior information leakage studies. In fact, the literature considers positive 
abnormal returns prior to the release of positive information, and negative returns 
prior to negative information, as mandatory evidence for the presence of leakages.   
 
A difference in the nature of the information leakage being studied may help to 
explain this peculiarity. To illustrate, let us juxtapose stock recommendations against 
a commonly examined information leakage involving corporate control. Prior to a 
merger announcement, information is often held by numerous parties associated with 
the deal, from the management, underwriters, lawyers, and accountants for example. 
This information is often known long before the official announcement. When they 
decide to trade on this private information, they compete with other informed traders 
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and therefore trade aggressively, quickly moving prices.18  In the case of a stock 
recommendation, the knowledge lies exclusively with the analyst and their brokerage 
house, and there is no urgency to trade as soon as the information becomes available 
to them. Therefore, leakages in stock recommendations will be unlikely to experience 
the same price run-up observed in corporate control events.  
 
To further examine this issue, market-wide activity for these stocks around stock 
recommendations is analysed. Volume in the event window is benchmarked against 
the daily average volume for the recommended stock one to four months prior to the 
recommendation. For each day t and recommendation i, the student t-test is computed 
as follows: 
 
ݐ௜௧ ൌ
௠௞௧_௩௢௟௨௠௘೔೟
௦ௗ೔
ඥ௡೔
൘
        (6.2) 
 
where sdi is the standard deviation of the benchmark estimate, and ni the number of 
days used to calculate the benchmark. Table 6.4 reports the mean percentage 
abnormal volume and proportion of cases where the student t-stat exceeds a value of 
0.7, representing a level of significance of approximately 20-25%. Figure 6.3 displays 
the percentage abnormal volume graphically. 
 
 
  
                                                 
18 Foster and Viswanathan (1996) conclude that when multiple informed traders have information that 
is highly correlated, or in fact identical, it becomes a “rat race” to reach the market first. 
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Table 6.4: Abnormal Volume Surrounding Equity Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
This table reports the mean abnormal volume surrounding changes in analyst 
recommendations. Abnormal volume is defined as the market volume for the stock 
being recommended, net of the historical daily average volume from four months to 
one month before the recommendation. This table also reports the percentage of cases 
where t-values for abnormal volume exceed 0.7, representing a level of significance 
of approximately 20-25%. Results for upgrades and downgrades are examined for 10 
trading sessions before and after changes in analyst recommendations. All numbers 
reported are in percentages. 
 
Trading 
Period 
Mean Abn. Vol (%) Prop. t>0.7 (%) 
Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
No. obs 1082 1161 1082 1161 
-10 -0.6189 -2.236 37.99 38.85 
-9 -4.919 5.947 40.94 42.03 
-8 8.118 1.153 41.96 41.77 
-7 6.808 9.072 40.67 40.66 
-6 3.747 4.654 42.51 40.40 
-5 7.101 10.94 39.28 42.21 
-4 6.000 15.09 41.68 43.24 
-3 7.628 4.845 43.90 40.48 
-2 8.611 8.202 43.16 40.05 
-1 6.521 -0.8170 42.05 38.59 
1 9.694 0.8984 46.58 42.38 
2 1.293 6.554 44.55 43.07 
3 1.029 -1.613 42.05 39.62 
4 -6.522 0.2327 38.35 40.83 
5 -4.525 -2.502 38.08 36.61 
6 -5.449 3.144 39.46 38.59 
7 -0.7305 8.810 40.67 41.86 
8 3.809 11.66 40.30 43.24 
9 -1.372 6.129 37.80 40.66 
10 1.132 7.606 38.91 41.00 
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Figure 6.3: Abnormal Volume Surrounding Equity Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
Figure 6.3 displays the mean abnormal volume (%) surrounding changes in stock 
recommendations, net of a historical three-month benchmark. 
 
 
 
 
Despite larger volumes in the days leading up to the recommendation, less than half 
of these cause an abnormally large increase, even at a very marginal level. This is 
attributable to the large variation normally associated with daily volume, and the level 
of control the analysts have in leaking recommendations. If a recommendation is 
leaked to only a handful of investors (as opposed to all clients), the rise in volume will 
be much lower in significance. Therefore, while leakages do create larger volumes, it 
is difficult for the market to detect these leakages, as only a limited number of traders 
act on the information. This is in stark contrast to the large volumes prior to merger 
announcements (e.g. Keown and Pinkerton, 1981), where informed traders compete 
with one another.  
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The analysis, however, does not explain why returns before and after the 
announcement move in opposite directions. Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood 
(2004) find that market conditions are a major determinant of price impact for 
institutional investors. Purchases made during bear markets and sales made during 
bull markets experience significantly lower price impact. Leaking upgrades during 
falling markets and downgrades during rising markets is therefore consistent with the 
minimisation of transaction costs. When filling client orders, brokers face less 
competition for liquidity, and simultaneously reduce the risk of detection by the rest 
of the market.  
 
To examine the likely benefit of transacting in favourable market conditions, two 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated, one from t(-10) to t(-2), and 
another from t(+1) to t(+10), excluding t(-1) altogether. The first window represents 
the CAR prior to the leakage of recommendations (transaction cost benefit), and the 
second represents the price run-up following trading (investment returns). Table 6.5 
and Figure 6.4 present these findings. From t(+6) onwards, the second window yields 
a mean CAR of 0.7751% to 0.9357% for upgrades and -0.7654% to -0.9068% for 
downgrades. The CAR is at its maximum on t(+10) for buys and t(+8) for sales, with 
respective returns at 0.9357% and -0.9068%. This shows that clients of brokers who 
acquired (or offloaded) positions prior to a stock recommendation stand to gain 
approximately 0.75-0.9% for a holding period of two weeks or less. 19  The first 
window yields the largest mean CAR at t(-3), where returns are -0.7323% and 
0.4340% respectively for upgrades and downgrades. 
 
19 Using a window of t(-1) to t(+10) yields similar results. 
Table 6.5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding Equity Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
This table reports the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding changes in analyst recommendations. Two CARs are 
calculated, a pre-event window from t(-10) to t(-2), displayed in Panel A, and a post-event window from t(+1) to t(+10), displayed in Panel B. 
Significance of mean and median CARs is determined respectively by student t-tests and sign rank tests, with alphas of 5%. 
 
Trading 
Period 
Upgrade (n=1082) Downgrade (n=1161) 
Mean CAR (%) P-Value Med. Car (%) P-Value Mean CAR (%) P-Value Med. Car (%) P-Value 
Panel A: Pre-event 
-10 -0.0663 0.3139 -0.1120 0.0478 0.0485 0.3875 -0.0311 0.8106 
-9 -0.1397 0.1274 -0.1972 0.0187 0.1403 0.1257 0.1395 0.0205 
-8 -0.1891 0.1063 -0.1968 0.0183 0.1405 0.2755 0.1294 0.0344 
-7 -0.2512 0.0797 -0.3673 0.0009 0.2192 0.1471 0.3208 0.0006 
-6 -0.3290 0.0331 -0.4375 0.0001 0.3126 0.0657 0.4911 0.0000 
-5 -0.4454 0.0088 -0.6670 0.0000 0.3311 0.0721 0.5213 0.0001 
-4 -0.6246 0.0005 -0.8902 0.0000 0.4285 0.0279 0.7158 0.0000 
-3 -0.7323 0.0001 -0.8631 0.0000 0.4340 0.0370 0.6214 0.0000 
-2 -0.6007 0.0028 -0.8369 0.0000 0.3736 0.1019 0.6952 0.0000 
Panel B: Post-event 
1 0.3407 0.0000 0.1832 0.0000 -0.2114 0.0007 -0.1307 0.0004 
2 0.4995 0.0000 0.2836 0.0000 -0.4860 0.0000 -0.3884 0.0000 
3 0.5978 0.0000 0.3950 0.0000 -0.6706 0.0000 -0.5332 0.0000 
4 0.6639 0.0000 0.4888 0.0000 -0.7466 0.0000 -0.5880 0.0000 
5 0.7088 0.0000 0.4936 0.0000 -0.8303 0.0000 -0.7718 0.0000 
6 0.7751 0.0000 0.5470 0.0000 -0.8631 0.0000 -0.7711 0.0000 
7 0.8703 0.0000 0.6322 0.0000 -0.8620 0.0000 -0.7914 0.0000 
8 0.7981 0.0000 0.6007 0.0000 -0.9068 0.0000 -0.8394 0.0000 
9 0.8784 0.0000 0.8284 0.0000 -0.8501 0.0000 -0.7843 0.0000 
10 0.9357 0.0000 0.8354 0.0000 -0.7654 0.0002 -0.7161 0.0000 
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Figure 6.4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding Equity Analysts’ 
Recommendations 
 
Figure 6.4 displays the daily cumulative abnormal returns surrounding changes in 
analyst recommendations. Two CAR windows are presented, one from t(-10) to t(-2), 
and another from t(+1) to t(+10). Panel A displays mean cumulative abnormal returns, 
while Panel B contains medians.  
 
Panel A: Mean 
 
 
 
Panel B: Median 
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By trading when prices are moving in the opposite direction of the intended trade, 
analysts (and their investment firm) minimise transaction costs for their clients, which 
can be interpreted as a ‘cost saving’ of sorts. The observations made here are not, 
however, free from limitations, and should be interpreted with some caution. First, it 
is impossible to estimate what transaction costs would have been, had analysts not 
timed their recommendations. It is therefore difficult to estimate the true benefit to 
market timing. However, given that transaction costs are generally positive, these 
results represent the floor to cost savings. To add complexity to the mixture, one can 
never prove with any degree of certainty that market timing was attempted. While the 
results presented are consistent with market timing, these results could be driven by a 
number of factors. 
 
It is entirely plausible for the odd pre-event price ‘run-down’ (as opposed to run-up) 
to be an artefact of the sample selection procedure. While this procedure minimise the 
confounding effects of contemporaneous information events, it also reduces the 
likelihood that the sampled recommendations are based on a reinterpretation of 
publicly available information. The remaining recommendations are therefore likely 
to be driven by two factors: inside information or a reiteration of an analyst’s price 
target. The former is not inconsistent with the notion of market timing. However, the 
latter may occur when stock prices drop (rise) significantly below (above) an analyst’s 
target price. In the absence of any information (public or private) to suggest 
otherwise, the analyst may be inclined to believe the stock to be over/under priced, 
and therefore issue a change in recommendation despite not making any changes to 
their target price. This may be an alternative explanation as to why upgrades 
(downgrades) are preceded by a fall (rise) in stock prices. 
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6.4 Who Makes Greater Use of Analyst Information? 
 
This section examines whether customers of more reputable analysts make their 
investment decisions based on a larger number of analyst forecasts. While the 
reputation of analysts (and their investment firm) can be proxied using analysts’ 
rankings, this is not without potential issues. Analysts are usually ranked based on the 
industry they cover. While knowledge of an industry is a necessary precondition for a 
successful analyst, this does not necessarily imply that the best analyst in a field is the 
most informed in all stocks for that industry. It is plausible for an unranked analyst to 
be the most informed in a stock for the simple reason of being the only analyst 
covering it. As an alternate proxy, an investment firm’s yearly volume market share 
for each stock, as an indicator of reputation, is used. 
 
To test Hypothesis 6.2, analyst EPS forecasts that are made between 1996 and 2008 
are examined. The method involves matching EPS forecasts by two different brokers 
on the same stock, where estimates are identical, are for the same forecast period, and 
are published within one weekday of each other, but not on the same day. This strict 
filter ensures that the two forecasts contain an equivalent amount of information, 
except for the possibility that one broker may have the advantage in reputation. For 
each matched pair, the broker having the larger market share (for the calendar year) in 
that stock is deemed to have higher reputation. 
 
Four order flow imbalance measures are used, and are related to the way in which 
customers of the two investment firms react to each other’s EPS forecasts. These 
ratios are:  
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A. Customers of the more reputable investment firm reacting to the EPS forecasts 
of the more reputable firm; 
B. Customers of the less reputable investment firm reacting to the EPS forecasts 
of the more reputable firm; 
C. Customers of the more reputable investment firm reacting to the EPS forecasts 
of the less reputable firm; 
D. Customers of the less reputable investment firm reacting to the EPS forecasts 
of the less reputable firm. 
 
Two tests are conducted to gauge the extent to which information is used by the 
customers of the more reputable and less reputable investment firms. Test 1 (A minus 
B) measures differences in the use of forecasts provided by the more reputable firm, 
while test 2 (C minus D) measures differences in the use of forecasts provided by the 
less reputable firm. If the hypothesis is correct, then one would expect one of the 
following to occur: 
 
1) A-B > 0 and C-D > 0; that is, customers of the more reputable firm use more 
analyst information provided by both firms; 
2) A-B > 0 and C-D = 0; that is, customers of the more reputable firm use more 
analyst information, but only in those provided by the more reputable firm. 
Both customer groups use an equal (or statistically indifferent) amount of 
analyst information from the less reputable firm; 
3) A-B = 0 and C-D > 0; that is, customers of the more reputable firm use more 
analyst information, but only in those provided by the less reputable firm. 
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Both customer groups use an equal (or statistically indifferent) amount of 
analyst information from the more reputable firm. 
 
Table 6.6 reports the median values of tests 1 and 2, and their associated sign rank p-
values. There are in total 1498 matched pairs which satisfy the matching criteria, of 
which 680 exhibit a buy signal, and 818 exhibit a sell signal. For matches with a buy 
signal, customers of the more reputable investment firm react more to forecasts 
provided by both firms, when compared with the customers of the less reputable firm. 
On average, customers of the more reputable firm purchase 4.52% more for forecasts 
provided by the more reputable firm, and 4.72% more when they are issued by a less 
reputable firm. For matches with a sell signal, there are no significant differences in 
their reactions.  
 
Therefore, it appears that the customers of more reputable investment firms show a 
greater degree of sophistication (at least for forecasts that exhibit a buy signal); that is, 
they make wider use of available information. This suggests that even in the absence 
of leakages in analyst reports, the customers of more reputable firms are likely to 
benefit more from equity analysis than other traders. It is possible that these traders 
are better endowed, and therefore can afford to subscribe to the research services of 
numerous investment firms. 
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Table 6.6: Abnormal Returns Surrounding Equity Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
This table reports the differences in the use of analyst earnings forecasts by customers 
of larger investment firms and those of smaller investment firms. The method 
involves matching EPS forecasts by two different brokers on the same stock, where 
estimates are identical, are for the same forecast period, and are published within one 
weekday of each other, but not on the same day. Test A represents the customers of 
the more reputable investment firm reacting to the EPS forecasts of the more 
reputable firm. Test B represents the customers of the less reputable investment firm 
reacting to the EPS forecasts of the more reputable firm. Test C represents the 
customers of the more reputable investment firm reacting to the EPS forecasts of the 
less reputable firm. And test D represents the customers of the less reputable 
investment firm reacting to the EPS forecasts of the less reputable firm. Test A-B 
measure differences in the use of forecasts provided by the more reputable firm, while 
test C-D measure differences in the use of forecasts provided by the less reputable 
firm. The statistical significance of mean and median differences in A and B, and C 
and D, are respectively tested with a t-test and sign rank test, at an alpha of 5%.  
 
Tests 
Buy Signal (n=680) Sell Signal (n=818) 
Mean (%) P-value Median (%) P-value Mean (%) P-value Median (%) P-value 
A 52.82 - - 49.56 - - 
B 48.30 - - 49.63 - - 
C 49.79 - - 52.05 - - 
D 45.07 - - 49.65 - - 
A-B 4.524 0.0320 2.290 0.0275 -0.0726 0.9695 0.0000 0.9347 
C-D 4.716 0.0201 1.289 0.0244 2.399 0.1975 0.0000 0.1880 
 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
This chapter finds evidence consistent with the leakage of analyst recommendations, 
which provide financial benefits in a magnitude of approximately 0.75-0.9%. Previous 
studies document the presence of price run-ups prior to information leakages. 
Contrasting these studies, this chapter finds that positive analyst recommendations 
tend to be leaked when prices are trending downwards, while negative 
recommendations are leaked when prices trend upwards. Consistent with the 
minimisation of transaction costs (and Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood, 2004), 
this study finds cost savings in excess of 0.4% for analysts who release 
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recommendations during favourable market conditions. However, it is unknown to 
what extent the results are driven by the strict sample selection criteria.  
 
This chapter also finds evidence that clients of larger brokers are more sophisticated, 
and have access to research from a greater number of analysts. This is consistent with 
the view that better endowed traders have greater access to information. Therefore, 
even if leakages do not exist, the distribution of equity information is unlikely to be 
equal. 
 
Taken together, these results shed light on the complexity of the relationship between 
equity research and information asymmetry. While equity analysts are shown to 
reduce the level of information asymmetry between the management and 
shareholders, it appears that the distribution of information between shareholders is 
far from even. 
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Chapter 7: Anonymity and Heterogeneously Informed 
Brokers 
 
 “At the time, the ASX said the market players had been canvassed on the 
matter, the jury was out, and academic studies suggested a broker ID blackout 
would enhance liquidity. The idea was that people were more likely to trade, 
and therefore generate greater turnover, if nobody knew who was in the 
market doing what. Many brokers and fund managers were deadset against 
the idea, a handful were for it, but the overall vibe was ‘more transparency is 
better than less transparency’.” 
 - ‘Blackout that caused an identity crisis’, Michael West, The Australian, 
February 17, 2007. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 7 re-examines the effect of anonymous trading. While broker IDs naturally 
affect the execution ability of brokers, the extant empirical literature focuses 
predominantly on market-wide effects (e.g. Foucault, Moinas and Theissen, 2007; 
Comerton-Forde, Frino and Mollica, 2005; Comerton-Forde and Tang, 2008; and 
Frino, Gerace and Lepone, 2008), and find that markets improve on average. This 
does not necessarily imply, however, that anonymity is Pareto-efficient, especially 
when a particular group of brokers benefits at the expense of others. 
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While exchanges have been quick to unite in anonymity on the grounds of greater 
market quality, concerns of fairness have been raised in an ASX consultation paper 
and by the media. These concerns have some validity, as the removal of broker IDs is 
likely to affect different market participants in different ways, possibly benefiting 
some at the expense of others. The recent empirical literature, however, focuses 
predominantly on market-wide effects of anonymity, citing improved market quality 
indicators such as lower bid-ask spreads.  
 
This chapter disentangles from a pool of averages the effect of anonymity on 
heterogeneously informed brokers. Brokers are the natural unit of analysis for broker 
IDs because they are the only ones that have legal access to them. This chapter makes 
use of a unique dataset made available from the ASX, which includes the identities of 
brokers in every trade. This allows a separation from a pool of averages, the winners 
and losers in the anonymity game, and the mechanisms at work. As a consequence of 
the approach used, this is the first study to examine the execution ability of brokers 
around changes in anonymity, and possibly the first to examine broker execution 
ability in general. Three hypotheses are tested in this chapter. The first hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 7.1) tests the average market-wide implications of anonymity for 
transaction costs. The latter two hypotheses (Hypothesis 7.2 and Hypothesis 7.3) 
examine the likely beneficiaries of anonymity, by separating heterogeneously 
informed brokers.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. Section 7.2 describes the data used 
in this study, while Section 7.3 examines market-wide effects caused by the ASX 
broker ID
 147 
removal. Section 7.4 investigates the effects of broker ID removal on the trading costs 
of different brokers, while Section 7.5 controls for trade size differences. Section 7.6 
analyses the price discovery implication, while Section 7.7 examines the effect of 
anonymity on broker market share. Section 7.8 concludes and summarises the 
findings.  
 
7.2 Data 
 
This chapter examines one calendar year before and after the removal of broker IDs 
from the ASX on 28 November, 2005. Data used in this chapter are from a proprietary 
dataset provided by the ASX. It contains stock code, date, time, trade price, trade 
volume, the buyer broker ID, and the seller broker ID. As the data contain no 
information on the initiating party, it is difficult to classify trades into buys and sells. 
To overcome this issue, the dataset is supplemented with a list of all trades from 
TAQTIC, offered by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific 
(SIRCA). This dataset comes from a Reuters feed, and contains stock code, date, time, 
trade price, trade volume, the prevailing best bid, and the prevailing best ask. The 
direction of the trade is then determined using the prevailing bid-ask quotes.  
 
7.3 Market-Wide Execution Costs - Pool of Averages 
 
To introduce a level of consistency with prior studies, this section tests Hypothesis 7.1 
by examining the market-wide effects of a switch to an anonymous trading regime. In 
particular this section is interested in the average execution costs for market orders of 
different-sized stocks, before and after the ASX broker ID removal. Two classical 
 148 
price impact measures are used in the analysis: the “total price effect”, and the 
“temporary price effect”, also commonly known as the price reversal. As proxies to 
these measures, the returns from the open to trade and from the trade to the close are 
used. These are adjusted by the returns of the prevailing All Ordinaries Index in the 
corresponding time period. The two metrics are defined as follows: 
 
Open to Tradei= 
VWAPi,t
Open
- Indext
Index Open
     (7.1) 
Trade to Closei= 
Close
VWAPi,t
- Index Close
Indext
      (7.2) 
 
Stocks are separated into four groups based on their daily closing market 
capitalisation; the top 100 stocks, 101-200, 201-500, and 501+. These correspond 
roughly to stocks in the ASX 100 Index, the ASX 200 Index, the All Ordinaries 
Index, and those uncovered by indices. Market orders that execute against multiple 
limit orders are ‘packaged’ together, with their volume-weighted average price, 
VWAPi,t used as the trade price. There are in total 12,026,685 market orders sampled 
in Table 7.1, 6,096,641 of which are purchases, and 5,930,044 are sales. Sample size 
for purchases (sales) in the top 100, 101-200, 201-500, and 501+ stock groups are 
respectively 3,692,401 (3,546,344), 1,076,979 (1,070,471), 854,208 (849,005), and 
473,053 (464,224). To examine the significance of changes in transaction costs, a t-
test is conducted on the difference of two means, assuming unequal variance20 in the 
pre- and post-anonymity regimes. 
                                                 
20 F-tests are conducted to test the variances of the two anonymity regimes for each stock group. As the 
null hypothesis (of unequal variance) cannot be rejected for any of the stock groups, variances are 
therefore assumed to be unequal. However, t-test results using equal variances are similar, and do not 
qualitatively change any of the conclusions.  
Table 7.1: Anonymity and Market-Wide Execution Costs 
 
This table reports the mean effect of anonymity on market-wide execution costs. Two execution cost measures are employed; open to trade and 
trade to close. Open to trade is defined as the return from the opening to the trade, and trade to close as the return from the trade to the closing. 
Both measures are adjusted for the returns of the All Ordinaries Index in the corresponding period. Results are reported separately for pre- and 
post-anonymity regimes, and the resulting change is grouped by market capitalisation, and the direction of the trade. Two sample t-tests are 
conducted to examine the significance of the mean changes (assuming unequal variance, with p-values reported).  
 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Group 
No. Trades Open to Trade Trade to Close 
Pre Post Pre (%) Post (%) Change (%) P-Value Pre (%) Post (%) Change (%) P-Value 
All     
    Buys 6,096,641 8,948,628 0.2476 0.2114 -0.0362 0.0000 -0.0689 -0.0598 0.0091 0.0000 
    Sells 5,930,044 9,251,660 -0.1887 -0.1667 0.0220 0.0000 0.0507 0.0605 0.0098 0.0000 
    
Top 100     
    Buys 3,692,401 5,348,716 0.0192 -0.0283 -0.0475 0.0000 -0.0344 -0.0410 -0.0066 0.0000 
    Sells 3,546,344 5,417,018 -0.0745 -0.0885 -0.0139 0.0000 0.0291 0.0319 0.0028 0.0000 
    
101-200     
    Buys 1,076,979 1,591,805 0.0919 0.0584 -0.0336 0.0000 -0.0535 -0.0431 0.0104 0.0000 
    Sells 1,070,471 1,795,198 -0.1852 -0.1531 0.0321 0.0000 0.0601 0.0966 0.0365 0.0000 
    
201-500     
    Buys 854,208 1,282,208 0.4182 0.3466 -0.0715 0.0000 -0.0802 -0.0460 0.0342 0.0000 
    Sells 849,005 1,347,760 -0.4505 -0.3220 0.1285 0.0000 0.1147 0.1167 0.0020 0.3955 
    
501+     
    Buys 473,053 725,899 2.077 2.074 -0.0026 0.8291 -0.3524 -0.2590 0.0934 0.0000 
    Sells 464,224 691,684 -0.5900 -0.5115 0.0785 0.0000 0.0772 0.0821 0.0049 0.4971 
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Table 7.1 shows that across all stocks on average (results ungrouped by market 
capitalisation), open to trade returns are significantly reduced for both buys and sells. 
For purchases (sales), average change in open to trade returns pre- and post-
anonymity is -0.0362% (0.0220%). Changes in trade to close returns for purchases 
(sales) are 0.0091% (0.0098%).  
 
For  results grouped by market capitalisation, open to trade returns also appear to 
decrease significantly, with the exception of sales in the top 100 stocks (which 
increased), and purchases in the 501+ stock group (with a statistically insignificant 
change). Changes in open to trade returns for purchases (sales) in the top 100, 101-
200, 201-500, and 501+ stock groups  are respectively -0.0475% (-0.0139%), -
0.0336% (0.0321%), -0.0715% (0.1285%), and -0.0026% (0.0785%).  
 
Trade to close return changes based on market capitalisation are erratic and do not 
appear to have strong systematic patterns. However, trade to close returns do appear 
to decrease in the top 100 stocks for both purchases and sales. Changes in trade to 
close returns for purchases (sales) in the respective stock groups are -0.0066% 
(0.0028%), 0.0104% (0.0365%), 0.0342% (0.0020%), and 0.0934% (0.0049%), with 
statistical significance at the 1% level in all cases except sales in the 201-500 and 
501+ stock groups. 
 
The recent literature either predicts or finds lower bid-ask spreads following 
anonymity. To the extent that bid-ask spreads are related to transaction costs, the 
results are consistent with Hypothesis 7.1 and previous literature, and the notion that 
anonymity improves market quality on average. The results on trade to close returns 
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are less convincing, with a lack of consistency between stock groups, and between 
purchases and sales.  
 
7.4 Anonymity and the Trading Costs of Different Brokers 
 
Broker IDs are informative when they reveal to the market the identity of market 
participants who in the past have been perceived as being more informed. The market 
is more inclined to react (e.g. follow) the trades of these participants if they believe 
that this strategy will earn them higher returns. It is therefore plausible that the 
removal of broker IDs affects different brokers differently, depending on their level of 
informativeness. Previous literature, together with the findings in the previous section, 
document lower execution costs after the removal of broker IDs. Taken at face value, 
these results imply that the removal of broker IDs results in a market-wide cost 
saving, which may be misinterpreted as being Pareto-efficient. This section 
hypothesises that the distribution of these cost savings is unequal, and is skewed 
towards brokers with a reputation for being more informed (Hypothesis 7.2).  
 
Brokers are separated into two groups based on the market’s perception of their 
quality. For this purpose, a list of the top ten brokers from the 2005 Business Review 
Weekly East Coles Best Brokers Survey is obtained. Brokers are ranked in three 
categories based on their research, trade execution, and market making abilities. 
While brokers have different rankings within these categories, the same ten brokers 
appear in all three. The literature (and Chapter 6 of this dissertation) shows that 
research reports provided by equity analysts are informative and valuable (e.g. 
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Womack, 1996; Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman, 2001; Gleason and Lee, 
2003, and Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, these ten brokers are also the largest full-service brokers operating at the 
ASX, and receive a disproportionate amount of the total market order flow. Given the 
larger number of equity analysts (and other resources) at their disposal, and the 
amount of order flow they receive, these brokers are more likely to be informed than 
other brokers operating in the market. These ten brokers are therefore classified as the 
‘top brokers’ group, with the remaining brokers classified as the ‘other brokers’ 
group. 
 
The analysis conducted in Section 7.3 is repeated here. The methodology is identical, 
with a further classification of market order trades into those conducted by ‘top 
brokers’ and ‘other brokers’. Table 7.2 reports that in total there are 5,322,602 market 
orders from ‘top brokers’ and 6,704,083 from ‘other brokers’. The trades of ‘top 
brokers’ appear to be concentrated in the top 200 stocks, with the bottom two stock 
groups only accounting for 12.64% of all their trades. Table 7.2 also reports the mean 
open to trade, and trade to close returns for the two broker groups (Panel A for ‘top 
brokers’ and Panel B for ‘other brokers’) in the pre- and post-anonymity regimes. 
Similar to Table 7.1, results are further partitioned by market capitalisation groupings. 
 
When examining the results ungrouped by market capitalisation, there is a significant 
(at 5%) reduction in the mean open to trade returns for both broker groups in both 
buys and sells. For the purchases (sales) of ‘top brokers’, open to trade returns change 
on average by -0.0379% (0.0271%), while for ‘other brokers’, this change is -
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0.0047% (0.0107%). Therefore, while execution costs appear to reduce for both 
broker groups, the magnitude of the cost reduction is much larger for the ‘top 
brokers’.  
 
Open to trade results by market capitalisation groups convey similar information, 
albeit with more variation. For ‘top brokers’, changes in open to trade returns of 
purchases (sales) in the top 100, 101-200, 201-500, and 501+ stock groups are 
respectively -0.0458% (0.0073%), -0.0501% (0.0532%), -0.0210% (0.1157%), and 
0.0286% (0.0587%). Changes for ‘top brokers’ are significant at the 1% level, with 
the exception of the 501+ stock group, where purchases experience no significant 
change, while sales are significant only at the 5% level. For ‘other brokers’, changes 
in open to trade returns of purchases (sales) in the respective stock groups are -
0.0516% (-0.0360%), -0.0156% (0.0037%), -0.0696% (0.1295%), and -0.0011% 
(0.0818%). The changes in open to trade returns for ‘other brokers’ are also 
significant at the 1% level, with the exception of sales in the 101-200 group, and 
purchases in the 501+ group.  
 
For trade to close returns (ungrouped by market cap), the average size of price 
reversals for ‘top brokers’ (in both buys and sells) has significantly increased (at the 
1% level) in the post-anonymity period. The same results, however, are not seen in the 
trade to close returns of ‘other brokers’, where the average size of price reversals for 
purchases has decreased, and no significant change is seen in the price reversal of 
sales. Trade to close returns for the purchases (sales) of ‘top brokers’ change by -
0.0101% (0.0230%), while for ‘other brokers’, this change is 0.0197% (0.0000%).  
 
Table 7.2: Execution Cost of Top Research Brokers Versus Other Brokers 
 
The analysis conducted in Table 7.1 is repeated here, with trades further classified into those conducted by ‘top brokers’ and those conducted by 
‘other brokers’. A ‘top broker’ is defined as one that ranks within the top 10 brokers as determined by the Business Review Weekly East Coles 
Best Brokers of November 2005. The ‘other brokers’ group contains the remaining unranked brokers. Results are reported separately for pre- 
and post-anonymity regimes, with the resulting change grouped by market capitalisation, and the direction of the trade. Panel A contains the 
results for ‘top brokers’, while those for ‘other brokers’ are in Panel B. Two sample t-tests are conducted to examine the significance of the mean 
changes (assuming unequal variance, with p-values reported). 
 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Group 
No. Trades Open to Trade Trade to Close 
Pre Post Pre (%) Post (%) Change (%) P-Value Pre (%) Post (%) Change (%) P-Value 
        
Panel A: Top Brokers         
All                      
    Buys 2,671,722 4,425,549 0.0970 0.0591 -0.0379 0.0000 -0.0275 -0.0376 -0.0101 0.0000 
    Sells 2,650,880 4,840,587 -0.1690 -0.1418 0.0271 0.0000 0.0349 0.0578 0.0230 0.0000 
Top 100     
    Buys 1,826,119 2,879,794 0.0308 -0.0150 -0.0458 0.0000 -0.0234 -0.0354 -0.0119 0.0000 
    Sells 1,786,965 3,068,813 -0.0942 -0.0869 0.0073 0.0000 0.0179 0.0310 0.0131 0.0000 
101-200     
    Buys 515,162 927,098 0.1026 0.0525 -0.0501 0.0000 -0.0442 -0.0469 -0.0027 0.1051 
    Sells 521,423 1,073,181 -0.1906 -0.1374 0.0532 0.0000 0.0460 0.0977 0.0518 0.0000 
201-500     
    Buys 273,569 526,234 0.2530 0.2320 -0.0210 0.0000 -0.0156 -0.0353 -0.0196 0.0000 
    Sells 280,239 605,653 -0.4212 -0.3055 0.1157 0.0000 0.1060 0.1177 0.0117 0.0004 
501+     
    Buys 56,872 92,423 1.421 1.449 0.0286 0.2929 -0.0622 -0.0273 0.0349 0.0711 
    Sells 62,253 92,940 -0.9970 -0.9383 0.0587 0.0206 0.1074 0.0935 -0.0139 0.4347 
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Table 7.2 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Other Brokers 
All                      
    Buys 3,424,919 4,523,079 0.3650 0.3604 -0.0047 0.0239 -0.1012 -0.0815 0.0197 0.0000 
    Sells 3,279,164 4,411,073 -0.2047 -0.1939 0.0107 0.0000 0.0635 0.0635 0.0000 0.9886 
Top 100     
    Buys 1,866,282 2,468,922 0.0078 -0.0438 -0.0516 0.0000 -0.0452 -0.0475 -0.0023 0.0001 
    Sells 1,759,379 2,348,205 -0.0545 -0.0905 -0.0360 0.0000 0.0404 0.0330 -0.0074 0.0000 
101-200     
    Buys 561,817 664,707 0.0822 0.0665 -0.0156 0.0000 -0.0620 -0.0379 0.0241 0.0000 
    Sells 549,048 722,017 -0.1801 -0.1765 0.0037 0.1384 0.0735 0.0950 0.0214 0.0000 
201-500     
    Buys 580,639 755,974 0.4960 0.4264 -0.0696 0.0000 -0.1106 -0.0535 0.0571 0.0000 
    Sells 568,766 742,107 -0.4650 -0.3355 0.1295 0.0000 0.1190 0.1159 -0.0032 0.3122 
501+     
    Buys 416,181 633,476 2.1662 2.1651 -0.0011 0.9330 -0.3920 -0.2928 0.0992 0.0000 
    Sells 401,971 598,744 -0.5270 -0.4452 0.0818 0.0000 0.0725 0.0803 0.0078 0.3192 
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When examining results partitioned by stock groups, trade to close returns draw 
similar conclusions, albeit with some variation. For ‘top brokers’ the magnitude of 
price reversals generally increases. Changes in trade to close returns for the purchases 
(sales) of ‘top brokers’ in the respective stock groups are -0.0119% (0.0131%), -
0.0027% (0.0518%), -0.0196% (0.0117%), and 0.0349% (-0.0139%); and all are 
significant at the 1% level with the exception of purchases in the 101-200 stock group, 
and both purchases and sales in the 501+ stock group. The trades of ‘other brokers’ 
show a much lower level of consistency, and in many cases experience a fall in the 
average size of price reversals. For these ‘other brokers’, changes in trade to close 
returns for purchases (sales) in the respective stock groups are -0.0023% (-0.0074%), 
0.0241% (0.0214%), 0.0571% (-0.0032%), and 0.0992% (0.0078%). These returns 
are significant at the 1% level, with the exception of sales in the 201-500 and 501+ 
stock groups.  
 
In summary of the results so far, open to trade returns generally decrease in the post-
anonymity regime for both broker groups. Previous literature shows that bid-ask 
spreads decrease following a switch to an anonymous regime. Consistent with these 
findings, and the results presented in Section 7.3, both broker groups benefit from the 
reduction in total execution costs. The trades of ‘top brokers’ experience either an 
increase in the size of price reversals, or in other cases no significant change. This 
suggests that the removal of broker IDs has reduced the market’s capacity to identify 
those that are most likely to be informed.  
 
However, the change in the magnitude of price reversals appears less consistent for 
‘other brokers’ in comparison to ‘top brokers’, and actually increases in numerous 
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cases. There are two possible causes for this result: that the ‘other brokers’ are now 
more informed, or it is simply a case of mistaken identity, where a number of trades 
conducted by the ‘other brokers’ are erroneously judged as informed. The former is 
unlikely as little probable cause exists for ‘other brokers’ to have suddenly become 
more informed. It is therefore plausible that ‘other brokers’ have lost their ability to 
signal their identity (in being less informed), causing their trades to move prices more 
often.  
 
Taken as a whole, these results suggest that large and reputable full-service brokers 
are the major beneficiaries of the broker ID blackout, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 7.2. Given the larger number of equity analysts these firms typically 
employ, and the amount of order flow they receive, they are more likely to be 
informed than other brokers. Prior to the removal of broker IDs, these large brokers 
can be easily identified by the market, which will seek to replicate their strategies, 
quickly moving prices. In the anonymous regime, information can no longer be 
inferred from broker IDs (as they no longer exist), and the market instead relies solely 
on patterns in order flow. This increases the probability of ‘mistaken identity’ where 
informed trades are misclassified by the market as uninformed, and vice versa.   
 
7.5 Trade Size and Execution Costs 
  
Execution costs are positively related to the size of the transaction (e.g. Chan and 
Lakonishok 1993, 1995). This is affected by the available liquidity at the time of the 
trade, and the potential price movements caused by temporary liquidity imbalances 
(e.g. Stoll, 1979; Ho and Stoll, 1981). In addition to liquidity costs, Easley and 
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O’Hara (1987) argue that large trades move prices more often as they are used by the 
market to proxy for the level of information contained in the trade. The literature 
provides mixed empirical results on anonymity and trade size. Foucault, Moinas and 
Theissen (2007) find a strong increase in the average trade size post-anonymity, while 
Comerton-Forde and Tang (2009) report an increase in the average limit order size at 
the best bid and ask prices. However, as these studies do not distinguish between 
heterogeneously informed brokers, little can be concluded on the relationship between 
anonymity and the trade size of informed market participants.  
 
Kyle (1985) argues that informed traders attempt to conceal their activity by hiding 
among noise traders. To that end, one would expect informed traders to optimise their 
trading strategies to look less conspicuous, and possibly to appear similar to the trades 
of uninformed traders. In the transparent regime where the identities of brokers are 
displayed, trade size alone is a poor way for informed brokers to hide their intentions, 
as information can be derived from the brokers’ order flow and trade patterns.  
 
For example, imagine a stylistic thought experiment where an informed broker wishes 
to purchase 100,000 shares of a stock which they believe will have favourable 
performance in the future. They may choose to trade quickly and immediately, at 
which point they incur large liquidity costs. The alternative is to split the required 
number of shares into parcels, of for example 1,000 shares, and trade as liquidity 
becomes available in the market. While the latter strategy may reduce liquidity costs, 
it increases the risk of other market participants inferring information from their order 
flow, at which point the uninformed may choose to mimic their trades. These mimic 
trades move prices, which creates significant execution risk to the unexecuted portion 
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of their desired position. In anonymous markets, however, other traders have a greater 
difficulty in inferring information from order flow. This provides informed brokers 
with a larger incentive to hide their intention by making their trade size appear less 
informed. To the extent that smaller trades are perceived as less informed, one would 
therefore expect informed brokers to have a smaller average trade size in the 
anonymous regime.  
 
Table 7.3 reports the mean (Panel A) and median (Panel B) trade sizes (in dollar 
terms) in the pre- and post-anonymity periods. Across all stocks, mean trade size 
decreased by 17.30% for ‘top brokers’, and increased by 2.75% for ‘other brokers’, 
while median size decreased by 26.30% for the ‘top brokers’ and  0.36% for the ‘other 
brokers’.  
 
Overall, the average trade size of ‘top brokers’ has decreased by a greater amount (or 
has increased by a lower amount) in comparison to the trades of ‘other brokers’. 
Therefore, these results lend support to the notion that anonymity affects the optimal 
trading strategies of informed traders. Specifically, anonymity allows informed traders 
to better conceal their intentions by mimicking the trade size of less informed traders. 
Such a strategy would be less successful in the transparent regime, since a series of 
small trades in the same direction from the same broker would quickly cause 
suspicion. However, given the difficulty of controlling for all confounding events, it is 
difficult to say with certainty that other factors have not driven (at least in part) some 
of the results obtained on average trade size. For example, a progression to 
algorithmic trading over time could potentially decrease the average trade size of the 
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large full-service brokers, despite little change in their non-algorithmic trading 
behaviour.  
 
Table 7.3: Anonymity and Changes in Average Trade Size 
 
This table reports the mean (Panel A) and median (Panel B) trade size of ‘top brokers’ 
and ‘other brokers’ in the two transparency regimes, grouped by market capitalisation. 
This table also reports changes in the mean and median trade sizes. To examine the 
significance of mean changes, two sample t-tests are conducted, assuming unequal 
variance. The significance of changes in medians are conducted using rank-sum tests. 
 
Broker 
Group 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Group 
Trade Size ($) Change 
($) 
Change 
(%) P-Value 
Pre Post 
Panel A: Mean Trade Size 
Top Brokers All 34,956 28,908 -6,048 -17.30 0.0000 
Top 100 45,848 39,768 -6,080 -13.26 0.0000 
101-200 14,068 10,614 -3,454 -24.55 0.0000 
201-500 8,593 7,250 -1,343 -15.63 0.0000 
501+ 6,923 7,606 683 9.869 0.0000 
Other Brokers All 24,874 25,559 685 2.753 0.0000 
Top 100 37,054 38,338 1,284 3.465 0.0000 
101-200 15,228 14,865 -363 -2.384 0.0000 
201-500 9,705 10,201 497 5.117 0.0000 
  501+ 6,021 6,861 840 13.95 0.0000 
Panel B: Median Trade Size 
Top Brokers All 10,593 7,808 -2,786 -26.30 0.0000 
Top 100 15,934 12,760 -3,174 -19.92 0.0000 
101-200 4,754 2,378 -2,376 -49.98 0.0000 
201-500 3,104 1,452 -1,652 -53.22 0.0000 
501+ 3,903 4,170 267 6.829 0.0000 
Other Brokers All 8,820 8,788 -32 -0.3640 0.0000 
Top 100 14,461 14,558 97 0.6700 0.0000 
101-200 7,615 6,695 -920 -12.08 0.0000 
201-500 5,226 5,087 -139 -2.656 0.0000 
  501+ 3,500 3,960 460 13.14 0.0000 
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Irrespective of the underlying mechanisms that cause this, a change in average trade 
sizes is a reason for concern over the reliability of execution cost estimates provided 
in Sections 7.3 and 7.4. Smaller trades will on average reduce execution costs, as they 
are more likely to occur at the best bid or ask prices. It is therefore possible that lower 
execution costs are the product of smaller trades alone (especially for the ‘top 
brokers’), rather than an effect induced by anonymity. To control for trade size, a 
series of simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions are estimated.  
 
There are two dependent variables in the OLS regressions: the ‘total cost’ and the 
‘price reversal’. Negative returns in open to trade for sales, and trade to close for 
purchases, are converted into positive metrics by multiplying them by minus one. This 
provides easier interpretation and allows purchases and sales to be grouped together, 
avoiding an unnecessarily cumbersome number of regressions. The metrics are 
defined as follows:  
 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܥ݋ݏݐ௜ ൌ ൜
൅1 ൈ ܱ݌݁݊_ݐ݋_ܶݎܽ݀݁௜, ݂݋ݎ ݌ݑݎ݄ܿܽݏ݁ݏ
െ1 ൈ ܱ݌݁݊_ݐ݋_ܶݎܽ݀݁௜, ݂݋ݎ ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ
   (7.3) 
 
ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ܴ݁ݒ݁ݎݏ݈ܽ௜ ൌ ൜
െ1 ൈ ܶݎܽ݀݁_ݐ݋_ܥ݈݋ݏ݁௜, ݂݋ݎ ݌ݑݎ݄ܿܽݏ݁ݏ
൅1 ൈ ܶݎܽ݀݁_ݐ݋_ܥ݈݋ݏ݁௜, ݂݋ݎ ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ
  (7.4) 
 
Open to trade and trade to close are market-adjusted, and are as previously defined. 
Analysis is conducted separately for ‘top brokers’ and ‘other brokers’, and for stocks 
in the different market capitalisation groupings. The model used is simple, and 
includes the size of the trade measured in dollar terms (in units of $1 million), and a 
dummy variable for the post-anonymity regime. They are defined as follows: 
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ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܥ݋ݏݐ௜ ൌ  ߙ ൅ ߚଵ ൈ ܶݎܽ݀݁_ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߚଶ ൈ ܲ݋ݏݐ௜ ൅ ߝ௜  (7.5) 
 
ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ܴ݁ݒ݁ݎݏ݈ܽ௜ ൌ  ߙ ൅ ߚଵ ൈ ܶݎܽ݀݁_ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߚଶ ൈ ܲ݋ݏݐ௜ ൅ ߝ௜  (7.6) 
 
Table 7.4 reports the regression results for ‘top brokers’ in Panel A, and ‘other 
brokers’ in Panel B. After controlling for trade size, the ‘total costs’ of trades are  
significantly lower in the anonymous regime for both broker groups, across all stock 
groups, with the exception of  trades in the 501+ stock group by ‘top brokers’, which 
exhibit no significant change. Parameter estimates of the post-anonymity dummy 
variable for ‘top brokers’ (‘other brokers’) in the top 100, 101-200, 201-500, and 
501+ stock groups are respectively -0.0245% (-0.0088%), -0.0479% (-0.0067%), -
0.0660% (-0.0995%), and -0.0050% (-0.0336%). Interestingly, the coefficient for the 
trade value of ‘top brokers’ in 501+ stocks is negative, despite all other ‘total cost’ 
regressions carrying a positive coefficient. This suggests that a large trade by ‘top 
brokers’ reduces transaction costs, which is counterintuitive. It is possible that ‘top 
brokers’ refrain from trading in these small stocks when liquidity is unavailable, and 
only choose to trade when spreads are tighter and depth is greater. The results may 
therefore be a partial reflection of this selection bias.  
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Table 7.4: Execution Costs, Controlling for Changes in Trade Size 
 
This table reports the effect of anonymity on transaction costs, controlling for the 
value of the trades. A simple ordinary least squares regression, including the dollar 
value of trades and a dummy variable for the anonymous regime as independent 
variables, is estimated. To prevent an unnecessarily large number of statistics, 
purchases and sales are combined. The open to trade returns of sales and the trade to 
close returns of purchases are multiplied by minus one. With the exception of these 
adjustments, ‘total costs’ correspond directly to open to trade returns, while ‘price 
reversals’ correspond with trade to close returns. Panel A reports the regression results 
for ‘top brokers’, while those for ‘other brokers’ are reported in Panel B. 
 
 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Group 
Variables Total Cost Price Reversal 
Estimate (%) P-Value Estimate (%) P-Value 
    
Panel A: Top Brokers     
Top 100 Intercept 0.0616 0.0000 0.0228 0.0000 
Size 0.0112 0.0000 -0.0449 0.0000 
Post -0.0245 0.0000 0.0121 0.0000 
    
101-200 Intercept 0.1430 0.0000 0.0485 0.0000 
Size 0.2565 0.0000 -0.2415 0.0000 
Post -0.0479 0.0000 0.0282 0.0000 
    
201-500 Intercept 0.3330 0.0000 0.0661 0.0000 
Size 0.6100 0.0000 -0.5601 0.0000 
Post -0.0660 0.0000 0.0173 0.0000 
    
501+ Intercept 1.211 0.0000 0.1070 0.0000 
Size -1.728 0.0054 -3.094 0.0000 
  Post -0.0050 0.7850 -0.0232 0.0733 
Panel B: Other Brokers 
Top 100 Intercept 0.0297 0.0000 0.0475 0.0000 
Size 0.0211 0.0000 -0.1246 0.0000 
Post -0.0088 0.0000 -0.0023 0.0000 
    
101-200 Intercept 0.1270 0.0000 0.0765 0.0000 
Size 0.2183 0.0000 -0.5796 0.0000 
Post -0.0067 0.0002 -0.0004 0.7268 
    
201-500 Intercept 0.4770 0.0000 0.1300 0.0000 
Size 0.3651 0.0000 -1.611 0.0000 
Post -0.0995 0.0000 -0.0295 0.0000 
    
501+ Intercept 1.346 0.0000 0.2730 0.0000 
Size 2.463 0.0000 -6.287 0.0000 
  Post -0.0336 0.0002 -0.0400 0.0000 
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Overall, the above results suggests that the ‘total costs’ of trading reduce when 
markets move to an anonymous regime. This is consistent with previous literature, 
and results reported in the previous sections. However, the extent to which cost 
reductions are economically significant for the smallest of stocks is debatable. For 
example, ‘total costs’ for ‘other brokers’ in the 501+ stock group is reduced by 
0.0336%, while base costs (the intercept) are 1.346%, representing a fall of 2.4947% 
(using the intercept as the base). For the top 100 stocks on the other hand, ‘total costs’ 
are reduced by 29.69% for ‘other brokers’. A similar story exists for the ‘top brokers’, 
where ‘total costs’ are reduced by 39.76% in the largest stocks, but increase by 
0.4143% in the smallest stocks (albeit a statistically insignificant change).  
 
Foucault, Moinas and Theissen (2007) argue that anonymity reduces transaction costs, 
but only when the participation rates of informed traders are low. When applied to a 
stock with a high participation rate, they predict higher transaction costs in the form of 
bid-ask spreads. Smaller and less liquid stocks have more information held by 
corporate insiders, and are therefore more likely to experience informed trading, 
However, as the empirical section of their study only include stocks in the CAC40, 
representing the most liquid stocks on the Paris Bourse, little can be concluded 
regarding the effects of anonymity on small and illiquid stocks. While the results 
presented here do not show a rise in the ‘total costs’ of trading small stocks, they do 
suggest that the benefits of anonymity are much lower in these securities. To that 
extent, these results are consistent with the predictions of Foucault, Moinas and 
Theissen (2007).  
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The results also show larger price reversals in the anonymous regime for ‘top 
brokers’, while ‘other brokers’ have smaller reversals. The post dummy coefficients 
for the ‘top brokers’ in the top 100, 101-200, 201-500, and 501+ stocks are 
respectively 0.0121%, 0.0282%, 0.0173%, and -0.0232%, all of which are significant 
at the 1% level, with the exception of the 501+ stock group. For ‘other brokers’, the 
coefficients are -0.0023%, -0.0004%, -0.0295%, and -0.0400%, respectively, and are 
all significant with the exception of the 101-200 stock group.  
 
Results presented above display a large disparity between the effects of the broker ID 
black-out on broker groups who are heterogeneously informed. These results show 
(after controlling for trade size) that the magnitude of price reversals generally 
increases for ‘top brokers’ and decreases for ‘other brokers’. This is consistent with 
the results from Section 7.4 (and Hypothesis 7.2), and the notion that anonymity 
benefits informed traders at the expense of uninformed traders. Markets in an 
anonymous regime have a greater difficulty in differentiating between the trades of 
the two broker groups. ‘Top brokers’ are more likely to be classified (or perhaps 
misclassified) as uninformed, while the trades of ‘other brokers’ are more likely to be 
treated as informed. 
 
7.6 Contribution to Price Discovery 
 
O’Hara (2003) argues that markets provide two things: liquidity and price discovery. 
Price discovery, or the process in which prices are formed in markets, is the centre of 
much attention in economics and related fields. In numerous market microstructure 
models, price discovery occurs through a process where the uninformed traders 
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gradually learn about the true price of an asset by trading with the informed (e.g. 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987, 1992). This 
learning process is examined by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) for the pre-opening 
period on the Paris Bourse. They find that as time approaches the opening, the 
information content and efficiency of prices increase.  
 
A large number of studies examine the relative contribution to price discovery from 
different markets that trade identical or linked assets (e.g. Hasbrouck, 1995; and 
Harris, McInish, Shoesmith and Wood, 1995, for NYSE versus US regional 
exchanges; Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley, 1996; and Tse, 1999, for derivatives versus 
equity markets; Eun and Sabherwal, 2003, for Canadian stocks cross-listed in the US; 
and Barkham and Geltner, 1995, for securitised versus unsecuritised real estate 
markets). The literature examines the level of contribution to price discovery made by 
medium versus other-sized trades (Barclay and Warner, 1993), and the level of 
contribution made by institutional versus retail traders (Chakravarty, 2001). 
 
If financial intermediaries have heterogeneity in the level of information they hold, 
then informed intermediaries are expected to contribute a larger proportion to price 
discovery. This price discovery dynamic may be affected by changes to the market 
microstructure, especially when these changes allow informed brokers to mask their 
identity. In transparent markets, one would expect broker identifiers to act as a signal 
to information. Abnormal order flow patterns from an informed broker will likely 
attract the attention of other traders, at which point they may decide to mimic the 
strategies of the informed broker. This moves prices, reducing the ability of the 
informed broker to acquire their desired position.  
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Therefore in the presence of broker IDs, one way in which less informed brokers 
contribute to price discovery is by mimicking the trades of more informed brokers. In 
the absence of broker IDs, prices will not adjust as quickly and consistently to the 
trades of the informed broker, as markets rely solely on information available in the 
order flow, reducing the less informed brokers’ contribution to price discovery. One 
would therefore expect more informed brokers to make a larger contribution to price 
discovery in the anonymous regime. 
 
This section extends the literature by examining the relative contribution to price 
discovery made by more informed and less informed brokers, and the clients whom 
they represent. This section also examines how this price discovery dynamic is 
affected by the ASX broker ID removal. A measure similar to the Weighted Price 
Contribution (WPC) metric used in Barclay and Warner (1993) is adopted. The WPC 
measure is defined as follows: 
 
ܲܥ௦௕ ൌ
∑ |∆௉ೞ೔
್|
∑ |∆௉ೞ೔|
         (7.7) 
 
Where the price contribution of broker group b in stock s is the ratio of (i) the sum of 
price changes caused by broker group b and (ii) the sum of price changes caused by 
all brokers. For each stock, the proportion of price innovations caused by the ‘top 
brokers’ is calculated. This is then averaged across stocks to obtain the average 
contribution to price discovery across stocks. Stocks are grouped based on their 
market capitalisation on 28 November, 2005. Stocks which were not listed for the 
entirety of the two year sample period are removed from the analysis. In cases where 
one broker group made zero contribution to price discovery in either the pre- or post-
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anonymity periods, that stock is also removed.  This section also calculates per stock 
changes in the WPC. To measure the extent in which changes to the WPC are 
significant, a t-test is computed on the series of mean WPC changes, and a sign rank 
test for the medians.  
 
Table 7.5 reports the average contribution to price innovation by ‘top brokers’ and 
‘other brokers’, in the pre/post-anonymity regimes, grouped by market capitalisation. 
The results show that ‘top brokers’ contribute significantly to price discovery, 
especially in the larger stocks. In the top 100 and 101-200 stock groups, the ‘top 
brokers’ contribution to price discovery exceeds 50% and 40%, respectively. This 
contribution is lower for the 201-500 and 501+ stock groups, exceeding 25% and 15% 
respectively. Therefore the top ten full-service brokers appear to have an information 
advantage in the larger and more liquid stocks. In the small to micro caps (201-500) 
and unindexed stocks, this advantage, if any, is much lower. To the extent that large 
institutional traders are more likely to use reputable full-service brokers, these results 
are consistent with Chakravarty (2001), who find that institutions move prices more 
often than retail investors.  
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 7.3, results also show that the top brokers contribute more 
towards price discovery in the anonymous regime (with higher mean and median 
WPC in the post period), but only for the top 500 stocks (roughly corresponding to 
stocks in the All Ordinaries Index). Mean (median) WPC increases are 1.6944% 
(2.0258%), 3.4351% (3.3021%), and 2.4726% (2.6194%) for the top 100, 101-200, 
and 201-500 stocks, respectively. For stocks outside of the top 500, large research 
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brokers actually contribute less to price discovery, with mean (median) WPC 
decreasing by 1.2437% (0.5950%).  
 
Table 7.5: Contribution of Top Brokers to Price Discovery 
 
This table reports the contribution of ‘top brokers’ to price discovery in the two 
transparency regimes, using the Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) metric first seen 
in Barclay and Warner (1993). The WPC metric (for each stock) is defined as the total 
absolute price movements caused by the trades of ‘top brokers’, divided by the total 
absolute price movements for the entire stock. This table reports the mean 
contribution of ‘top brokers’ to price discovery (per stock) in the pre/post periods, 
with the associated mean/median changes, and are grouped by market capitalisation. 
To examine the significance of mean changes on a stock by stock basis, paired student 
t-tests are conducted. Medians are tested using signed rank tests.  
 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Group 
Mean Pre 
(%) 
Mean 
Post (%) 
Mean 
Change 
(%) 
P-Value 
Med. 
Change 
(%) 
P-Value 
Top 100 53.14 54.84 1.694 0.0004 2.026 0.0003 
101-200 43.14 46.57 3.435 0.0000 3.302 0.0000 
201-500 26.69 29.16 2.473 0.0000 2.619 0.0000 
501+ 17.21 15.97 -1.244 0.0105 -0.5950 0.0209 
 
 
In general, these results are consistent with the notion that the informed gain with 
anonymity. Some caution is advised when interpreting these results based on the 
broker groupings. While the likelihood for ‘top brokers’ to be informed is higher than 
for ‘other brokers’, this does not necessarily mean that ‘top brokers’ are always more 
informed. The level of a broker’s informativeness is partially related to their research 
activities. Therefore, if a broker has no coverage in a particular stock, the likelihood 
of their being informed in that stock will be much lower.21 With that in mind, the 
results do not show that the informed contribute less to price discovery in the 501+ 
stock group, and they should not be interpreted as a deviation from economic 
                                                 
21 Indeed, some of the ‘top brokers’ do not even have a small/micro caps equity analysis team during 
the sample period, and focus solely on the top 100 stocks. 
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common sense. What these results do show is that an information advantage exists for 
‘top brokers’ in the larger stocks, and the removal of broker IDs appears to magnify 
these advantages. Likewise, the broker ID blackout has increased the competitive 
disadvantage for ‘top brokers’ in the smallest of unindexed stocks, where coverage is 
extremely sparse, if not non-existent. 
 
7.7 The Effect of Anonymity on Brokerage Market Share 
 
Market share is likely to be of high importance to brokers as it represents the pool 
from which they draw revenue. The literature shows that information provided by 
equity analysts has a significant impact on volume generated through the affiliated 
brokerage firm. In stocks for which brokerage firms provide analyst coverage, Irvine 
(2001) shows that order flow is higher than for uncovered stocks. Irvine (2004) finds 
that earnings forecasts and recommendations cause significantly higher volume for 
the brokerage firms that release them. In transparent markets, traders that do not have 
access to analyst research reports can mimic (to a certain extent) the strategies of full-
service brokers by observing their order flow. In anonymous markets, however, this 
ability is impaired, as traders can no longer identify the brokerage houses historically 
associated with valuable research reports. The value placed on equity research reports 
is therefore likely to be higher in anonymous markets. This may lead to an increase in 
the order flow of the reputable full-service brokers.  
 
This section hypothesises that brokers who are more likely to be informed will be the 
beneficiary of these market share increases (Hypothesis 7.3). This hypothesis is 
consistent with the study conducted on corporate bond markets by Bessembinder, 
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Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006), who find a reduction in the market share of large 
dealers when switching to a more transparent reporting regime. To measure market 
share, the total dollar turnover and number of trades executed through ‘top brokers’ 
versus ‘other brokers’ are calculated.  
 
Table 7.6 shows that the ‘top brokers’ market share in turnover increases across all 
stock groups, with the exception of the 501+ group. Changes in the turnover market 
share for the top 100, 101-200, 201-500, and 501+ groups are 0.4265%, 4.0284%, 
4.5838%, and -0.0395%, respectively. For the number of trades, market share for the 
‘top brokers’ increases across all stock groups, with changes of 3.7736%, 6.7702%, 
7.4574%, and 0.1735%, respectively. While these results represent the actual changes 
to market share in turnover and number of trades, their level of significance is difficult 
to determine, as they lack the necessary degrees of freedom to conduct reasonable 
statistical tests. For the purpose of statistical testing, changes in market share are 
calculated for each stock separately.  From these calculations, the mean and median 
per stock change in ‘top broker’ market share is then determined. For the purpose of 
statistical testing, a t-test is conducted for the mean, and a sign rank test for the 
medians. 
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Table 7.6: Market Share in Turnover and Number of Trades 
 
This table reports the market share of ‘top brokers’ in trade turnover and number of 
trades, grouped by the market capitalisation of stocks. Statistics are calculated 
separately for the two transparency regimes, with the difference in the pre/post market 
share representing the change. As the ‘change’ is a simple difference between two 
numbers, no statistical tests are provided. All numbers reported are in percentages. 
 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Group 
Top Brokers Turnover  
Market Share (%) 
Top Brokers No. Trades  
Market Share (%) 
Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
All 54.45 55.21 0.7570 46.13 50.72 4.590 
Top 100 57.35 57.78 0.4265 53.59 57.36 3.774 
101-200 47.09 51.12 4.028 47.71 54.48 6.770 
201-500 29.46 34.04 4.584 30.41 37.86 7.457 
501+ 14.04 14.00 -0.0395 12.17 12.35 0.1735 
 
 
Table 7.7, Panel A displays the results for market share in turnover, and results based 
on the number of trades are in Panel B. The direction of market share changes in 
Table 7.7 is generally consistent with those presented in Table 7.6. For turnover 
(Panel A), mean (median) changes in market share for the ‘top brokers’ in the top 100, 
101-200, 201-500, and 501+ groups are 2.0468% (2.0839%), 3.8287% (2.9406%), 
2.6499% (2.7417%), and -0.7312% (-0.7313%). For the number of trades (Panel B), 
mean (median) changes in market share for the same groups are 4.5228% (4.0201%), 
6.0871% (5.6220%), 2.9553% (3.1272%), and -0.4283% (-0.5888%). The above 
results are significant at the 1% level of significance for t-tests and signed rank tests, 
with the exception of t-test for mean change in turnover market share in the 501+ 
stock group (significant at the 2% level), and both tests for changes in the number of 
trades in the same group (significant at the 10% level). 
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Table 7.7: Market Share, Per Stock Average 
 
This table reports the market share of ‘top brokers’ in trade turnover (Panel A) and 
number of trades (Panel B), grouped by the market capitalisation of stocks. Statistics 
are calculated on a per stock basis, separately for the two transparency regimes, with 
the difference in the pre/post market share representing the change. To measure the 
significance of changes in means, t-tests are conducted, while signed rank tests are 
conducted to test the medians.  
 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Group 
Pre 
Market 
Share (%) 
Post 
Market 
Share (%) 
Mean 
Change 
(%) 
P-Value 
Med. 
Change 
(%) 
P-Value 
Panel A: Average market share per stock in turnover 
All 23.79 24.20 0.4126 0.0855 0.4118 0.0619 
Top 100 55.47 57.51 2.047 0.0000 2.084 0.0000 
101-200 45.36 49.19 3.829 0.0000 2.941 0.0000 
201-500 28.46 31.11 2.650 0.0000 2.742 0.0000 
501+ 17.26 16.53 -0.7312 0.0178 -0.7313 0.0009 
Panel B: Average market share per stock in no. of trades 
All 22.50 23.49 0.9856 0.0000 0.9490 0.0000 
Top 100 53.05 57.58 4.523 0.0000 4.020 0.0000 
101-200 46.07 52.16 6.087 0.0000 5.622 0.0000 
201-500 28.05 31.00 2.955 0.0000 3.127 0.0000 
501+ 15.63 15.21 -0.4283 0.0693 -0.5888 0.0572 
 
 
These results are therefore consistent with the notion that anonymity affects the value 
of equity research, and consequently the market share of the large and reputable full-
service brokers. Consistent with Hypothesis 7.3, market share for the ‘top brokers’ 
increases significantly across all stock groups in both turnover and the number of 
trades made, with the exception of the 501+ group. Their market share in the smallest 
of stocks actually decreases, albeit at a lower level of statistical significance. This is 
possibly related to the lack of equity research conducted on unindexed stocks.  
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The literature presents two possible sources of remuneration for equity analysts 
covering a stock: from additional brokerage generated through increased trading, and 
from potential investment banking income arising from any relationships created with 
management. These potential sources of income are likely to be small for the stocks 
outside of the All Ordinaries, making analyst coverage in them unlikely. Furthermore, 
market share for the ‘top brokers’ in these stocks is small to begin with (i.e. around 
15%). The ‘top brokers’ are therefore less likely to be informed in these small stocks, 
which explains why anonymity has not improved their market share. This is consistent 
with the results obtained from the price discovery analysis (from Table 7.5), where the 
‘top brokers’ are found to contribute less to price discovery in the 501+ stock group.  
 
7.8 Summary 
 
Using a unique dataset from the ASX with broker identifiers, this chapter aims at 
disentangling from a pool of averages the effect of anonymity on heterogeneously 
informed brokers. While recent empirical literature in anonymity focuses 
predominantly on market-wide effects, this study takes one step further and examines 
the winners and losers after anonymity is introduced. Consistent with the empirical 
literature, the results show that market-wide average execution costs decrease. 
However, these benefits appear to be skewed towards the large and reputable full-
service brokers, who are more likely to be informed. The purchases of these full-
service brokers have greater price reversals post-anonymity, a result not seen 
consistently for other brokers.  
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This lends support to the notion that anonymity reduces the market’s ability to infer 
information from the identity of brokers, reducing the impact of information-
motivated trades to subsequent prices. However, the trades of the less informed 
brokers face a case of ‘mistaken identity’, and lose their ability to reduce price impact 
by signalling to the market. This is consistent with the theoretical work by Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1991), who propose lower transaction costs for uninformed traders, but 
only when these traders are able to signal.  
 
Consistent with the above findings, this study shows, using Barclay and Warner’s 
(1993) Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) metric, that large and reputable full-
service brokers contribute more to price discovery in the anonymous regime. This is 
not surprising, as anonymity reduces the ability of less informed brokers to mimic the 
trading strategies of the informed. This chapter also finds evidence that brokerage 
market share for the ‘top brokers’ increases in the anonymous regime. This is 
consistent with the findings of Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006), 
who find reduced market share for the largest dealers when corporate bond markets 
move to a more transparent regime.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
In a market free from imperfections, such as those described by Leon Walrus, it is 
unclear what role market intermediaries play, if any. However, equity markets suffer 
from two imperfections: imperfect liquidity and imperfectly symmetric information. 
Given these imperfections, market intermediaries serve two roles: to reduce execution 
and liquidity costs when markets are not perfectly liquid, and to reduce information 
asymmetry costs through information production and dissemination, and through the 
identification of trades that are more likely to be informed. Therefore, demand for the 
services of market intermediaries exists in equilibrium, enhancing overall welfare.  
 
While both roles are important in reducing market imperfections (and are therefore 
discussed), this dissertation focuses predominantly on the relationship between market 
intermediaries and information asymmetry. By differentiating the identities of 
different market intermediaries using unique datasets, this dissertation re-examines 
the issues surrounding market intermediaries and information asymmetry, but with 
greater detail than what was previously possible. Specifically, this dissertation 
examines three areas of the literature that require additional clarification: 
 
1) The role of brokers in upstairs markets, 
2) The relationship between equity analysts and information asymmetry, and 
3) The effect of market structures on heterogeneously informed market 
intermediaries. 
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Chapter 5 investigates the role of brokers in the upstairs market. The literature argues 
that upstairs facilities are valuable to traders because they offer taps into unexpressed 
liquidity (Grossman, 1992), and for their ability to filter out informed traders (Seppi, 
1990).  The ASX provides a unique setting to test the predictions of Seppi (1990), 
where upstairs brokers differentiate between informed and uninformed traders, as no 
‘fairness’ rules exist on the pricing of ASX upstairs trades. When brokers have the 
freedom to trade at any negotiated price, they will be more willing to trade with the 
informed provided they are sufficiently compensated for the risk they take on. This is 
in direct contrast to other studies, which only sample upstairs trades that occur close 
to the best spread. 
 
Results suggest that upstairs markets are more widely used when liquidity in the 
downstairs market is low, or when trading costs are high. Results also suggest that 
upstairs markets are especially useful for complex trades, i.e., trades of larger size and 
trades in smaller stocks, which are often difficult to arrange cheaply in the downstairs 
limit order book. Findings in Chapter 5 are therefore generally consistent with 
Grossman (1992) and the widely held belief that upstairs markets allow for the 
execution of trades that would not otherwise have occurred.  
 
Results on the absence of ‘fairness’ rules indicate that a large number of upstairs 
trades occur outside of the best downstairs spread, in contrast to the findings of 
Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004). When prices are moving quickly, upstairs 
trades receive poorer execution costs (in comparison to flat markets), as they are more 
likely to carry information. To the extent that upstairs brokers differentiate between 
informed and uninformed traders, these results are consistent with Seppi (1990). 
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Findings from Chapter 5 contrast with those of Fong, Madhavan and Swan (2004), 
who find no evidence of broker filtering. In addition, these results provide evidence 
that upstairs brokers may use other information in addition to trader reputation (e.g. 
market conditions) to determine the information content of trades. This is consistent 
with Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004), who report market conditions as a 
strong determinant of execution costs for institutional traders in the downstairs 
market. 
 
Chapter 6 investigates the complex relationship between equity analysts and 
information asymmetry by examining the level of investor access to analyst reports. 
The literature suggests that analysts help to reduce information asymmetry by 
bringing privately held information in the hands of management to the market, and 
through their superior ability in disseminating and analysing publicly available 
information. Merton (1987) separates information asymmetry into two dimensions: 
information asymmetry between investors and the management (depth), and 
information asymmetry between shareholders (breadth). While both are presumably 
important dimensions of information asymmetry, the literature focuses predominantly 
on the relationship between analysts and the depth dimension of information 
asymmetry (e.g. Rogers and Grant, 1997; Frankel and Li; 2004).  
 
Results from Chapter 6 are consistent with the presence of leakages in analyst 
recommendations. Furthermore, clients of larger and more reputable broker-analysts 
appear to use more analyst reports. While analysts may excel at bringing privately 
held information to the market, its distribution is unlikely to be equal. Thus, there is a 
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likely trade-off in the information asymmetry between investors and the management 
(depth), and information asymmetry between shareholders (breadth). 
 
However, Chapter 6 refrains from making the dangerous conclusion that these 
leakages are necessarily bad for the market. As Irvine, Lipson and Puckett (2007) and 
Gomes, Gorton and Madureira (2007) suggest, removing leakages altogether would 
seriously affect the analysts’ incentives to acquire information. Therefore, in the case 
of equity analysis, there exists a trade-off between the level of information asymmetry 
between shareholders and the management, and the asymmetry between shareholders.  
 
Chapter 7 re-examines the effect of anonymity using a unique dataset from the ASX 
with broker identifiers. The recent literature suggests that anonymity increases 
liquidity (e.g. Foucault, Moinas and Theissen, 2007; Comerton-Forde, Frino and 
Mollica, 2005; Comerton-Forde and Tang, 2008; and Frino, Gerace and Lepone, 
2008). However, these studies are conducted on a market-wide basis, despite brokers 
being the natural unit of analysis. Using a unique dataset, Chapter 7 aims at 
disentangling from a pool of averages the effect of anonymity on heterogeneously 
informed brokers.  
 
While the results suggest that market execution costs decrease on average (which is 
consistent with prior literature), the benefit of anonymity is skewed towards the large 
and reputable full-service brokers, who are more likely to be informed. Findings in 
Chapter 7 indicate that anonymity reduces the market’s ability to infer information 
from trades. This results in larger price reversals for the trades of large full-service 
brokers. However, the trades of the less informed brokers face a case of ‘mistaken 
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identity’, and lose their ability to reduce price impact by signalling their identity to the 
market (e.g. through mechanisms similar to those described by Seppi, 1990; or 
Admati and Pfleiderer, 1991). Furthermore, results suggest that the market share of 
large full-service brokers increases, with their trades having a greater contribution to 
price discovery. Chapter 7 illustrates the complexity of the relationship between 
anonymity and market quality, a complexity that is difficult to appreciate when 
examining a pool of averages. 
 
Overall, the results presented in this dissertation raise three complexities in the 
relationship between market intermediaries and information asymmetry. Chapter 5 
shows that upstairs brokers filter out informed trades (through market conditions in 
addition to reputation). If some of these informed trades are forced downstairs, this 
may have implications for the quality of downstairs markets. Chapter 6 demonstrates 
that the distribution of equity analyst reports is unlikely to be equal, with certain 
investors having greater access. While equity analysts may reduce information 
asymmetry between the management and shareholders, unequal information 
dissemination may potentially result in a higher level of information asymmetry 
among shareholders. Chapter 7 finds that anonymity improves market quality on 
average, although these benefits are skewed towards brokers who are more likely to 
be informed. 
 
Doubtlessly, these complexities warrant greater investigation. To further explore these 
areas in the future, this dissertation proposes two additional avenues of research. First, 
to examine the effects of upstairs markets ‘cream-skimming’ downstairs markets, an 
investigation could be conducted on an exogenous increase in the level of upstairs 
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activity. The simplest foreseeable method for this investigation is the identification of 
changes in upstairs thresholds. For example, a higher (lower) threshold will 
exogenously increase (decrease) the number of upstairs trades. Second, theory is 
currently lacking on the trade-off between the depth and breadth dimensions of 
information asymmetry. It would be valuable to investigate the costs and benefits of 
equity analysts in the context of this potential trade-off in information asymmetry.   
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